52. Memorandum of Conversation0
SUBJECT
- Discussion between the President and Chancellor Adenauer
PARTICIPANTS
- The President
- Mrs. Lejins, LS, Department of State
- Chancellor Adenauer
- Mr. Weber, Interpreter
After an exchange of gifts the President and the Chancellor exchanged a few preliminary remarks about the Chancellor’s appearance [Page 125] at the Press Club, and in that connection briefly discussed the merits and demerits of correspondents in general and women correspondents in particular, the latter comments, in a joking vein, not being too flattering.
The President then indicated that there was one question which he was very anxious to discuss with the Chancellor at this time. This was the question of UK accession to the EEC, a matter which the President felt to be highly critical at the present time. In his opinion, and he was saying this confidentially, if UK were not to join the EEC, the Labor Party is bound to win in the coming elections. While Mr. Gaitskell is a good person, the Chancellor is fully aware of the fact, no doubt, that there are a very large left-wing faction and many neutralists in the Labor Party. While Macmillan gave the US full support in the Cuban crisis, the Labor Party was much less inclined to do so; moreover, the Labor Party did not have any position on Berlin, nor did the Liberals. Non-accession to EEC on the part of UK would lead to political deterioration in Great Britain in the President’s opinion. This was a very dangerous situation for all concerned. No one could foresee what the future would bring as regards France five or ten years hence. This made it all the more important for Great Britain to be firmly allied with the other Western European nations and the Common Market in particular, because this would be a greatly stabilizing influence for all of Europe. To be sure the Common Market as such would continue to prosper even without the UK as a member, but the situation, politically speaking, would be much less promising for an Atlantic partnership. However, the President emphasized, the decision concerning UK accession was purely a European matter and therefore up to the Chancellor. Nevertheless, the President feels that it is extremely important to keep the US, Canada and Great Britain closely allied with the EEC. Actually, the President pointed out, UK accession to EEC will create many more economic difficulties for the US, which is the case as regards EEC in general. In this connection the President expressed his appreciation for the cooperation shown by the Federal Republic in the poultry matter. In spite of the difficulties created for the US by UK accession the President felt it was extremely vital for Europe that the UK become a member of the Common Market, since Europe would be much stabler as a result thereof. He reiterated repeatedly that UK accession was not in the narrow interests of the US.
The Chancellor expressed full support for UK accession to the EEC, agreeing with everything the President had said. He indicated, however, that England should handle herself a bit more skillfully and more wisely in the negotiations. While he did not want to go into any details, he thought he should tell the President that the British were acting in such a manner that one of the French representatives had felt obliged to tell them: “After all, you are the ones who are seeking something from EEC, and not we who want something from you.”
[Page 126]The Chancellor then indicated that he would like to take the time to tell the President something he had told the Secretary this morning and which would explain some of the Chancellor’s misgivings with reference to EEC in general. He was greatly concerned by the tremendous bureaucracy growing up in the name of EEC. The thing had gone to the head of the EEC Directorate. The latest was that the EEC was asking all member states to prepare two budgets, one political and one economic budget. The economic budget was then to be sent to Brussels, to be worked over and combined into one joint budget. At the same time, when the member nations had signed the Rome Treaty they had not anticipated any such development. Actually, they had believed that they would obtain a European Parliament before very long. Instead, they now had a tremendous bureaucratic apparatus without any parliamentary controls whatsoever. He, the Chancellor, had qualms about continuing to go along with this kind of arrangement. He felt sure that the American Congress would be reluctant to relinquish any of its rights to a bureaucratic machine of this type. All these were misgivings which the Chancellor had with reference to EEC quite aside from the matter of UK accession. He felt that there might need to be a complete reorganization of EEC.
The President agreed that these things might present a problem, but he felt the matter of UK accession was of greater importance since everything possible needed to be done to avoid a set-back to the Conservative Party. If the UK were to be refused admission to EEC there would be a strong reaction within England which would have a harmful effect on the relations between the UK and the rest of Western Europe. In the final analysis, this would prove harmful to Germany, a fact which should be of grave concern to the Chancellor. Moreover, there would be bitterness between France and England which would be harmful to the prospects for the Atlantic Community. The President was under the impression that General de Gaulle was reluctant to dilute the area of the Common Market by the inclusion of the UK. Perhaps this was based primarily on historical reasons . . .1 perhaps even some political considerations of the present. But for political considerations in the future it was absolutely essential for Britain to become a member of the EEC. At the present time, the President said, there are three massive power blocs in the Atlantic area, the US, the Six, and then Britain and the Commonwealth. It was absolutely necessary to join these three blocs more closely together into one Atlantic Community.
The Chancellor indicated that he fully subscribes to the President’s views. He feels that this is the right approach, but he is not at all sure that [Page 127] it will be successful. As for de Gaulle, the Chancellor is of the opinion that de Gaulle is actually little concerned with the matter of British accession. The Chancellor has discussed the matter with de Gaulle on occasion. Both felt that UK accession was a matter for very serious examination and consideration. As a matter of fact de Gaulle had stated that an application like that of Great Britain was not a thing that could be simply rejected. On the other hand, Great Britain was handling herself most unwisely in this affair and was asking much too much, for instance as regards agricultural products. The UK argued that four percent of its population is dependent on agriculture. The Chancellor wished to point out that twelve percent of the German population are engaged in agriculture, and what is more, they and their families give their support to the CDU. Therefore, the agricultural population of Germany was an element to be seriously considered by the Federal Government. As for the Labor Party, the Chancellor indicated that George Brown was the most intelligent of them all, and that he had a more positive attitude toward EEC than Gaitskell, for example. The Chancellor then stated that he would do everything in his power to help along the matter of UK accession. He said, however, that he would be lying if he were to say that he was sure of the success of this matter.
The President emphasized once more that the main thing to keep in mind was the effect on the Atlantic Community of any possible failure of the Conservative Party in England. Actually, he was not very optimistic about their remaining in power in any event. As for the Labor Party, Gaitskell was on the way down, he felt, and Wilson was going up. He was fearful of the very leftist elements in the Labor Party, the Communists and pacifists. These were against the concept of a firm stand in Europe, and a firm stand was in the direct interests of the US and the Federal Republic. Any disharmony within the Atlantic Community in these matters would have bad effects for Germany as well as for the US.
The Chancellor reiterated that he would do everything in his power to help this matter along.
The President referred to the talks between General Heusinger and General Taylor during the Chancellor’s visit. In this connection he handed the Chancellor the memorandum on the Strauss–Gilpatric arrangement which he had promised him earlier. In conclusion the President then told the Chancellor how happy he was that the Chancellor had accepted his invitation to come to Washington.
The Chancellor stated that he was particularly happy about the timing of his visit, because he felt that this showed solidarity among partners and he felt that this was of utmost importance in a decisive situation of this sort.
The President reminded him that the Cuban situation had still not reached a satisfactory conclusion, in view of the bomber situation, but, [Page 128] he indicated, this was typical of negotiations with the Soviets. He promised to keep the Chancellor informed of developments, indicating that the further actions with reference to Berlin would be carried out in accordance with the discussions of the past few days, depending on the outcome of the Cuban situation.