Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XV, Berlin Crisis, 1962–1963

166. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France⁰

Washington, January 9, 1963, 20:19 p.m.

3335. Paris also for USRO, Stoessel, McGuire. Thompson yesterday chaired Ambassadorial Group meeting called to initiate work resulting from Quadripartite Foreign Ministers meeting Paris Dec 12 on Berlin contingency planning and Western negotiating positions.¹

On contingency planning, Thompson referred to work under way on improvement communication facilities, and specifically four-way conference teletype facility for FonMins, which apparently technically feasible but expensive. However, experts’ report still to be completed.

Group agreed continue discussion in Contingency Coordinating Group on appointment single Berlin Commandant in serious emergency at earlier stage than provided for in present plans such as implementation Free Style/Back Stroke or Jack Pine II.²

Also agreed Military Subgroup wld seek agreement on additional authority for Live Oak as set forth SHLO 9–00013.³ Additional authority to be sought for SACEUR to cut down Trade Wind⁴ assembly time.

Group also agreed on additional study to streamline economic countermeasures plans and procedures.

Thompson prefaced discussion on negotiation with review of Sov intentions on Berlin in light Khrushchev attendance SED Congress. Sov delegation heavily weighted on ideological side which suggests Sovs see Congress concentrating on dispute with ChiComs. Thompson gave personal view that Sovs will not come to complete break at Congress but may take steps leading to this, e.g. anathematizing Albanian party. Thompson thought complete break would be prefaced by purge of pro-Chinese elements in various parties which may have been what happened in Bulgaria recently. Also possible Khrushchev may use Congress to take first steps toward Ulbricht ouster. Given 1958 precedent, it is always possible Sovs may plan new Berlin initiative or steps toward this at Congress.

Thompson also explained that sentence in US/Sov agreement to disagree on Cuba⁵ which speaks of “agreement on other subjects” included at Sov insistence. We believe Khrushchev needed this at minimum to justify his Cuba policy in context Sino-Sov dispute. US does not expect any Sov initiative at present because of recentness of Cuba. Khrushchev at present in disadvantageous position to suggest any concessions to West. In any case, Thompson said we would expect Sov initiative toward any agreement to come not on Berlin but on matter such as disarmament, nuclear testing, etc. Thompson said US considers formal discussions ended on Cuba. In answer to question, said US has no formal basis for demand that Sovs remove ground forces from Cuba and has given no formal commitment on invasion, surveillance flights, etc. Noted that Cuban letter to UN which reserved Cuban right to any weapons provides justification continued aerial surveillance.⁶

On Berlin negotiations Thompson reviewed Secretary’s suggestion that Allies be prepared for three contingencies:

1. A Sov willingness discuss a truly satisfactory solution which would entail an updating of 1959 Western peace plan.

2. An arrangement on de facto situation in Berlin which might include proposals on access, Western forces and all-Berlin solution.

3. Arrangements for managing situation without hot crisis should agreement in first two categories not be possible.

As basis for preparing positions on these contingencies, Thompson suggested five papers might be relevant:

1. Revised Western Peace Plan including 1961 Washington Working Group report.⁷

2. Substantive negotiating paper included in Dec 1961 Paris Working Group report.⁸

3. All-Berlin proposal given Gromyko in Feb 1962.

4. Principles Paper handed Gromyko informally in Mar 1962.

5. Revised International Access Authority proposal.

Thompson noted that not all papers are quadripartitely agreed.

Alphand raised question of US attitude toward Sov initiative on Berlin in light of sentence in Cuba agreement on “other subjects.” Thompson said US had no formal position as yet, but obviously we did not want to take “too negative” position if Sovs really want serious discussion. For the moment, however, we see no such Sov desire. Alphand replied that while French see no threat from Sovs neither do they see any change in Sov positions, thus no new openings for Berlin negotiations are available to West.

Knappstein then read what were obviously Bonn instructions on negotiations. Exploratory talks have been “fruitless” and thus there is no reason go into negotiations. Should Sovs indicate willingness resume exploratory talks, West should insist on precondition that Western troops remain West Berlin. This means remain under present conditions and not for an interim period or under UN flag. If Soviets accept this precondition, West should begin negotiations with maximum rather than minimum proposal but one which should appeal to public and enhance ability to reach modus vivendi. Thompson replied that Sovs unlikely accept this precondition. Also pointed out that US has continually made clear to Sovs in all talks that Western troop presence not negotiable. On maximum negotiating position, Thompson noted Secretary’s belief we might go back to all-Berlin proposals to remind Sovs that East Berlin is also negotiating material. However, problem of advancing a maximum position which is also credible must be faced.

Meeting adjourned with agreement to seek instructions on new ideas, new approaches for discussion after Khrushchev East Berlin visit ended.

For USRO: You may draw on Thompson remarks on negotiations and Cuba for NAC briefing, except for reference to documents which we do not wish NAC members to ask for.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1–963. Secret. Drafted by Holloway, cleared by Hillenbrand and Guthrie, and approved and initialed by Thompson. Also sent to Bonn, London, Moscow, Berlin, and U.S. Element Live Oak.
1. See Document 163.
2. See footnote 3, Document 115.
3. Not found.
4. Trade Wind was a tripartite plan for using a battalion-sized force to attempt to get the Soviet Union to reopen the Autobahn.
5. For text of this January 7 agreement (U.N. doc. S/5227), see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, p. 243.
6. For text of this letter (U.N. doc. S/5228), see ibid., pp. 243–244.
7. Regarding this report, see vol. XIV, Document 149, footnote 1.
8. Regarding this report, see ibid., Document 243, footnote 2.