149. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Berlin-NATO Subcommittee (Nitze) to President Kennedy0

I–26257/62

The attached paper, “Berlin in Light of Cuba”, arises from the work of the NSC Subcommittee on Berlin but is not an agreed paper. It represents my views after discussion with the group.

I believe that we should make every effort in good time to find a long-term solution to the Berlin question and, if possible, the German question. Otherwise we may find ourselves someday in a Berlin crisis, where we all will wish we had taken more radical measures to lance the boil despite the recognized risks, costs and difficulties. The view of others of the group is that the attached paper underestimates the difficulties in arriving at long-term solutions and that there are unwarranted dangers in considering what they believe to be impracticable ideas.

The key to practicability may well be in areas beyond Germany and Berlin, the area assigned to the Rostow group.1 I have passed on to Walt some of my ideas in this broader area. They include the following:

A. Disarmament

A radical proposal, but one which I believe could be to our interest on its own feet, would be Warsaw Pact-NATO nuclear forces, limited on each side to the minimum necessary to cover the problem of the inherent impossibility of being sure all warheads have been destroyed. This might involve no more than 500 delivery vehicles of our choice, with warheads of a yield aggregating no more than 50 megatons, on our side, and an equal number and yield on their side, with a complete prohibition on all other nuclear weapons, AICBM’s etc., on both sides. The agreement to be contingent on their proposing inspection procedures satisfactory to us and vice-versa.

These agreements would be coupled with appropriate test ban, non-diffusion, and conventional force limitations.

B. Reduction of Far Eastern Tensions

1.
The Republic of China to become the Republic of Taiwan.
2.
Quemoy and Matsu to be evacuated.
3.
The Chinese People’s Republic to recognize the Republic of Taiwan.
4.
The MacMahon line to be agreed.
5.
The Korean 38th parallel line to be given permanent status.
6.
North Vietnam to pull out its support of the Viet Cong.
7.
The CPR to agree to the counterpart of the non-diffusion agreement.
8.
Admission of the CPR to the United Nations.

C. Reduction of Middle East Tensions

1.
Agreement that no bloc or Western arms be sent to Middle East.
2.
Mutual assurances with respect to frontiers in the area.

D. Latin American Tensions

1. Agreement by the USSR and CPR to eschew any military connection with this Hemisphere.

Such arrangements have been unthinkable in the past context. I believe they could be to the interest of both the USSR and the U.S. If both sides agreed that this was so, I do not think it impossible we could bring them about. The competition between the Communist system and ours would continue but on quite different terms than otherwise foreseeable.

The above ideas ignore all the tactical problems. The tactical problems are immense and undoubtedly would greatly modify even the substance of any program of action. But one can’t start putting a program together without some idea of the direction one wishes to go.

The relation of all this to Berlin is that Berlin has been a focal point in the over-all Western confrontation with the Bloc. The long-term solution of Berlin can hardly take place except as part of a general readjustment of the terms of that confrontation.

Paul H. Nitze

Attachment2

BERLIN IN THE LIGHT OF CUBA

I. The Problem

If the Cuba settlement goes forward as outlined in the President’s letter of October 27th3 and accepted by Mr. Khrushchev, a Summit [Page 413] meeting may be necessary within a reasonable period, and may be desirable. At a Summit, Berlin would undoubtedly be an important item of discussion. Such Berlin discussions would take place against a variety of proposals from the U.S. and the Soviets on other items of importance to one or both sides.

It follows that we need a theory of our Berlin interest from which a variety of positions can be developed, depending upon the actual setting which emerges and which is not now accurately predictable.

It would be useful to have the broad lines of this theory tentatively agreed before Mr. Adenauer’s visit, so that questions put to him can be appropriately aimed. Any indication to Mr. Adenauer that the U.S. is even studying drastic solutions should be carefully handled,4 however, to prevent extreme German reaction during exploratory phases.

II. New Elements of the Situation

A.
The United States. The country has gone through a traumatic exposure to the imminence of war, the relationship of the military situation to the political outcome, and the necessity for firm but moderate diplomacy. Its confidence in itself and its leadership has been enhanced. It does not, however, wish to live indefinitely with a series of Cubas, one of which might be in a less favorable geographic position, or might be handled, by one side or the other, with less care and restraint, or might be the occasion for some accidental aberration. Both this enhanced confidence and enhanced concern dispose the U.S. to take a firmer line with our Allies, where this is required to further our aims, as well as affecting our attitude to the USSR.
B.

The Soviet Union. A central question is whether the Soviets will have emerged from the Cuban experience with the feeling that avoidance of a comparable crisis over Berlin is paramount and that they must therefore be prepared to give on Berlin in light of demonstrated U.S. determination, or whether they will feel they must counter our Cuban success with gains of their own in Berlin or elsewhere. While there is great uncertainty as to the Soviet reaction, it probably combines a new wariness about U.S. response with a compulsion to recover lost prestige.

At a minimum, the Soviets can probably be expected to take political and diplomatic steps to counter the effects of the Cuban back-down on the Soviet power image, and to disabuse the U.S. of any notion that tactics like those applied in the Cuban crisis can be used to force concessions from the Soviet Union on long-standing issues under dispute, including Berlin. We cannot exclude the possibility that they may feel driven to exert strong pressures in the reasonably near future.

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The Soviets may estimate that the Cuban crisis will open up room for maneuver. By making the danger of nuclear confrontation real and visceral for all the world, the crisis may seem to them to provide the catalyst needed to put new flexibility into the stalemated Berlin situation. It could create an environment where radical solutions are possible.

The Soviet judgment of this possibility will probably be conditioned by their assessment of the U.S. temper. If the U.S. appears firm and sober after the crisis, and if Khrushchev feels impelled to do something about Berlin in the near future, he may feel that serious negotiation at the Summit would be preferable to unilateral Soviet action.

The Soviets may well be motivated toward a serious attempt to stabilize the situation, not only by the prospect of nuclear confrontation in a disadvantageous balance, but also by a real desire to focus on economic competition.

The Soviets probably also face reappraisal of their strategic posture. It was an inadequate deterrent in Cuba; they may consider the alternatives of even more energetic efforts to redress the imbalance, or measures to reduce instabilities.

Finally, having apparently misread our reactions in the Cuban case, the Soviets may confine themselves to highly tentative moves until they reassess the situation.

C.
Allies. Our NATO Allies now have greater confidence in the U.S. They have seen success result from our firmness and moderation. The U.K., in particular, was reassured by our restraint; France and Germany by our determination, under the risk of major conflict. U.S. prestige is higher; its capacity and maturity more respected; its freedom to lead enhanced.

We should be able to brush aside trivial Allied objections and reservations, and insist on concentrating on major issues.

At the same time, while the Allies supported our Cuban actions with minimum consultation, we can expect increased sensitivity about consultation in the future, both because the issues will be closer to them and more within their responsibility and because they naturally oppose any U.S. disposition to act unilaterally. Further, our Allies will be unsettled until they can explore the changed situation resulting from Cuba and can know through consultation our reading of it.

On balance, it appears that while our scope for unilateral action may be restricted, we have increased our capacity, with consultation, to bring our Allies along with us.

European suspicion that a sudden, secret, Berlin deal underlay the Soviet withdrawal from Cuba is a possible side effect of U.S. initiatives.

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A variety of Allied interpretations of the Cuban outcome is possible (e.g., as to Soviet motivations, Soviet future intentions, the effectiveness of various elements of U.S. power, and the validity of the proposed sequence of actions in Berlin). It will be important to present and support U.S. conclusions.

III. Possible Approaches

The basic source of instability is obviously the division of Germany. Even if East Germany were prosperous, under a more liberal regime, and without the problem of Berlin, it is doubtful that the underlying sentiment for reunification would die out either in East Germany or West Germany.

Other important sources of instability are the division of Berlin symbolized by the Wall, the uncertain access to Berlin, the unsettled boundaries, and the absence of a definitive German peace treaty. The interaction of military threat and defense, viewed differently from each side, adds to the seriousness of the other instabilities.

Any long-term solution should cut as deeply as possible into these instabilities. The Soviet Union has in the past had a clear and unambiguous policy with respect to Berlin and Germany: a solution of all the above instabilities, perhaps over an extended time frame, in a manner acceptable to it. It has rejected all Western proposals not consistent with eventual progress toward the Soviet objectives. The Western powers, not having the means, diplomatic or otherwise, to reverse this position, have attempted to stand firm against further encroachments.

The question cannot now be answered whether Soviet policy on Berlin will have hardened or relaxed as a result of Cuba. Undoubtedly, however, it will be different. It is possible that they too will see the danger of another Cuban crisis over Berlin. If so, it is possible they will want a prompt solution of the important German and Berlin instabilities in a manner mutually agreeable to them and the U.S. Only on this hypothesis, which will be substantially affected by the possibilities of U.S.-Soviet agreement on other important areas of instability apart from Germany, can one see the possibility of a long-run solution of the Berlin situation satisfactory to the West.

In this situation, the U.S. interest is:

  • —at the maximum, for a long-term solution of the Berlin situation, one apt to last for twenty or more years;
  • —at the middle, for an agreed modus vivendi to carry us along with reduced friction, at least for some years;
  • —at the minimum, for measures in other areas which will hold off serious Berlin discussions or pressures until a more propitious time for negotiation.

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IV. Long-Term Approaches

Possible long-term approaches toward stability include All-German, All-Berlin, and removal of West Berlin, solutions.

A. All-German

Objectively, and certainly from the U.S. interest, the best end would be an all-German solution in which, ultimately, the GDR would in effect be absorbed by The Federal Republic. It would remove all the instabilities listed in III (above).

Such a solution, running directly counter to central Soviet objectives, would probably be considered by Khrushchev only in the context of broad European security arrangements. To achieve it, we should be prepared to make substantial concessions on our side, short of removing Germany from the Atlantic and European political and economic communities.

Some form of merger of the existing two states would seem called for initially, and a wide variety of sequences and phasings of the various steps toward eventual unification would be possible. The nature of the arrangements, and the duration of the process would have to be designed to reduce Soviet resistance. Among the steps toward, or elements of, an all-German solution would be:

  • —Increased economic intercourse between the two Germanies, with substantial economic aid from West to East designed to equalize the economies.
  • —Arms control measures in the Germanies: a surprise attack inspection and warning system, progressive limitations on external forces, perhaps a phased reduction of GDR and FRG forces.
  • —Evolutionary integration of political institutions, beginning with a central administrative organ, progressing toward ultimate common government.

B. All-Berlin

If the unity of Germany cannot be achieved, the other major sources of instability could be removed or mitigated through an all-Berlin solution. It would eliminate the wall dividing Berlin, though it would probably require, from the Soviet viewpoint, maintenance of a barrier surrounding all Berlin.

The instability of access could be greatly reduced by the cession, or perhaps long-term lease, of an autobahn corridor to the city. Were this not obtained, access instability would remain high. An access authority with clear non-bloc control would mitigate but not eliminate the instability.

Under an All-Berlin solution with a corridor, we might be able to force through a definite peace treaty signed by both East and West (or perhaps parallel treaties), a settlement of German boundaries, and the recognition of the GDR. It would then be possible to remove occupation [Page 417] forces and rely on a UN presence and guarantee of the unified city. Other instabilities could be mitigated through liberalization of the GDR regime and increased trade with and credit to the GDR.

This solution, which would in essence accept the permanent division of Germany, would find strong resistance in the FRG. It would be politically difficult for any West German government to give it more than de facto acceptance. The German objective of reunification would remain a serious source of instability.

C. Removal of West Berlin

It is possible to conceive of solutions in which a substantial part of GDR territory, say all that part lying south and west of the Elbe, from Magdeburg to the Czech border, is transferred to the FRG in return for removal of the West Berlin populace out of West Berlin. The populace of Berlin, and all of the GDR, would be given a free choice of staying in the GDR or moving to the enlarged FRG.

The area south and west of the Elbe is the industrial heart of the GDR. The political wrench to both sides would be immense. Boundaries, access, etc. would, however, be definitely settled. It is conceivable that as a part of a serious effort to resolve the whole East-West tensions problem, the USSR would prefer some such long-term solution to those suggested under IV. A and B (above).

V. Modus Vivendi

If a long-term settlement is not feasible, a modus vivendi may not now be impossible.

Intermittently since Geneva in 1959, and steadily over the past year, we have been seeking without success to establish such an agreed modus vivendi, but it may be that the Cuban crisis will increase elasticity to some degree on both sides. The Soviets have had an example of U.S. firmness. They could now feel that rather than test us again, closer to the jugular, it would be preferable either to continue the debate, in the vicinity of the status quo, or to agree on a workable modus vivendi. On the Western side, the Cuban success has made less compelling the need to avoid any appearance of elasticity in order to preserve Allied confidence in our guarantees.

On the other hand, if the Soviets feel their recent losses strongly, they may find it even less possible to make concessions on long-debated issues.

Components of a modus vivendi have been combed over many times, especially in the last year. Aside from significantly reduced tension in Berlin and prospects for reasonable stability there, several other general criteria would have to be met. Allied vital interests would have to be safeguarded; these appear to be unchanged by the Cuban outcome, so that the presence and security of Allied troops, unhindered access, [Page 418] and economic viability cannot be adversely affected. On the Soviet side, assured control over East Germany and some enhancement, possibly nominal, of GDR status appear to be minima. Having these in hand, and depending on how one assesses the likely tone of Soviet policies toward Berlin, micrometer adjustments could be made in the following general schemes:

1.
A series of interlocking declarations by the USSR, GDR, FRG, and tripartite powers about guaranteed access, troop presence, the name “Free City”, and a separate treaty.
2.
Some form of international access authority, accompanied by a separate treaty and unilateral declarations about Berlin (troops remain, no nuclear weapons, etc.).
3.
Some new form of purely local arrangement involving the removal or amelioration of the Wall, guarantee of access, addition of UN administrative presence without changing the occupation powers’ troop strengths or responsibilities, and a separate treaty.

VI. Hold-Off Serious Berlin Discussions; Improve Climate in Other Areas

A third broad line of approach is to refrain at this time from further initiatives on Berlin, on the assumption that the Soviets will also be willing to let the atmosphere cool before making new moves in the hyper-sensitive Berlin area.

This approach aims at allowing both sides to reassess the situation without altering the outstanding issues which underlie instability in Berlin. It attempts to create a more favorable environment for a Berlin solution by progress toward agreement and easing of tensions elsewhere.

Since the status quo is the essence of the existing Western Berlin position, this approach might seem to appeal more to us than to the Soviets, but it leaves us still exposed to the basic dangers of the situation.

Soviet receptivity to a hold-off approach on Berlin is uncertain. It might appeal to them as a way to dissipate U.S. momentum from Cuba, and to allow time for strengthening the Soviet posture against a future confrontation. Apart from possible repercussions of the Cuban crisis upon the Soviet attitude toward Berlin, a Soviet hold-off position is supported by some evidence that GDR and Soviet propaganda is stressing that further delay must be expected before the signing of a peace treaty. It would also be consistent with the trend noted in current discussions between West and East German representatives on the inter-zonal trade.

Measures for a hold-off approach might include:

  • —Progress in arms control: a test-ban agreement, a non-diffusion agreement, surprise attack measures, perhaps a Latin-American nuclear-free zone.
  • —A NATO-Warsaw Pact Non-Aggression Agreement.
  • —Satisfactory carrying through of Laos neutrality measures; reduction of external pressures on South Vietnam.
  • —Progress toward space cooperation.

VII. General

The effects of the Cuban crisis cannot yet be accurately seen. In any event, many elements of any solution are not under our control. In this situation, we must clearly analyze and be prepared to work toward a full spectrum of outcomes.

Insofar as we do control the movement of events, it would seem desirable to aim at a long-range solution. Long-range solutions face much the greatest obstacles; they may well, in the event, prove impossible to achieve. Lesser measures, however, and in particular the hold-off approach, leave us with the possibility of a Cuba-type crisis over Berlin only postponed. Even if there is a Soviet disposition to avoid Berlin initiatives for the time being, an extended moratorium is unlikely, and we could be faced with a challenge under no better conditions, perhaps with some of our bargaining counters expended on peripheral issues. It would therefore appear improvident to overlook any chance to get an enduring solution.

(Ambassador Thompson, on the other hand, holds in general that in the present tensions, and in the face of the present obstacles, acceptable movement in the Berlin problem is unlikely to be possible, and attempts in this line could do damage by arousing Allies and USSR alike. He would therefore support a hold-off approach, seeking to get useful agreements in other areas, improving the climate generally, and approaching the complex of Berlin issues later.)

  1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin. Top Secret. A handwritten note on the source text reads: “Ret’d from Mrs. Lincoln 11/5/62.”
  2. At the second meeting of the Executive Committee of the NSC on October 23, Rostow had been confirmed as the chairman of a subcommittee on advance planning. (Ibid., Meetings and Memoranda Series, Excom Vol. 1)
  3. Top Secret. The source text bears some handwritten revisions, all but one (see footnote 4 below) of an editorial nature.
  4. Printed in volume VI.
  5. The original language was “scrupulously avoided.”