Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XV, Berlin Crisis, 1962–1963

255. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

LBJ Ranch, Texas, December 29, 1963, 11:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Procedure for Consultation on Berlin Problems. Part One of Two¹

PARTICIPANTS

• Germans
  • Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder
  • Ambassador Heinrich Knappstein
  • State Secretary Ludgar Westrick
  • State Secretary Karl Carstens
  • Assistant Secretary Franz Krapf
  • Minister Georg von Lilienfeld
• United States
  • The Secretary
  • Ambassador George C. McGhee
  • Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
  • Assistant Secretary William R. Tyler, EUR
  • Mr. Robert C. Creel, Director, GER

After the President and the Chancellor had gone into private session,² the Secretary suggested that a small group convene to continue yesterday’s discussion of certain Berlin and all-German problems.

He said he first wanted to say a word about the procedures for consultation on problems in Berlin. He was himself inclined to use procedures now in force, involving the Four-Power Group in Bonn, the Ambassadorial Group in Washington, and existing arrangements for Bonn to keep in close touch with the Commandants and Senat in Berlin.

Carstens said the problem arose from the fact that as concerned contacts between the Commandants and the Senat it was difficult under present procedures for the FRG to be fully in the picture. It was absolutely essential for the FRG to be fully informed at all times. He therefore wished to suggest that the focal point for consultations be in Bonn where there were the three Ambassadors, the FRG and a representative of the Senat. (Note: Klaus Schuetz, Senator for Federal Affairs.) This would insure that the FRG knew what everyone was saying at one time—there had been much difficulty in the past with knowing what had been said here and what had been said there. The FRG was always getting different stories. It was essential that there be one place where the Three Powers, the FRG and the Senat could all sit around one table.

The Secretary said we must be very careful not to diminish in any way the authority of the Commandants in Berlin. Ambassador McGhee stressed the importance of the three Commandants in Berlin meeting frequently as a group. Mr. Tyler pointed out that while there were many types of problems regarding Berlin which might arise, there were some which fell strictly within the competence of the Commandants—particularly those matters affecting the security of Berlin. He thought Carstens’ suggestion might create problems in this respect.

Carstens said that his proposed procedure would be limited to those particular contacts and discussions which were already under way in Berlin. As concerned this matter, it was absolutely necessary for the FRG to know who was saying what, and to arrive quickly at the stage where we were all sure we were in full agreement. This could be done only if all those concerned were assembled in one place. He pointed out again that the Berlin Senat had a permanent representative in Bonn and also mentioned the divergent trends in Berlin.

The Secretary observed that if we had this procedure for 5-party consultation differing from existing procedures, there was the possibility we could have five vetoes. This was undesirable. It was essential that the three Commandants in Berlin remain in a position to give instructions to the Berlin Senat.

Ambassador McGhee pointed out that there were even certain aspects of the present problem of passes which were within the sole competence of the Commandants insofar as they might affect the security of Berlin (as, for example, the location of pass offices).

Carstens said his immediate concern was how we should coordinate the matter of the answer to be given to the next initiative from the East. There were indications that such an initiative was already under way. There would be strong pressures to continue the measures which had been started, but we should not let the other side exploit any differences among us. He agreed that we should do nothing to prevent the Commandants from continuing to carry out their existing responsibilities, but he did not feel that what he was proposing would have any such effect.

The Secretary said he was still not clear why the existing machinery was not satisfactory. Mr. Tyler commented that we had always looked to the FRG and the Senat to coordinate between themselves the German position on Berlin matters. Why wasn’t the present arrangement adequate for this?

Mr. Bundy observed that, as he understood Carstens’ point, the FRG was afraid it would get “whip-sawed” by hearing two different things from two different sources. Carstens said this was right; they had already gone through this several times. He stressed again that what he was proposing would not in any way affect the rights and responsibilities of the Commandants.

The Secretary inquired whether the Senat had good and secure communications with its representative in Bonn. Carstens said this was the case and added that Schuetz was very close to Brandt personally. He said his suggested procedure should be used only in cases where “all four of us agree there should be a conference of five”. This was the only way to handle the problem rapidly.

The Secretary said we would consider the matter further and take it up with the French and British.

Mr. Bundy said that if Carstens’ suggestion were adopted, we should not let on that this represented any big change. It would be important not to give Moscow the idea there had been any modification in Bonn-Berlin relations. It would also be important not to give the appearance of by-passing the Commandants and making them less visible.

Carstens commented that an alternative procedure might be to bring the FRG into the Senat-Commandant discussions in Berlin. This was not now being done and to do so would in fact represent a real change. But what he was proposing was not in fact a change in existing procedures.

The Secretary concluded the discussions at this point by saying it was agreed that we would look into Carstens’ proposal and maybe give it a try.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 28 Berlin. Secret. Drafted by Creel and approved in S on January 1, 1964.
1. Part 2 is printed as Document 256.
2. See Document 254.