Office of the Historian

163. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State0

Paris, December 12, 1962, 20 p.m.

Secto 10.Subject: Quadripartite Ministerial Meeting, December 12, 1962.

Following based on uncleared memorandum of conversation:1

After dinner four Foreign Ministers had lengthy private discussion. In larger group, Secretary subsequently summarized conclusions reached noting they had agreed that Ambassadorial Group in Washington should review Berlin contingency plans in order to insure promptest response to Soviet actions. This would include improvement of communications among governments, timing of appointment unified command in Berlin, assembly of Autobahn probe units and timing and application of economic sanctions. Objective would be to reach larger measure of previous agreement among governments. Home commented that with respect economic sanctions emphasis should be on Western response to total blockade of access.

Ministers had also agreed, Secretary continued, to direct Ambassadorial Group to study Western position in three categories:

(a)
Satisfactory solution of German question. This would involve bringing 1959 approach up to date.
(b)
Berlin arrangements based on de facto situation. This would include proposals on access, Western forces and all-Berlin solution.
(c)
If no agreement possible within categories (a) and (b), Western position on possible modus vivendi to manage fact of disagreement with Soviets without hot crisis.

Couve noted that Western powers in 1959 had made all-Berlin proposal based on US draft.2 Secretary said we needed something of this sort to protect against Soviet pressure to talk only of West Berlin.

Secretary emphasized importance of communications between governments in crisis management. Goal should be establishment of possibility of conference type consultation between four governments. This might involve teletype system, classified telephones, etc. Our Cuban experience had shown how communications could fall behind requirements. Both sides had had to resort to public statements, as for example Khrushchev on December 28. Lord Home said he hoped communications could be telegraphic rather than telephonic. Secretary commented that technical means for establishing such communications existed. Governments would have to be willing to consider costs. He noted that fairly good communications now existed between Washington and three capitals as well as Bonn and other capitals, but interlocking systems still required. If crisis occurred today he estimated it would take at least six hours to arrange hook-up for conference type discussion between Ministers. More rapid facilities should exist.

In discussion of handling subject of Berlin at NATO Ministerial Meeting following day, Ministers concluded there was no need for particular emphasis but that something would have to be said about Berlin in communique, since absence would otherwise be noted unfavorably. Schroeder suggested reference to December 1958 formula might be simplest approach.3

Ministers agreed press line that Four had taken advantage of their presence in Paris for NATO Ministerial Meeting, as was customary, to consult on Berlin and related subjects. They had reviewed work of Ambassadorial Group and had given directives for further work of that group.

Rusk
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/12–1262. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Bonn, London, Moscow, and Berlin. According to another copy, this telegram was drafted by Hillenbrand. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2197) Rusk and the other Foreign Ministers were in Paris for the NATO Ministerial Meeting December 13–15.↩
  2. US/MC/5, December 15. (Ibid., CF 2198)↩
  3. For text of this proposal, June 16, 1959, see Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, pp. 665–666.↩
  4. For text of the North Atlantic Council communique, December 15, 1962, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 570–572; for text of the December 16, 1958, Declaration on Berlin, see ibid., 1958, pp. 602–603.↩