Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume V, Soviet Union

160. National Intelligence Estimate⁰

NIE 11-5-62

Washington, February 21, 1962.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE USSR AND THE COMMUNIST WORLD

The Problem

To examine the political situation in the USSR and the world Communist movement, particularly in the light of the XXII Party Congress and developments in the Sino-Soviet dispute, and to estimate major trends.

Principal Conclusions

A. Within the USSR, Khrushchev remains the most powerful single leader, and we believe that his leadership is not in danger at present. His control over policy, however, is subject to restraints; conservative resistance has forced him to compromise or postpone his proposals on such matters as economic policy, military force structure, and the partyʼs role in Soviet society.

B. Present trends suggest that, over the long term, popular aspirations are likely to acquire a larger influence in Soviet domestic politics. There are some prospects for further moderation of totalitarian controls; however, such a trend depends not only on social forces but also on external events and developments in top level politics.

C. Sino-Soviet relations are in a critical phase just short of an acknowledged and definitive split. There is no longer much chance of a fundamental resolution of differences. In our view, the chances that such a split can be avoided during 1962 are no better than even.¹

D. The Sino-Soviet rivalry will continue to have disrupting effects upon the international Communist movement, and these will greatly intensify if a definitive split occurs. Whatever the outcome of the present Sino-Soviet crisis, we believe that the pressures for national autonomy within the international Communist movement will present the Soviet leaders with increasing difficulties, and that their control over it is likely to be further diminished.

Summary

1. The politics of the Communist world have continued in the past year to grow more complicated and more controversial. The intensity with which issues of policy and authority were posed at the XXII Congress has highlighted the contradictions which are emerging as Soviet internal development becomes more complex and as the world Communist movement becomes larger and more diverse. Adjustment to these changing conditions is made more difficult by the element of doctrinal rigidity in Communist theory and practice and by the legacy of Stalinism. (Paras. 14-17)

2. These problems do not weaken the growing material base of economic strength, scientific development, and military power which underlies the Soviet threat. Nor have they had a significant effect upon the Soviet view that the East-West conflict is a fundamental clash of systems or upon their determination to press their aims in this conflict. Present Soviet moves toward a détente in East-West relations may owe something to Moscowʼs desire to contain tensions in this area while a crisis impends in its relations with Peiping. While we perceive no indication that the Soviets are abandoning their basic hostility toward the West, there has been a shift in their tactics toward relatively greater subtlety and flexibility in pursuing their foreign policy objectives.²

3. While basic attitudes toward the West are not in dispute among the Soviet leaders, Khrushchevʼs sponsorship of successive reforms in internal policy has generated conflict with various elements which resist his changes. In the past year, differences of opinion have become evident over the important question of the relative priority of welfare programs as against the traditionally favored sectors of heavy industry and defense. Some contention has also been apparent over other issues—the proper structure of the armed forces, the role of the party apparatus in Soviet society, and the final disposition of the “antiparty group.” Even the violent onslaught against Stalin at the Congress, which Khrushchev conceived as a means of weakening the opposition to his views, failed to resolve these problems. (Paras. 18-21, 23-29)

4. We continue to believe that Khrushchev remains the most powerful single leader in Soviet politics. Most top party leaders share his general outlook, and those who resist various of his innovations do not appear to form a coherent faction which is seeking his downfall. Indeed the lineup among his colleagues probably changes from issue to issue. In addition to the difficulties of securing agreement at the top, Khrushchev in implementing his policies must rely primarily on a party bureaucracy schooled in conservatism and jealous of its traditions and privileges. In all these ways, he is subject to restraints which have the effect of slowing down the pace of his reforms. (Paras. 22, 25, 30-32)

5. The attitudes of the Soviet people, on the other hand, represent a form of largely silent pressure on the regime to proceed in the direction of further reforms of the system. The traditionally compliant attitude of the population has to some extent been upset in recent months by heightened anxiety over the possibility of war over Berlin and a related concern over the effects of international tensions on the already sagging rate of improvement in living standards. In addition, the revelations of the XXII Congress about the Stalin period and subsequent confusion within the party have led to openly expressed skepticism and to considerable ferment among intellectual circles. (Paras. 33-34)

6. We do not, however, foresee any sharp turning of the public mind toward radical solutions. Not only is the regime able to capitalize upon the strong sense of pride in national accomplishment, but the Soviet people are accustomed to authoritarian rule. Current trends suggest that, over the long term, popular aspirations are likely to acquire a larger influence, and we believe that there are some prospects for further moderation of totalitarian controls. But this will depend on external events and developments in top level politics as well as on the identifiable forces for change which are clearly now at work within Soviet society. (Paras. 35-37)

7. A far more critical question has been posed by the moves launched at the Congress against Communist Chinaʼs challenge to Soviet policies and international authority. While the condemnations of Stalin and the “antiparty group” were also conceived as part of the rebuttal to China, the main vehicle is the unremitting campaign against Albania. This Soviet attack, and the unyielding Chinese response, have moved the Sino-Soviet dispute into a critical phase just short of an acknowledged break. While substantial differences on Communist strategy divide the two, these have now been transcended by the even more fundamental question of authority, in which the USSRʼs traditional leadership of the international Communist movement is at stake. (Paras. 15, 38-39, 45)

8. Considering the conflicting views and interests of the two parties, the record of attack and counterattack, the liabilities already incurred, and the uncompromising attitude of both, we believe that there is no longer much chance of a fundamental resolution of Sino-Soviet differences. Indeed, the question now is whether Moscow and Peiping will succeed in maintaining formal unity, or whether they will take those remaining steps—undisguised accusations of heresy and the formation of separate international movements—which would constitute a definitive split. (Paras, 40-41, 46-47)

9. The considerations of self-interest which argue against such an outcome must be fully evident to both parties. On the Chinese side, however, there are important contrary factors, particularly the belief that the USSR is turning away from revolutionary aims and that Soviet policy is running counter to Chinese interests and ambitions. These considerations, plus a certain xenophobic righteousness which persuades Peiping that its policies could best carry the Bloc to victory, have already led the Chinese to sacrifice many of the advantages of the former relationship. For the Soviet part, remaining in partnership with China involves the possibility of being drawn into riskier situations than they wish to contemplate, and the probability of a continuing struggle within the movement which could lay restraints on Soviet policy and enable China to acquire an increasing authority in that movement. Thus the Soviet leaders may now be considering whether, from the standpoint of their national interests, a smaller movement in which they enjoyed undiluted predominance would not be preferable to a larger movement which they could not control. (Paras. 42-44)

10. Predictions cannot be confident, particularly since, with tensions so high, the likelihood is increased that either the USSR or China could miscalculate the otherʼs moves and reactions. In our view, however, the chances that a definitive split can be avoided during the current year are no better than even.³ If such a split should occur, diplomatic and economic ties between the USSR and China would be further reduced, though not necessarily severed. The military alliance, whether openly renounced or not, would be of doubtful value to either signatory, although each would still have a very heavy stake in the preservation of Communist power in the other. The international Communist movement would become a virtual battleground as both the Soviets and the Chinese competed for the allegiance of other parties, fostered splits in those non-bloc parties not firmly committed to one side or the other, and used all the weapons of pressure and persuasion available to them to isolate their rival. (Paras. 45, 47, 65, 75-76)

11. If no definitive split occurs, we believe that the Sino-Soviet relationship will continue to be marked by tension and instability, increasing and declining as events may occasion. In these circumstances, the disruptive consequences for the international movement will continue to be felt, although in a less intense and more manageable form than under conditions of avowed rivalry. The present lineup finds Albania and the minor parties of Asia in the Chinese camp, important elements in the Indian, Indonesian, and Japanese Parties sympathetic to Peiping, and the North Koreans and North Vietnamese seeking to maintain neutrality but edging closer to Chinese positions. Outside Asia, Soviet authority generally prevails, so far with little difficulty, against scattered pro-Chinese elements. (Paras. 48, 60, 62-64, 66-72)

12. The Chinese challenge, however, tends to undermine Soviet authority even among parties which are totally out of sympathy with Chinese views, just as Khrushchevʼs attacks on Stalin tend to becloud the legitimacy of Soviet leadership even among Communists who are not themselves Stalinists. As the international movement grows in size and diversity, as the Satellite regimes become preoccupied with national problems, as other parties acquire real prospects for sharing or even seizing state power under circumstances which have no parallel in Soviet experience, the virtue and necessity of following Soviet guidance is being increasingly questioned. In these circumstances, the Soviets are under considerable pressure to make concessions to national autonomy and to take increasing account of diverse national views in framing the general Communist line. (Paras. 15, 52, 66, 73)

13. Gradual adjustments in this direction might preserve for some time to come the essentials of Soviet leadership, were it not that China is simultaneously pressing rival policies and gaining adherents among other parties. Chinaʼs defiance dramatizes the inability of the professedly internationalist Communist ideology to preserve the unity of a movement embracing powerful nationalist forces, once the traditional sources of Soviet authority had been weakened. No clear solution to this problem is in sight, and we believe that the management of the international Communist movement will present the Soviet leaders with increasing difficulties which are likely, in one way or another, to result in a further diminution of their control over it. (Paras. 50, 74)

[Here follows a 15-page Discussion section.]

0. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates. Secret. Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on February 21.
1. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, believes that the chances of a definitive split during 1962 are much less than even. [Footnote in the source text.]
2. Soviet policies toward the non-Communist world will be examined in a forthcoming estimate due in March 1962. Chinese policies will be discussed in NIE 13-62, “Communist China,” now scheduled for completion in April. [Footnote in the source text.]
3. See the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, footnote to paragraph C of Principal Conclusions. [Footnote in the source text.]