Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XV, Berlin Crisis, 1962–1963

164. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Nassau, December 19, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Berlin and Germany

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.
  • The President
  • Secretary McNamara
  • Mr. Ball
  • Ambassador Bruce
  • Mr. Nitze
  • Mr. Tyler
  • Ambassador Thompson
• U.K.
  • Prime Minister Macmillan
  • Lord Home
  • Mr. Thorneycroft
  • Ambassador Ormsby Gore
  • Sir Robert Scott
  • Mr. Bligh
  • Lord Hood

The following are only the highlights of a dinner conversation, as no notes were taken:

Lord Home raised the question of Germany and the Berlin problem and asked if there were anything we ought to be doing. He expressed his own opinion that in view of the attitude of our French and German allies, it did not seem possible for us to take any initiative at the moment—which he thought was a pity. He had hoped that Mr. Khrushchev’s conversation with Ambassador Roberts would have provided a basis for tackling the problem but Mr. Khrushchev had backed away from his own proposal.

Lord Home thought that some provision for some UN presence in Berlin would be useful in any plan for settlement. He indicated that what he had in mind was moving various bits and pieces of UN organizations to West Berlin. He also touched upon the question of what flag Western troops would be under.

Ambassador Thompson expressed the view that although the Soviets had made much of the troop issue, the heart of the matter was their desire for greater recognition of the sovereignty of East Germany and their desire to establish greater stability in that area.

Ambassador Bruce gave a long exposé of his views on the German problem upon which the Prime Minister congratulated him after dinner, describing it as a brilliant presentation. Ambassador Bruce thought any prospects for German reunification were virtually nil. He discussed the possibility of an all-Berlin solution and thought personally that one of the few possibilities of a settlement which might work would be to move the UN headquarters to Berlin. He paid tribute to the role Chancellor Adenauer had played in keeping postwar Germany on the right track.

In reply to a question, Mr. Tyler pointed out that an important factor in the situation was the psychology of the population of West Berlin. He did not think that they would feel secure unless American and other Western troops remained and did not believe they would consider we had upheld our commitment to them if the security of Berlin were turned over to UN forces.

The President said he wondered if we were not making a mistake in always treating the Soviet leaders with consideration and courtesy.

Ambassador Thompson said he thought that our doing so had a definite effect for the good on Soviet policy. He pointed out that the orthodox communist view was that the capitalist—or, as they would call it imperialist world—was out to destroy them. Moreover, they were extremely sensitive and had a deep-seated inferiority complex. It was therefore important to get across to them that we were prepared to negotiate as equals. He cited the fact that Mr. Khrushchev had on a number of occasions, publicly and privately, referred to the fact that President Eisenhower had called him “friend.”

In reply to a question from Lord Home, Ambassador Thompson said he thought that the Soviets would try to seek an agreement with the West in some other area before bringing the Berlin problem to a head. He thought that in view of the current state of Sino-Soviet relations, that Khrushchev must badly want an agreement with the West. He also mentioned the great strain on Soviet resources. He said he thought we should not take any initiative on Berlin at this time but should be preparing the position we would adopt when the Soviets did seriously raise the matter again, as he felt certain they would before many months had passed.

The President said the Soviets had had many opportunities to settle the Berlin problem but had, in the past year, gone even further out on a limb by making an issue of the presence of Western troops.

0. Source: Department of State, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Thompson and approved by the White House on January 28. For further documentation on the talks between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan at Nassau December 18–21, see volume XIII.