Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume V, Soviet Union

161. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State⁰

Belgrade, February 22, 1962, 4 p.m.

1164. Eyes only for Secretary and President. Prior to leaving for Paris and Germany, talked again last evening for two hours with Soviet Ambassador Yepishev. Although meeting was at my initiative, it was clear he had communicated with his government in interval since we met on February 12.¹ He himself said he was not speaking officially on behalf his government but also “not entirely personally”. In contrast previous occasions, his remarks struck me as of considerable interest and suggestive of changes in Soviet outlook which, if real, would be important. Highlights as follows.

1. He dealt great length and emphasis on need for improvement commercial relations between US and USSR. When I voiced skepticism as to importance this factor for either one of us, he made it clear this was conceived by them as first step to wide political rapprochement including many forms exchanges. When I asked him how he thought our specific political differences of the moment would be helped by improvement commercial relations, he said if we took correct path in this respect specific political problems would die on the vine. canʼt imagine what he could have meant by this if not Berlin. I would not attach importance to this statement if it did not represent new note in his approach and if I did not know as historian how prone Russian Communists are to regard improvement commercial relations as normal first public step toward genuine political improvement.

2. He indicated suspicion we were delaying attempt to find solutions to Soviet-Western differences in belief there might soon be internal changes in Russia which would yield advantage from our stand-point. He asserted with great vigor any such view would be wholly misconceived. Nothing of this sort was happening. Policies announced by Khrushchev represented in every respect considered views of Soviet government as whole. I told him I thought they were very wrong in suspecting we had been misled in this way.

3. He showed much interest in De Gaulleʼs proposal for preliminary four-power meeting on disarmament² and wanted to hear my opinion of it. His government, he hinted, had come to no conclusion about it but was very interested in the proposal and thought it might have merit. I pleaded ignorance both of details proposal and of views my government.

4. He said he expected to remain Belgrade until at least March 3, when I should be back here, adding that he was not even sure he would attend Central Committee meeting March 5 at all since it would presumably deal only with agriculture. I took this as hint if I expressed desire meeting with him upon my return he would give precedence to this over Central Committee meeting.

While I do not have adequate information for judgment, point one above looks to me like attempt to convey to us that Khrushchev would be willing to permit Berlin situation to simmer down and become quiescent again but can do this only if we save his face by a general show of improvement US-Soviet bilateral relations. Reference to internal problems could be warning either that we will not do better by waiting for further internal developments within Soviet regime or that any sort of progress in our relations could be vitiated if we allow it to appear we are speculating on Soviet internal differences. I lean to first explanation.

I can be reached Saturday at General Norstadʼs headquarters and next week in care of General Landon at Wiesbaden.³

Kennan

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 601.6168/2-2262. Top Secret.
1. In the meeting on February 12 the two Ambassadors had discussed Berlin. (Telegram 1116 from Belgrade, February 13; ibid., 601.6168/2-1362)
2. For text of De Gaulleʼs letter to Khrushchev, February 18, in which he stated that France was prepared to participate in talks among the nuclear powers, see Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. I, pp. 48-49.
3. Lieutenant General Lauris Norstad, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and General Truman H. Landon, Commander in Chief, U.S. Air Force, Europe.