Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XV, Berlin Crisis, 1962–1963

153. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, November 14, 1962, 11 a.m.

In addition to the November 14 meetings (see also Document 154), on November 15 the President and the Chancellor discussed European regional questions; a memorandum of this conversation is printed in vol. XIII, Document 52. The Chancellor also met with Secretary Rusk to discuss China, India, NATO, and European regional issues. A memorandum of their conversation is in Department of State, Central Files, 611.62A/11–1562.

SUBJECT

• Conversation between President and Chancellor Adenauer

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• Mrs. Lejins, L/S, Dept. of State
• Chancellor Adenauer
• Mr. Weber, Interpreter

The private talks were held at the request of Chancellor Adenauer while he was walking with the President to his office.

Mr. Adenauer congratulated the President on the success achieved in the Cuban situation and indicated that this was the beginning of a new epoch for the West. He also stated that the President could rest assured that he would always find Germany firmly on his side in situations like this.

The President stated that he was very appreciative of this stand expressed by the Chancellor. He also appreciated the Chancellor’s remarks to Ambassador Dowling when the Cuban affair first got started. It was obvious, of course, that the Cuban situation could have resulted in serious repercussions on Berlin, and everyone was aware of that at the time.

The Chancellor replied that he is well familiar with the world situation and realizes that the President had to make his decision on Cuba not with reference to any one single problem but in the light of the overall world situation. Thus, he could not be concerned only with the German question at the time. The latter is just one of the big problems which Providence has placed on the shoulders of Mr. Kennedy. With reference to today’s reception, Mr. Adenauer recalled his visit to Paris a few months ago and a parade held in his honor on that occasion, showing French tanks and other military equipment. Chancellor Adenauer had stood side by side with President De Gaulle, and he termed the occasion an historical event. Today’s ceremony at the White House, too, he did not consider just a colorful show, but a truly historical event.

The President expressed his appreciation for this sentiment.

Mr. Adenauer then made the request that he be given the opportunity to discuss his ideas on Berlin in only the smallest of circles.

President Kennedy indicated that he would honor this request. He stated that he wished to get the Chancellor’s ideas on what Western procedures should be from this point on with regard to Berlin. He asked for the Chancellor’s comments and what he considered the best timing with regard to arrangements which might give us hope to achieve some kind of a permanent settlement of that problem.

The Chancellor replied that he would like to express himself very cautiously on this point. He himself had no knowledge to what extent the Cuban situation could actually be considered solved. For that reason the decision as to what to do vis-a-vis the Russians, even on possible German initiatives, was up to the President. If the President were of the opinion that all his demands with regard to Cuba had been fulfilled by the Soviets, then he might try to proceed on the question of Berlin. If, however, he did not feel that his demands there had been fully met by the Soviets, then Mr. Adenauer felt it was better to wait.

The President indicated that he had been interested in a statement made to the press by Mr. Adenauer not long ago in which he expressed the opinion that not all missiles had been removed from Cuba. The President stated that no one knew of course with complete certainty whether all missiles had been removed. For all we knew some might have been hidden in caves or other spots on the island. It was our judgment, however, that the missiles had, for the most part, been removed. We had counted thirty-three of them from the air and supporting equipment for forty-eight, in other words two regiments. We had now counted forty-two missiles being taken out. The President did not believe that there was much advantage to the Soviet Union in keeping a few missiles in Cuba. If another missile attempt were to be made in Cuba at a later time, it would be better to take everything out now and start anew some other time. He was pretty sure, however, that the Cuban missile episode was ended. The Soviets knew now that the next time they started something of this sort we would invade Cuba. While we were pretty sure that the missiles had been removed, we had not achieved any agreement as yet on the bombers, which we definitely wanted removed. We were also insisting on inspection. At the same time we felt that our own system of air inspection is much better and surer than having UN observers on the spot for inspection purposes. We felt that we could rely better on our own cameras. The second problem, however, at present really the chief one, was that Khrushchev had grossly lied on the Cuban situation and the President therefore had no confidence in Khrushchev at all. For this reason also he was not interested in the West taking the initiative vis-a-vis the Russians in the Berlin question, but rather favored waiting for their moves.

The Chancellor fully agreed with this opinion. He felt that it was not very important whether any remnants of equipment had been left in Cuba to salve Castro’s feelings. He also considered that the chief thing was that Khrushchev had lied dismally to the President. He had tried to launch as criminal and as dangerous an attack on the United States as anyone had ever undertaken, and the President had been successful in warding it off. If the President were to resume talks with the Soviets at once after all these happenings, Khrushchev would think that the President was willing to let bygones be bygones. He would therefore be encouraged to start trouble somewhere else. In this connection the Chancellor pointed out something he had learned from Nazi times. A dictatorship completely changes the moral fiber and manner of thinking of the person involved, for example Khrushchev, completely warping the personality so that his way of thinking will be entirely different from that of the President or Mr. Adenauer for instance.

The President stated that there is ample evidence that the aim of Khrushchev is the same as the aim of the Chinese Communists, only his methods are somewhat different. His long range ambitions remain the same but his tactics have been somewhat complicated by the setback he has suffered in Cuba. Three factors in the world situation are different from what they were about two months ago: One was the failure of Khrushchev’s designs in Cuba; the second was his difficulties with the Communist Chinese; and the third was the complications arising out of the Chinese-Indian conflict. The importance of these was how they would affect Khrushchev’s further actions. One thing was clear, of course, he wants to get both the United States and Germany.

The Chancellor concurred and went on to say that a slow revolution was taking place in Russia. No one knew how far this revolution had progressed. Of one thing Mr. Adenauer felt sure, however, namely that Khrushchev would not risk all his achievements by starting a war. He will try to achieve further successes by intrigue and through cold war. This needs to be watched very carefully. He, too, was of the opinion that we should take our time and carefully observe developments but not act as though nothing had happened. As an outsider, Mr. Adenauer wished to say that the United States had been in very grave danger indeed and the President had averted this danger. This constituted a tremendous victory for the President himself and for the American people. On the other side, however, there was a real criminal, Khrushchev, who needed careful watching. Therefore, the Chancellor advised observing developments carefully before having any further dealings with Khrushchev. The Chancellor was speaking as a German, of course. His opinion, however, differed from that of his own Foreign Minister, Dr. Schroeder, who would act differently in this matter. The latter might be inclined to draw up a new memorandum on German-Soviet relations. Germany had done this in 1958 and still had had no reply from Moscow. Now, however, the Chancellor felt that the decision on whether to proceed with regard to the Soviets was up to President Kennedy. At the same time the Chancellor felt that Cuba from Khrushchev’s standpoint should be chalked up as a failure. Likewise, the Chinese situation presented grave difficulties to him as did the Chinese-Indian conflict. Perhaps it would be well for us to sit back and wait and let Khrushchev think matters over a bit and see what happens.

The President then stated that no one seems to be able really to read the Soviets; certainly no one in the United States. None of the Soviet experts in the United States would ever have imagined that Khrushchev would undertake to station missiles in Cuba. On the other hand the Soviets would never have thought that we would react the way we did or else they would not have placed the missiles in Cuba. Thus, neither side appears very adept at interpreting the other, and both sides are to some extent blind. Nevertheless, within the limitations of our judgment, we must try to evaluate what effect the previously mentioned factors will have on Khrushchev’s reactions, and then decide on the basis thereof whether it might be advantageous to talk with Khrushchev on the Berlin question now, or whether it might be better to wait say six months or even longer. Mr. Kennedy doubted that we would be able to tell anything certain until the bomber question had been settled. The Chancellor replied that most people do not judge Khrushchev correctly, since they generally talk in terms of what he has not achieved or wants to achieve and rarely speak in terms of what he has achieved. The Chancellor believes that Khrushchev has achieved a great deal during the past ten years for instance. In 1953 Russia had no atom weapons, but in 1962 she was sending nuclear missiles to Cuba. The Chancellor is convinced that Khrushchev values very highly what he has achieved so far. Mr. Adenauer recalled that he had previously told the President about his meetings with Khrushchev in 1955, when for a period of six days he met with Mr. Khrushchev as many as three times a day, experiencing all of Mr. Khrushchev’s moods. Khrushchev is smart, completely ruthless and has no conscience whatsoever, but he is a Soviet patriot at heart and he will not risk his achievements in a war. Only now he has understood the determination of the United States and US strength and he will have to digest this for awhile before he can adapt his actions to this in the future. The Chancellor considers it definitely a mistake to resume dealings with Khrushchev at once because, he repeated, then Khrushchev would feel that everyone is willing to forget what happened and he will act accordingly. The Chancellor agreed that perhaps his reactions with reference to the bomber removal might indicate what conclusions Khrushchev is drawing. Also the Chinese situation should make him think. Mr. Adenauer recalled that in 1955 Khrushchev had actually asked Germany to help him against Red China and Adenauer was convinced that Khrushchev lives in real fear of China. Therefore, the Chancellor advises dragging our feet vis-a-vis the Soviets. If Khrushchev swallows all of Cuba including the bomber question then the President will have time to think matters over. If then he decides the time is ripe to take further steps, he may count on Germany to live up to its obligations. But the time is not ripe now.

The President reiterated that he felt it was important to decide whether the happenings of the last two months might have made Khrushchev more vulnerable to pressure and therefore more ready to enter into an agreement on Berlin than he might be six months hence or in a year. The President realized that we could never be really sure that the right moment was at hand, but he was certain that he would not be able to tell anything for at least three more weeks.

The Chancellor thought the idea was very simple. Khrushchev had disgraced himself before the world and his people. If there were to be any talks with him at the present time, he would try to do everything in his power to prove that he was not getting soft or too old in order to wipe out his disgrace. Therefore, we could expect that in any talks now on any but the Cuban question Mr. Khrushchev would take a very unyielding stand.

The President agreed that this might be the case. On the other hand, he felt that Khrushchev had talked about Berlin for so long that he might be willing to accept some kind of a settlement precisely in view of the difficulties he had had in Cuba, with the Chinese, etc. Perhaps, he would value getting some kind of an agreement on paper which might strengthen him domestically and which he needed vis-a-vis China. Thus, perhaps, he might be willing to accept something now that he would not be willing to accept later. Therefore the President felt that we should watch Cuban developments carefully and be ready for any indication from Moscow that might give us a clue whether it would be better to act now or later. Not that the President felt we should start; we should wait to see what they might be intending to do.

The Chancellor agreed that if Khrushchev felt the need for domestic reasons to achieve a settlement of some question he would come and seek the agreement on his own. If, however, the United States and Germany would approach him as partners, as it were, then Khrushchev would become very hard and unyielding. Therefore the Chancellor fully agreed that it was necessary to wait and to watch for Khrushchev’s reactions.

The Chancellor then indicated that there was another matter that he wished to raise privately. He said that Germany, historically, has good relations with some of the Latin American countries. These are based on human rather than political considerations. Thus a Minister from Brazil, whose name the Chancellor could not at the moment recall, visited the Chancellor recently. This Minister had started a Christian Democratic Union in Brazil and was getting the German party’s publications in that connection. In his talk with the Chancellor he discussed some of the Latin American attitudes toward the United States, and the Chancellor wished to propose an idea for the President to examine. It was not necessarily his own idea. His proposal envisaged establishing vis-a-vis the South American countries, started by the United States and Europe, a kind of OECD.

The President indicated that he was convinced that Europe should play a much more important role in South America. That hemisphere represented a real danger spot, especially Brazil. At the same time there were many common factors between Europe and Latin America such as language, religion and culture. Moreover, the historically conditioned hostility vis-a-vis the United States does not exist with reference to Europe. He then asked the Chancellor to indicate the areas of disagreement or attitudes which the man from Brazil had mentioned.

The Chancellor stated that the Brazilian had complained about the patronizing attitude displayed by the United States vis-a-vis Latin America. The Latin Americans considered themselves on a par with the Europeans and resented such attitudes. At the same time the Brazilian had indicated that he had been in Washington and complained of the treatment received, either at the White House or the State Department, the Chancellor could not remember which. The Brazilian was therefore complaining out of hurt pride. The Chancellor then pointed out that the Brazilian in question is now in Washington and if the President permits he will pass the man’s name to the Secretary of State who could then perhaps ask the Brazilian to come and see him.

The President thought that this might be a good idea. Then, he stated that as regards Berlin, he felt there was agreement that we should wait until the complete solution of the present Cuban problem. We should not make any approach to the Russians on Berlin but stand ready to listen to their proposals and consider what our position should be in case they came up with proposals that were different from those made by them in the past. Gromyko had visited the President in October and had voiced proposals which were completely unreasonable and downright insulting. There was no point discussing proposals of that kind. If, however, Khrushchev came up with different proposals we should be prepared to exploit them. Until then we would have to wait. Also since no one appeared to be very good at reading the Communist world we should be prepared to deal with the possibility of one or more different reactions. Thus we should be ready to deal with Khrushchev if he turned out to have become more unreasonable on the basis of his pres-ent difficulties, but we should also not discount the possibility that he might be prompted to want to seek some kind of a settlement. We should be ready in either case.

The Chancellor then indicated that the Soviets were definitely having economic difficulties. He made reference to the West German trade agreement with the Soviet Zone. He stated that some time ago the Soviet Zone representative approached West Germany expressly with the consent and knowledge of the Soviet authorities, stating that if West Germany were to give the Soviet Zone several hundred million DM’s they would be ready to enter into an agreement giving permission to the West Berliners to come and go in the Zone undisturbed, but not the other way around. The Chancellor had expected that this matter might have been settled by the time of his trip to the United States, but this was not the case. He therefore proposed to keep the President informed of developments. He felt however that the fact that these questions were raised at the Zone’s initiative with Russian approval was an encouraging sign.

Before joining the larger group in the Cabinet Room the President indicated that he and the Chancellor would have further private talks.¹

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2181. Secret. Drafted by Lejins and approved in the White House on November 29. On October 10 the President had invited the Chancellor to visit Washington November 7–8. (Ibid., Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204) On October 12 Adenauer accepted the invitation, but on October 22 Kennedy sent the Chancellor a second letter, outlining the speech he would make that night about the Soviet introduction of offensive nuclear missiles into Cuba. (Ibid.) On October 25 the Chancellor thanked the President for the presentation that Dowling had made on the Cuban situation and offered to postpone his visit. (Ibid.) The visit was subsequently scheduled for November 14–15. A summary of the visit was transmitted to Paris in circular telegram 929, November 17. (Ibid., Central Files, 033.62A11/11–1762)
1. In the meeting with the larger group the President and the Chancellor discussed Cuba and Berlin briefly, but devoted most of the conversation to NATO. A memorandum of that part of the discussion is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2181.