Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XV, Berlin Crisis, 1962–1963

151. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Advance Planning Subcommittee (Rostow) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)⁰

Washington, November 9, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Negotiations

Herewith a supplement to our negotiating paper,¹ which the President and you may wish to read. (I attach a copy of our paper. You’ll be getting five copies officially before noon Saturday.)

The supplement is Tommy Thompson’s concept of a West Berlin solution. It is virtually the same as our expanded Berlin/Germany proposal in Track B, except that it does not provide for the 7–10 year stretch-out of the Western Peace Plan.

In addition, we shall be giving some thought to the possibility of a bolder diplomatic initiative which the U.S. might take beyond the quite radical proposals in Track B. Their weakness, as pure initiatives, is that (except for the radical disarmament proposal) they could not be surfaced with our allies until there is clear evidence that Mr. Khrushchev is ready for very serious business indeed.

There is, within our group, a desire to explore whether there exists some course of action or initiative we might take which would:

a. Not be a phony psywar exercise;

b. Not appear to Moscow to be an effort to force their hand on issues where, in fact, we don’t have any serious military leverage; and

c. Not appear to be the result of over-anxiety about other issues, having just had a dangerous confrontation.

None of us is sure whether a bold initiative which meets these complex specifications actually exists; nevertheless, we shall try.

Attachment²

POSSIBLE BERLIN SOLUTIONS

West Berlin Solution

The following is a possible package deal on West Berlin, which attempts to take account of Soviet and East German interests as well as United States and West German interests. The general idea would be to make a number of changes which would have the possibility of removing the Berlin problem from the area of contention for a considerable period of time. The general approach would be that of a scale balance in which the weights on both sides could be changed without upsetting the overall balance. The following are only suggestive and in actual negotiation, if a concession on one side proved impractical, the offsetting concession on the other side would have to be dropped.

Western concessions:

1. Agree to some change in the status of our forces in West Berlin, putting them on a contractual basis, perhaps setting up some sort of trusteeship arrangement, or suspending exercise of occupation rights for duration of the agreement.

2. We would go a considerable distance toward de facto ac-knowledgement of East German sovereignty, for example by making them signatories, or at least participants, in access arrangements.

3. We would agree with Soviets to measures to take West Berlin out of the cold war along the lines of our 1959 Geneva proposals. There might be a limitation on power of radio and TV transmitters, elimination of certain espionage and subversive operations, prohibition on introduction of atomic weapons into West Berlin, and then possibly some representative of UN Secretary General to be stationed in West Berlin to observe implementation these provisions.

Ceiling on number of Western forces to be stationed in West Berlin and possibly change of designation to call them military police, but without any major change in their military equipment.

4. Statement that existing economic and political ties with West Germany would be maintained but there would be a prohibition for duration of the agreement against incorporation West Berlin into Federal Republic.

5. Western forces would accept the position that by the change of status of their forces in West Berlin they would not attempt to exercise their rights in East Berlin.

Communist concessions:

1. Accept the continued presence of Western forces in West Berlin without acquiring any substantial Soviet rights there.

2. Agree to some relatively secure access authority either along the lines which we have put to them, or an arrangement for West Berlin to lease the autobahn from the GDR for a specified period of time. (L has pointed out that arrangements similar to Soviet lease of canal to Finns would be good precedent and strong argument that this did not impair sovereignty.) Air access would be difficult problem.

3. Soviets and East Germans would agree to measures to take East Berlin out of cold war such as limitation on power of radio and TV transmitters, prohibition on stationing of atomic weapons in East Berlin, generalized prohibition against espionage and subversive activities, similar to Western declaration. Their unwillingness to have any such measures applied to East Berlin might be overcome if it were clear we were giving up our rights in East Berlin.

4. Declaration that these measures are instituted pending reunification.

Mixed German and/or mixed Berlin commissions might be set up in connection with the foregoing.

Along with these arrangements, might be package of measures in broader field of European security, such as NATO-Warsaw Pact non-aggression declaration, recognition by Britain, France, and United States of Oder-Neisse line, or at least declarations on the non-use of force to exchange [change] existing frontiers or demarcation lines, measures against surprise attack, possibly atomic testing and non-diffusion nuclear weapons and, if feasible, some immediately applicable disarmament measures.

It will be noted that such a package would enable the Soviet Union to proceed with signature of separate Peace Treaty unless we had a provision or understanding to the contrary. Such signature would do much to get Khrushchev off the hook he is on, but it may well be that if agreement reached along lines set forth above that Khrushchev may not attach so much importance to a separate treaty which has some disadvantages for him.

For the West, the chief advantage would be acquiring secure access arrangements, particularly for the West Germans.

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin. Secret. Initialed by Rostow.
1. The negotiating paper, entitled “Negotiations,” November 9, is not attached to the source text, but is printed in vol. V, Document 160. The paper described a series of topics (bilateral, arms control, and Germany and Berlin), which had already been staffed and which were generally familiar to the U.S. Allies, that might be the subject of negotiations with the Soviet Union (Track A) and a more radical series of proposals on Germany and Berlin (Track B) that might be the subject of informal U.S.-Soviet discussions to see if progress might be made leading to a summit. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/11–962)
2. Secret. Drafted by Thompson.