Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XV, Berlin Crisis, 1962–1963

154. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, November 14, 1962, 16:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• President-Adenauer Talks—2nd Plenary Session

PARTICIPANTS

• US
  • The President
  • The Secretary of State
  • Mr. Tyler
  • Mrs. Lejins (interpreter)
• Germany
  • Chancellor Adenauer
  • Foreign Minister Schroeder
  • Dr. Carstens
  • Mr. Weber (interpreter)

Chancellor Adenauer indicated that he had had a chance to discuss the question raised during the morning meeting¹ with General Heusinger and had found that views concerning this matter had been clarified considerably since the Cuban crisis.

The President replied that he had had the opportunity to discuss the same question with General Taylor and wished to inform the Chancellor of the following: (1) Our troops are equipped with some Davy Crocketts but it is our opinion that the Soviets do not have much similar equipment; (2) If our troops were to use some of this nuclear equipment in the case of an emergency, the same type of equipment would immediately be released on the same basis to the other forces fighting together with us so that there would be no difference in their equipment.

The Chancellor expressed his satisfaction at this news.

The President indicated that he had asked General Taylor to come and discuss this matter with the Chancellor. He wondered, however, whether the Chancellor might prefer to have General Taylor speak with General Heusinger and then have Heusinger inform the Chancellor about the discussion.

The Chancellor answered that he would prefer the latter since he himself is no expert in these matters.

The President said that he understood Defense Secretary McNamara would be the Chancellor’s dinner companion this evening and they would therefore have a chance to discuss this matter too.

Adenauer then stated that he briefly wished to explain a few things about De Gaulle in this small group in order to contribute to a better understanding of De Gaulle’s position. Adenauer had chided De Gaulle in 1959 for committing so few troops to NATO. De Gaulle had answered: I do not know your opinion of generals but if you commit them to NATO, you lose control over them completely. Adenauer stated that he had not really understood the meaning of De Gaulle’s words until the troubles later with the OAS.

The President said that he did not really see the connection because having the generals in Algeria was quite a different matter, since that problem was one in which much emotion was involved. Committing troops in Western Europe is an entirely different problem since there they are used in our attempts to tackle our major problem, namely the Soviets. The President conceded that the uncertain disposition of these troops might possibly have some political implications, but the danger of not having sufficient troops available to NATO in our dealings with the Soviets was far more dangerous.

The Chancellor then stated he felt that the President did not quite appreciate the French situation. If it were left to the National Assembly, De Gaulle would be overthrown at once. The parties represented in the Assembly are rooted back home, and the officers come from those same areas. This is where De Gaulle’s concern came from. Adenauer indicated that the political situation in France is extremely weak. We should not forget that the Communist Party in France is the second largest party and that they are the kind of Communists who are willing to fight on the barricades. It is a little known fact that three military depots were plundered by OAS revolutionary forces only a short time ago without meeting any resistance. One of them was in Versailles. This was done obviously to get arms for the revolutionary OAS. The Chancellor was convinced that if De Gaulle were overthrown the result would be a catastrophe for France. De Gaulle is really trying to give France some inner strength. He told the Chancellor that this is at the bottom of his disagreement with the Parliament. If France had even one party ready to assume sole responsibility then the situation would be in good hands. There was no such party, however, and the six or seven parties in existence were all alike. Each knew that when one government fell the other one would come in and each in turn would have a chance to furnish the Prime Minister. Therefore things kept going around like a merry-go-round. The situation in France had really been desperate until De Gaulle took over and if he had not come in when he did, there was real danger of a true civil war.

The President stated that this problem was related to another one which he wished to discuss with the Chancellor. This was the matter of our dollar balance, which of course always affects the burdens we are carrying overseas. Under no circumstances did we want to retrench in our overseas defense efforts, which were costing us about $3 billion annually. (The Chancellor expressed surprise that it was so little. He had thought it would be considerably more.) For this reason the United States greatly appreciated the Strauss/Gilpatric arrangement whereby German orders would be placed in the United States in the amount of $250 million per year. Since our difficulties in October we had had to draw on our dollar resources even more and had since then heard the disquieting rumor that for budgetary reasons the Federal Republic was expecting not to fulfill this agreement this year. This would mean that our deficit would be that much higher this year and this would have a very bad psychological effect. The President hoped that Germany could see its way to making the purchases as anticipated. The Chancellor indicated that he was not informed in this matter and that he would look into it on his return. He would do everything in his power to see that Germany’s promise was kept.

The President stated that we were appreciative of the aid extended so far in this respect by the Federal Republic, for instance their percentage of dollar holdings. It was important that our deficit did not go up over last year. If it remained the same, it was tolerable, but if it increased it constituted a worsening of the situation. He had heard that Germany expected to make up next year what they would not be buying this year but it would be better if it were done this year. The President then stated that he would like to give the Chancellor a one-page memorandum on this matter to take home with him.

Returning to the Cuban situation, the President indicated that it was still very much unsettled. The possibility existed that we might have to resort to more drastic steps, if the bomber situation was not solved satisfactorily. The future was therefore still uncertain. The President then reiterated the consensus reached at the morning meeting concerning Berlin, namely that both he and the Chancellor thought that it was inappropriate for the West to undertake any initiative vis-a-vis the Soviets until a final solution had been achieved in Cuba, and future Soviet intentions became more clear. After successful completion of the Cuban affair we should be prepared with our position in case the Soviets came up with proposals that were better than what they had come up with in October. Perhaps the right moment for this might come in two or three months. No one could know the exact time. Perhaps it might be less.

The Chancellor then said that he thought the President might be interested in hearing the German ideas about a possible cooling off period of ten years and asked Dr. Carstens to present this problem in English.²

Dr. Carstens stated that this matter was being treated as highly confidential in Germany and that the United States was the first one to be told about it. It had not been discussed with either the British or the French and even in Germany was confined to a very small circle. Germany felt, however, that if the US approved, this plan might perhaps be submitted to the Soviets but it had probably best come from the United States. Dr. Carstens then briefly enumerated the eight points of the proposal: (1) A ten-year standstill period on Berlin and the German question in general, i.e., no peace treaty, etc.

(2) This point is one well known to all parties concerned. It deals with an international access authority with administration and control over certain traffic routes. (In reply to the President’s question whether they had thought about who the members of the authority would be, Dr. Carstens replied that they had avoided this, since the plan was meant to be a very general one in order not to get bogged down in all the difficulties which would be created by too much detail.)

(3) Establishment of two mixed German commissions with representatives from both West and East Germany. These commissions were to handle two problems: (a) Increase economic exchange between the two parts of Germany; (b) Establish a free movement of persons between the two areas; talks on the latter subject have been going on between the two parts of Germany for some time.

This third point would actually meet the Soviet demand that East and West Germany get together to work out some of their problems themselves, and so far the Federal Republic had always refused. If these two commissions proved successful, this plan envisaged setting up additional mixed commissions to handle additional problems of a limited nature.

(4) A non-aggression declaration by the NATO and the Warsaw Pact powers together with a statement renouncing the use of force to solve international questions, especially frontier readjustments.

(5) After the ten-year cool-off this plan envisaged a plebiscite under international control on the question of German reunification.

(6) and (7) These two points dealt with the two possible results of the plebiscite. In case the majority of both areas voted for reunification, then free elections were to be held to elect a German government which would then send representatives to a German peace conference. At the same time certain arrangements would be made to ensure that the resulting military strength of Germany could not be shifted in such a way as to create any more favorable or unfavorable situation for the military alliances to which either East or West Germany belong at the present time. Later, this unified Germany would then become a member of the UN.

The second possible result being provided for under these two points was in case the majority of the Eastern Zone would vote against reunification. In that case, the Western powers agreed to recognize the existence of two separate Germanies, which, after the necessary intermediate steps, would both become members of the UN and a peace conference would be held with representatives of both Germanies present. The problem of Berlin would still remain in this latter case, and a plebiscite would probably be suggested to determine the city’s status.

(8) During the ten-year cooling-off period there would be in operation a four-power committee composed of Deputy Foreign Ministers which would be dealing with the problems arising during that time.

Mr. Carstens stated that Mr. Tyler was the only person with whom he had had occasion to discuss this German proposal very briefly since his arrival in Washington.

The President said that he had not heard of this as yet. On the surface it appeared to him that this 8-point proposal would give us all we want without giving the Soviets much of anything. The Soviets would not buy the idea, he thought, of a stand-still because that would mean the continued presence of Western troops in Berlin, and the Soviets wanted these definitely out. Moreover, we had renounced the use of force before. All the Soviet Union would appear to be getting out of this plan would be the somewhat uncertain Eastern German status under an access authority. The President thought that we could live with this 8-point agreement. As an argument vis-a-vis the Soviets we could state that we are giving up our claim to immediate reunification, but the Soviets might not be impressed by that. Moreover, if the Soviets hold to their October demands that Western troops be withdrawn, we will not get anywhere. If they change their attitude on troops they might be willing to sign an agreement of this sort. The acceptability thereof would probably depend on the status of West Berlin and what that is called and the status of the Western forces in Berlin. In this connection, he indicated, the suggestion relayed by Sir Frank Roberts might be useful.³

Dr. Carstens explained that he felt that three elements of the 8-power plan should be attractive to the Soviets:

(1) The 10-year waiting period. Eastern Germany had now been under Soviet control for 17 years. Ten more years would give the Soviets that much additional chance to indoctrinate the population and therefore would increase the chances that a plebiscite would come out against reunification of Western Germany.

(2) The fact that the West promises to recognize East Germany as a sovereign state if the plebiscite turns in that direction.

(3) The direct contact envisaged by the proposal between repre-sentatives of East and West Germany on an official basis which the Soviets had been agitating for, for a long time.

Secretary Rusk inquired about East German views on the political implications of the access arrangements.

Foreign Minister Schroeder indicated that what had been envisaged so far in this matter was very limited in scope. The primary aim was for family reunions, and nothing pertaining to general access had been touched upon.

The Chancellor then suggested that the United States might perhaps examine the access implications of the US having turned over to the Soviets such territories as Pomerania and Thuringia. While the US had held these areas, free access to Berlin should have been assured. West German law experts had looked into this matter without coming up with anything useful. Perhaps American experts of international law were more clever.

The President stated that the presence of Western forces in Berlin had been the key question in that situation for the past year. It was the primary concern of Khrushchev’s proposal in October, and the President was not quite sure what Sir Frank Roberts had meant.

The Foreign Minister indicated that there were two reports on this matter: one, the report given out by Sir Frank Roberts to his fellow ambassadors in Moscow;⁴ the second, these ideas as reported over here by Lord Hood. Khrushchev had used the word “temporarily,” and apparently had spoken only of exchanging the flag of the Western powers for the United Nations flag. It was not clear whether this was meant to be a face-saving device or not. However, Dr. Schroeder was fearful that once the change in flag had been made, Khrushchev might feel encouraged to raise new problems every day, using the UN as an additional lever. This possibility could be excluded only if the changeover were accompanied by an explicit statement that all other bases remained unchanged. He feared, however, that Khrushchev would not go along with the latter. The President expressed agreement with this point of view. It was his understanding, too, that Roberts had said the word “temporarily” was used only once. He felt the proposal was worth considering provided we ensured that West Berlin remain free and that the commitments of the US, France and the UK remained clear without the UN being able to take them over. Under those circumstances it might be useful to make the change for the UN flag. But the three powers would have to be carefully watching any infringement of their rights and if the UN should act counter to these rights, the former status would be reverted to at once. Perhaps we should listen somewhat more to find out whether the Russians are interested merely in a face-saving device, and if it were possible to omit the word “temporarily,” some progress could perhaps be achieved.

Foreign Minister Schroeder explained that he thought perhaps a sort of combination of the eight points in the German proposal and Khrushchev’s suggestion to Sir Frank Roberts might prove useful. If there were agreement on that, the tactical question to be decided upon would be the timing of the Western proposal to this effect. He hastened to say that everything would, of course, have to wait until a settlement in the Cuban affair.

The President stated that there was no indication how soon the Cuban problem could be considered settled. Serious consequences might result if the Soviets refused to take out the bombers. If this were the case, the US was faced with several alternatives. They could reimpose the quarantine at full force, which was not good psychologically because world opinion might state that the missiles had been taken out and that Russia should not be expected to back down twice, as it were. Thus it might be difficult for us to keep the backing of other countries. On the other hand, we might eliminate the quarantine which was not really in operation at the present time, and, without invading Cuba, maintain our overflights to keep the situation in check. The decision may be forced upon us within the next ten days to two weeks. If the Soviets agree to take the bombers out of Cuba, then we can consider that particular chapter closed. Thus the President was of the opinion that the Cuban situation should be resolved one way or another first. If Khrushchev refuses to meet our requirements there, then there is no point to try to discuss anything with him. If, however, Khrushchev agrees to our requirements in Cuba, then we might inquire as to Soviet proposals without, however, making any of our own for the time being. If the Soviets put forth proposals on Berlin, then we should try to clarify the status of Western troops in West Berlin. The answer to that will be the decisive one.

The Chancellor wondered what the possible implications might be of Soviet fears of Red Chinese progress in Asia.

The President was of the opinion that it was very difficult for us to determine this. Perhaps his fears in Asia might force Khrushchev to be more reasonable at this moment, and if this were the case we should certainly seize the moment. In summary, the President reiterated that we should continue in the Cuban matter to see what Soviet reaction will be there. If we fail there, all further dealings with the Soviets will by necessity need to be delayed. If we achieve a reasonable solution in Cuba, let us await Soviet initiative on Berlin, see their attitude concerning Western troops in Berlin, and then, if the time appears right, come back at them with something like the 8-point proposal.

The Chancellor indicated that this appeared the correct approach. The President was of the opinion that conversations concerning the suggestion reported by Sir Frank Roberts should be expanded to see whether there might be some acceptable formula behind it, and if there was, consideration should be given to the way in which the Western Powers could give way to the UN flag under full assurance, however, of the three-power status. In any event, however, he felt that any progress in this respect was possible only if Khrushchev actually was inclined to relax the Berlin situation.

The Chancellor pointed out that patience and more patience was indicated.

The President agreed, provided it was coupled with a willingness to take the necessary chance if and when it came.

The Secretary of State felt that it might be useful to discuss the 8-point proposal in the quadripartite Ambassadorial Group. The 10-year cooling-off period actually was not such a revolutionary idea from the Soviet standpoint. Actually they had been talking about a four to five years delay, and it was therefore not unthinkable that they might agree to extending this period to ten years. Moreover, consideration of this plan might lead at an early date to a meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers over an extended period, as in the case of Austria.

The President indicated that it would be very important to keep this entire matter out of the press, or it might create grave problems. Therefore, he felt that only after preliminary discussion and deliberation should this plan or idea be put into the machinery, as it were, but not before.

Dr. Carstens pointed out that it would be difficult to keep these plans from our Allies for any length of time.

The President repeated that he felt it was important to keep this out of the press. He stated that it happened frequently that the Quadripartite Group would get into an argument over a given idea and this would leak to the press, only to have the Soviets come out with a statement that they are not interested in this proposal at all.

The Chancellor stated that the proposals in question are sort of day dreams which it is better not to talk about.

The President again reiterated that it might be best perhaps for US and German representatives to go further into the possible implementation of the 8-point proposal, but to bring in the Allies only when it was time to work out the details.

The Secretary of State stated that it was important to avoid the impression that the plan that will be proposed is something new and tremendous. He felt it was better to launch this thing quietly and without fanfare and not as a new plan.

The President indicated that he would be agreeable to whatever procedures appeared best, but he felt that it was important that controversy on the plan among the Quadripartite Group should be kept to a minimum.

The Secretary of State suggested that the Quadripartite Group, when the time came, should not be confronted with this plan as a systematic 8-point program, but rather only the ideas contained therein should be communicated as such.

Again the President reiterated that it was important not to make anything spectactular out of this new project because then the Soviets would get wind of it and would be certain to say that they are not interested. In any event we should put forth any kind of project only after the Soviets had put forth proposals different from their October proposals, because Gromyko’s demands in October had been something fearful.

The Chancellor repeated that we should wait for Khrushchev’s reaction and appear ready to talk further only if the situation appeared favorable.

Dr. Carstens then stated that French Ambassador Alphand had asked to see him the next day. What should or could Carstens tell him in view of the present discussion? The Chancellor stated that he felt it was easy. Carstens should tell Alphand that until the Cuban situation was solved it was wrong to begin discussions on anything else and therefore it was decided to let matters rest until a solution of the Cuban situation had been achieved.

Dr. Carstens added “and until the presence of Western troops in West Berlin had been clarified.”

The President agreed. He added that it was clear that we would have to consult the French and the UK before we did any talking with the Soviets. In the meantime, the whole matter had to be kept out of the press because otherwise it would be made to appear as a new Western initiative, and then De Gaulle would come out, to begin with, with the statement that this was wrong. And then we would be in another deadlock.

The Chancellor indicated that under the circumstances it might be well to break up the meeting since, the longer it lasted, the more suspicious the press would become of what was going on inside.

The President then summed up that it was the consensus of the meeting that it should not be made to appear as though the Chancellor’s visit had resulted in a decision to take the initiative anew with regard to Berlin. We might state that we exchanged views on the Berlin situation and that the exchange was satisfactory. He then outlined once more the steps to be taken, depending on the Cuban outcome, to await a Soviet proposal, etc.

The Chancellor suggested that one sentence be added to the communiqué to the effect that the question of Berlin and Germany had been touched upon in the general discussion.⁵

Dr. Schroeder then asked whether it might not be advisable for the Germans to draw up another memorandum outlining Western Germany’s views with reference to a separate peace treaty and general German-Soviet relations.

The Chancellor jumped in to say that as long as the Cuba situation was not settled no such steps should be taken.

The President also indicated that he could not see the advantage of any such action and that it would be best to wait for Soviet reaction before any steps are undertaken on the side of the West.

The Secretary of State pointed out that it was important to note that all during the Cuban crisis both Moscow and Ulbricht had been very quiet about Berlin. They had not stirred up any excitement about it in their public speeches. Perhaps they had been caught off timing in general, or perhaps off their timing on Berlin; and therefore, perhaps, they wanted to wait and see what would happen.

Dr. Schroeder said that West Germany had received only one indication from a representative from the Soviet Zone to the effect that the matter of the draft treaty was not acute at this time.

The Chancellor reiterated that it was clear no move should be undertaken vis-a-vis the Soviet Union until the Cuban situation became clear, because any such step on the part of the partners of the US might be interpreted as criticism of US measures, and the West could not afford to have this impression created. The Secretary of State stated that it was well to continue the talk about the 8-point program but he warned the German representatives to be careful about what they said about any possibility of formal recognition of two Germanys. That was, after all, a major trump to be played at the very end.

The President, in closing, stated that when the Soviets had tried to insert new topics in the discussions on the Cuba question between Kuznetsov and McCloy,⁶ they had been told repeatedly that we refused to discuss anything in these talks except Cuba. Therefore it was wise, as agreed, to refrain from raising any other issues with the Soviets until after the settlement of the Cuban crisis. This was a protection for the US.

The Chancellor indicated that he considered this standpoint correct.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.62A11/11–2062. Secret. Drafted by Lejins and Tyler and approved in S on November 20 and in the White House on November 29. The meeting was held at the White House.
1. See footnote 1, Document 153.
2. On November 12 Carstens, who had preceded Adenauer to the United States, gave Tyler a 2-page paper on Berlin, dated November 11. A copy of the paper, which is described here, together with a paper discussing it, drafted by Hillenbrand on November 12, was transmitted to the President by Rusk on November 13. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11–1362)
3. On November 13 Lord Hood had sent Rusk a report of Roberts’ farewell conversation with Khrushchev. In this discussion Khrushchev had suggested that the Western forces might remain “temporarily” in West Berlin under the U.N. flag. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204) In a conversation with Hillenbrand at 5 p.m. on November 14 Hood discussed Khrushchev’s idea, stating that the British were willing to consider injecting a U.N. presence into Berlin. (Ibid., Central Files, 762.00/11–1462)
4. Transmitted in telegrams 1264 and 1265 from Moscow, November 13. (Both ibid., 611.61/11–1362)
5. For text of the joint communiqué issued on November 15, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 626–627.
6. Documentation on these discussions at the United Nations is scheduled for publication in volume XI.