254. Memorandum of Conversation0
SUBJECT
- Germany and East-West Negotiations (Part 2 of 2 Parts)1
PARTICIPANTS
- Germany
- The Chancellor
- Hermann Kusterer, Interpreter
- United States
- The President
- McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President
- Arnold Lissance, Interpreter
Returning to the subject of East-West relations, the President told the Chancellor he was under no illusions as to what might be accomplished with the Soviets. Nevertheless, if imaginations were put to work, somehow and some way ideas might emerge which promised hope.
The Chancellor assured the President that the Federal Government was not opposed to a relaxation of tensions. Germany could not afford to take such a position. It was incumbent upon everyone, and especially for the Germans, to see what could be done to make war impossible. And the Germans, for their part, would try to make constructive contributions to this end.
The President said he found this encouraging and was indeed pleased with the leadership Chancellor Erhard was giving Germany.
The President emphasized that the West must lead from strength; and that the US was prepared to do its part. This year, the US was thinking in terms of a $50 billion defense budget and the German defense budget of DM 20 billion was an important element in the overall western defense posture.
The Chancellor said the Federal Republic would do all it could to avoid the dangers of war. However, it was impossible for the Federal Government to approach Khrushchev directly. He wondered therefore whether the US might be willing to make the necessary approaches to Khrushchev, making it clear that the US could not renounce the principle of self-determination. The Chancellor suggested Khrushchev might also be told Germany was prepared to make real sacrifices to this end. The Federal Republic was not only ready to extend credits; it was prepared to make other kinds of substantive contributions.
The Chancellor then asked whether the President might be willing to explore with Khrushchev possible solutions to some of the urgent problems in Europe. In this connection, the Chancellor mentioned that six or seven years ago as Minister of Economics he received an invitation to visit the Soviet Union. But this invitation was no longer valid now that he was Chancellor. However, this was no reason for not communicating. In fact, the Chancellor thought the Western powers ought to continue to explore with the Soviets possible points of agreement and attempt to determine whether economics might not buy political solutions.
The President said he had no illusions about Khrushchev. Moreover, he had no intention of meeting with him unless and until such a meeting could produce concrete, positive results. By the same token, he [Page 672] was prepared to go anywhere and talk with anyone if something useful could be accomplished.
The US, the President continued, had a $50 billion defense budget and its combat strength had increased considerably during the past three years. This was an important element in the equation. The US always had to lead from strength and be prepared to defend itself.
The President said one of his principal concerns, however, was that there seemed to be a dearth of new ideas for relieving international tensions. A considerable amount of planning had been done in the State Department and elsewhere. But the end result always seemed to be that we would have to travel along until we slid into war. Perhaps the Chancellor had ideas on how we might make things just a little easier for ourselves by making Soviet aggression less likely. For if there is no relaxation, there could suddenly be a situation where “Khrushchev goes for our jugular.”
The Chancellor thought things were going very rapidly and clearly we had to think in different categories than we did fifteen years ago. Some good might come out of all this movement, but he, the Chancellor, thought it necessary to remain hard-headed. The Soviets seemed to be having real difficulties, and if the West had a better idea of what was going on in the Soviet Union, it might be better prepared to deal with the Kremlin. The Chancellor mentioned that Secretary Rusk had told him that such studies were now under way and that the conclusions would be made available to the Chancellor. This would certainly help in making the necessary political judgments.
The President agreed, but added that as soon as the study was finished and more precise information available, minds and resources had to be applied to see what might be done. It was especially important to do so while Khrushchev was still weak, for it would be a great mistake to wait until the Soviets recovered.
The President said what disturbed him a great deal was that the West seemed to be getting all the wrong headlines. Wheat sales and the test ban agreement were not looked upon as the Western powers’ will for peace. The Soviets seemed to get the major credit for these developments even though Khrushchev did not do more about peace than we have done and are doing. While we must stay strong, we also must remain reasonable. One of the things that troubled him over the past six or seven years was Chancellor Adenauer’s numerous warnings to the President to “be careful” and “not trust Khrushchev.” The fact was that he did not trust Khrushchev. But by the same token he did not think the Western powers could remain insensitive to world opinion and he thought it would be a great mistake if the West refused to consider moves toward peace.
[Page 673]The Chancellor said he talked about this often with Adenauer. But Adenauer always insisted that Khrushchev was isolated in a fortress under siege and therefore the only alternative was to starve him out. Erhard said he never accepted this view. On the contrary, it was his view that it is dangerous to push dictators into a corner. This was bound to produce irrational reactions, and the Germans probably knew more about this than any other people since they lived with unpredictable dictators and watched them react under pressure.
The Chancellor expressed his personal appreciation for this candid exchange of views. He was pleased that there seemed to be a meeting of the minds and his views of the important problems were not unlike those of the President.
The President reiterated that it was absolutely essential that the US remain strong and not allow itself to be weakened. At the same time, its policy had to be one of live and let live. The President was sure Khrushchev knew he did not have to worry that US bombs would be dropped on him. By the same token, Khrushchev had to understand he would not be permitted to subvert this hemisphere. The US wanted no more Cubas. The US was willing to guarantee Moscow’s survival in return for comparable Soviet guarantees for Berlin and New York. Everything was capable of solution if minds were put to work. However, it was not enough to talk peace; something had to be done about it.
In this connection, the President said he again wanted to reaffirm US commitments to Germany. However, Germany does have commitments to the US which it demonstrated by agreeing to a defense budget of DM 20 billion.
The President then reemphasized that areas of agreement had to be found. He hoped to remain in touch with the Chancellor so there would be no lack of understanding on either side, and each would know what the other was doing.
The President then shifted the discussion and said he wanted to make one point absolutely clear since this was a matter of continuous speculation—he had no antipathy for nor was he disappointed by General De Gaulle. He knew the General well. Both he and the General understood the problems between us, and both realized that for the most part they did not lend themselves to simple or easy solutions. However, the President added he was certain that when the chips were down, President De Gaulle would stick by the alliance as he did during the Cuban crisis and on other occasions.
The Chancellor said so many changes were taking place in the world, the German people were in a quandary as to how to react. Would the future course be protectionism and isolation or trade expansion and wider association? In Brussels the Germans put up a strong fight for the [Page 674] Kennedy Round for this is an essential prerequisite to wider world trade. The Chancellor said he would be willing to go to Geneva himself if his presence there would assure this. But the Chancellor also felt the President should know—and he emphasized that he was telling this to him in all frankness—that there was wide speculation that the US intended to loosen its military and political ties with Europe. And if there was to be any success in Geneva, answers had to be given to these unspoken questions to end this harmful kind of speculation.
The President appreciated this comment. He said he wanted to reassure the Chancellor that there need be no doubt about changes in US plans or policies.
(At this point, the President invited Mr. Bundy to join the talks to discuss possible Western approaches to the Soviet Union.)
The President emphasized again that dealings with the Soviets had to be from a position of strength. The Federal Republic had its defense budget of DM 20 billion and the US its budget of $50 billion. The US had a continuing commitment to keep its six divisions in Europe. There was no question in the President’s mind but that the West needed a strong, unified Europe tied to a strong America in an unbreakable alliance. However, talk was not enough. Something had to be done about it. Khrushchev was weakened by his difficulties with his Chinese allies and his economic problems at home. But the West did not seem to be taking advantage of the situation. The President felt strongly that it was important for the Western powers to use their imaginations and ingenuity to get what they could and what they had to have. This was the time for the partnership to see what it could do and take the necessary action.
Turning to Mr. Bundy, the President explained that he had asked the Chancellor for his ideas and thoughts for dealing with the East-West situation. He explained that the Chancellor indicated his willingness to make some concessions to the Soviets, perhaps in the form of large loans. However, the Chancellor did not think the Germans could propose this to the Soviets. They preferred to have the US handle this matter with Moscow. The President thought this proposal ought to be carefully considered.
Mr. Bundy explained that as he saw it the problem was to try to find something that could be offered to the Soviets which the Kremlin wanted and which was worth more to them than to the West, in return for which the Western position in Berlin, where the greatest danger to peace now existed, would be strengthened. The West had to look for the kind of proposal that went to the heart of the problem—that relieved the existing political situation in Germany without bringing about the recognition of East Germany. The Federal Republic was not prepared to consider recognition, and neither was the US. Nevertheless, the West had to make clear to the Soviets it was prepared to work toward a settlement. [Page 675] Therefore the US looked to the Chancellor for suggestions for improving the lot of the Germans living in East Germany; strengthening the Western position in Berlin; and in the last analysis providing a clear quid pro quo for the Soviets.
The Chancellor admitted that under Adenauer it was difficult to get such talks started. The German Government agrees that pressures must be put on Khrushchev, but the question is how and where. A better assessment of the Soviet situation would be most helpful. Khrushchev is having problems. He is clearly under pressure on several fronts. He therefore is probably approachable. In this kind of situation, credits could be attractive, and Khrushchev might be interested in such a proposition. Long-term credits from the West, however, depended on a real relaxation of tensions. However, if such a dialogue were undertaken, the US would have to insist upon Soviet acceptance of the principle of self-determination. There would also have to be a phased and synchronized time table to insure the right of the German people to decide their future. Germany was willing to pay the price. It was prepared to offer credits and other kinds of assistance, including help for Soviet industry in Eastern Siberia. But in addition to economic assistance, there had to be a phased program for increasing freedom in East Germany and East Berlin, and leading to free elections. The Chancellor said he realized this was a radical plan. Sometimes, however, such plans were easier to achieve than the conventional ones.
The Chancellor admitted he had no illusions about the ease of getting such a program under way. However, he was sure he could appeal to the German people for the necessary sacrifices. These sacrifices would not only be good for the Germans; they would demonstrate to the world that the Germans’ principal interest was reunification and not revanchism. In this connection, the Chancellor said he wanted to add a word of caution—that under no circumstances could such a program be considered reparations. Economic sacrifices of this order had to buy freedom for the German people.
Mr. Bundy said he wanted to reiterate a point made earlier. The President appreciated the difficulty of the German problem. However, there were people in the US who were putting pressure on the President for an early solution. Their argument is that the difficulties being discussed are not really decisive or real; and that in fact there are a number of options open to us. Moreover, they feel Khrushchev needs time and an easing situation if he is to make any counter concessions. At the present time, this kind of development seemed blocked by the Federal Republic’s rigid attitude toward East Germany. Ulbricht, these people argue, remains in control because the Soviets have no alternative and West Germany’s rigidity on contacts with the Soviet Zone will not facilitate self-determination. They go on to say Khrushchev cannot be bought [Page 676] off. The only way to move toward a German solution is for the Federal Republic’s relations to East Germany to develop as they did with Poland, Rumania and Czechoslovakia. Therefore, they conclude the answer to the present impasse is to seek an interim agreement preserving the freedom of Berlin; defuse the access question; and take a more flexible position on the question of relations with East Germany. “That is what people are telling us, Mr. Chancellor. And my question to you, sir, is what shall we answer?”
The Chancellor said he was convinced that any recognition of the Soviet Zone, even only superficial, would mean the final and irrevocable split of Germany. There should be no illusions about this. The two parts of Germany were quite different socially and economically. It was impossible to reconcile them. The Federal Republic was free, democratic and capitalistic. The Soviet Zone was undemocratic, unfree, and communistic. There is no middle ground. If the Communists are permitted a breakthrough, the split will be final. The Chancellor vehemently denied that the West Germans were out of touch with the East Germans. The Federal Republic, for example, is trading with the Soviet Zone; West German credits were offered to improve the lot of the East Germans. There are communications between the two parts of Germany. There were even the Christmas passes. But the fact remains that it was the East Germans who built the wall. East Germans can come to the Federal Republic any time and without passes; West Berliners need passes to enter East Berlin. The West Germans and the West Berliners want to see German life normalized and therefore certain agreements are possible. The Chancellor said he understood the Ambassadorial Group was now looking at possible new initiatives, but it was too early to predict the results. He went on to say that he understood the pressures the President was under to provide answers on how to proceed. But the German Government was not viewing the problem from a narrow point of view. It was taking into consideration not only German needs but also the needs of Germany’s friends and allies. Nevertheless, the Chancellor promised to give this matter further thought, but warned against an easy solution, given the history of this complicated problem.
The President said he appreciated this. Nevertheless, he was concerned that inaction could produce disaster. Much therefore depended upon the ideas the West could produce and particularly on what the Germans might come up with.
Concluding, the Chancellor pointed out that the Soviets were signatories to the Potsdam Agreement which committed them to a peace treaty following all-German elections. If such elections were permitted, West Germans were fully prepared to accept comprehensive international controls. One would assume, however, that the Soviet Zone would also submit to such controls. In addition, the Chancellor said, [Page 677] there would have to be free movement of all Germans to permit full campaigning on both sides. The Germans were ready to decide their own destiny, and once that was out of the way, the boundary problems could be resolved. (The Chancellor asked the President to keep this information absolutely confidential.) Germany could and would live in peace with its Eastern neighbors.