150. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations0
Topol 618. Following is promised material re Soviet intentions for discussion in connection with “Plan for Western Response to Peace Treaty.”
[Page 420]Begin Text.
ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT SOVIET INTENTIONS
While Soviets themselves first suggested a relationship between Berlin and Cuba in September 11 TASS statement Moscow has, since outbreak of Cuban crisis, carefully avoided any hint of a direct link between events in Cuba and Berlin situation.1 Various Soviet officials abroad evidently reflecting instructions have also indicated that USSR would not move against Berlin should it retaliate because of Cuban developments.
Moscow appears to be anxious that tension generated by Cuba not spill over into Berlin; whether because of fear of possible US reactions or to avoid prejudicing post-election negotiations (to which Moscow remains committed) or a combination of both factors remains to be seen. In any event Soviets continue reaffirm publicly their commitment to a “German peace treaty and resolution of Berlin situation on that basis” (Brezhnev October 30), and now avoid any public reference to a separate GDR treaty. Vigorous Polish support of GDR aims and interests up to and including separate treaty is thus all more striking in view of recent Soviet reticence.
We had previously thought Soviets were likely to set stage for coming round of talks with some gesture directed toward improving atmosphere in Berlin, most probably some minor alleviation of border traffic situation within Berlin. Arrangements toward this end now appear to be well underway. Desirability of a gesture of this nature would from Soviet standpoint appear to be even greater now than it was previously if USSR actually does desire to keep Berlin situation calm for time being.
And since Soviet moves to ease pressure on Berlin are usually accompanied by overtures to West Germans, some relaxation of travel restrictions of persons between East and West Germany similar to that in Berlin is also conceivable under present circumstances if it can be engineered in manner which does not endanger GDR security.
As a further element in Soviet calculations on Berlin, seeming Soviet retreat in Cuba will almost inevitably have repercussions in East German party organization and complicate its already almost insurmountable tasks. And uncertainty already evident in functionary corps will in turn feed and stimulate existing popular dissatisfaction with regime. If past experience is any guide, SED would perforce be compelled [Page 421] to maintain a semblance of closed ranks to protect its position and preserve Ulbricht dominance.
Whether in long run position of SED can be maintained with such methods in view of changing political climate and anti-Stalinist campaign in bloc is questionable however. It may be that after initial shock of Cuban events has been overcome Soviets may seriously consider liberalization of GDR regime.
If this actually were Kremlin’s plan of action, radical change in circumstances now underway will require revision of Soviet planning on Berlin and probably cause at least considerable postponement of scheduled denouement outlined above. At this point however indications are that Soviets have been caught up short by US reaction in Cuba and are as yet undecided on specific courses of action with respect to Berlin other than avoiding tension in that area for time being.
Soviets have with foresight been careful to tie themselves to no timetable on Berlin and thus are free to procrastinate by a variety of means without serious loss of face.
In any event further US-Soviet exchanges on Berlin following US elections still seem almost certain and there is still a possibility that this new round will be initiated by a Khrushchev visit to UN. (Current Soviet propaganda line attributing preservation of world peace in Cuban context to Khrushchev’s personal statesmanship may well be intended in part as buildup for UN appearance.) Present substance of Soviet and bloc commentaries does not however suggest USSR intends—in event of Khrushchev visit to UN—to raise Berlin issue per se before General Assembly. Emphasis appears instead to be tending toward matters of disarmament, ban on nuclear arms, and possible NATO-Warsaw Pact negotiations. Khrushchev will probably wish reserve any serious discussion of Berlin for personal meeting with President Kennedy, should he come to America. End text.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/11–762. Secret; Priority; Verbatim Text. Drafted by Cash and Mautner, cleared by Thompson and Kranich, and approved by Hillenbrand. Repeated to Bonn and London.↩
- In an earlier telegram on November 7 the Department of State had informed the Mission at Berlin that it had consistently sought to discourage press speculation about links between Cuba and Berlin. The telegram continued that the Department of State was taking the line that it had no indication of Soviet intentions to resume harassment of the Allied position in Berlin in the immediate future. (Telegram 440 to Berlin; ibid., 862B.181/11–662)↩