148. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State0
598. Sovs must be convinced by this time we really mean that Allied presence in Berlin is non-negotiable. If there to be further talks with Sovs on Berlin, they may come round to recognize this fact, implicitly if not explicitly. While we no doubt prefer press consistent Allied position based on preserving Four-Power status and working out new access arrangements, might be good idea be prepared with alternative package if Sovs show interest in face-saving compromise. Sovs might well refuse discuss any such proposal but suggested approach and reasoning that follows is designed give Sovs chance claim progress toward their goals and at same time maintain our vital interests.
Our insistence on Allied presence does not stem from obsolete desire maintain wartime military government in Berlin. We too interested in drawing line under World War II, without abandoning objective of reunited Germany or obligation protect freedom West Berlin. In order narrow difference between us, might find way to end occupation regime and put Allied troops in West Berlin on contractual basis following example Sov troops East Germany. Our troops must remain in order fulfill commitment to defend West Berlin but Sov abandonment responsibilities over East Berlin suggests need for adjustments in West Berlin. Allies accordingly might give up wartime powers and sovereignty in West Berlin except obligation to defend city.
Question arises as to where sovereignty would then rest. It could not be given up to GDR nor to free city, i.e. third division of Germany. Only logical place for West Berlin, pending reunification of Germany, would be for it to join that part of Germany which has same political, economic and social system, i.e. FedRep. Allies therefore should withdraw reservation to full association of West Berlin with FedRep. This reservation was made on assumption Sov Government was committed to reunification of Germany on basis of free elections, an assumption which since 1958 has lost its validity through unilateral actions by USSR. At same time Allies would make contractual arrangement with FedRep by which they would retain task of continuing to ensure freedom and defense of West Berlin. In short, Allies would give up sovereignty and all functions of military government except defense which would include ultimate control over West Berlin police forces.
[Page 409]A new status for Allied presence in West Berlin and for West Berlin itself must meet squarely the problem of relations with East Berlin regime and access to Berlin. Admitting that there are many contacts with GDR at present especially among Germans and that such relations are bound to increase over the years, Allies might well accept same controls in traveling to and from Berlin that Germans accept, provided free access for both Allied and German traffic is guaranteed. This could be done through a quadipartite commitment and international access and control authority which would also have to be underwritten by FedRep and GDR.
To make this proposal more acceptable to Soviets it is assumed we would be willing to go quite a distance to meet their demands for recognition of Oder-Neisse line, NATO-Warsaw non-aggression pact, and non-diffusion of nuclear weapons. In addition we might, pending reunification of Germany, give de facto recognition to incorporation of East Berlin into East German state. Might also consider willingness have Federal Republic modify Hallstein doctrine.
In suggesting foregoing, part of which inspired by Senator Schiller’s proposal in connection with plebiscite (conversation with Franklin Roosevelt), assumption is made that Allies would reaffirm in clearest way possible their guarantee to defend Berlin. There might be some difficulty in defining responsibilities of Allies and those of German authorities under contractual arrangement, but it should be possible to assure overriding authority of Allies in all defense matters both in planning and in emergencies. This might even require closer working relations with German authorities than exist at present in military and police field. Allies would cease to deal with practically all activities that come under Kommandatura. Reorganization on Allied side might even contemplate integrated command.
If at any stage in discussions it would seem useful to suggest that Allied forces under contract to protect Berlin might be constabulary rather than army forces, I assume this would make very little difference to us. We could probably only agree to do this in name as in fact they would remain military units.
It is recognized that this proposal means giving up Four-Power status which is legal basis for our presence in Berlin. The question is whether gains outweigh this legal disadvantage.
This proposal would undoubtedly be hailed as step toward recognition of GDR. However, many people including Schroeder, Brandt and I hope Adenauer himself recognize that we must take certain chances in this direction and be willing to make certain de facto arrangements. Modification Hallstein doctrine might permit FedRep to establish diplomatic [Page 410] relations with Poland, Czechoslavakia, etc., without affecting policies three Allies and NATO toward de jure recognition.
Proposal may be interpreted as attempt by Allies to pave way for ultimate withdrawing from their Berlin commitments. It cannot disguise fact Germans would be taking on powers formerly held by Allies. Berlin Senat might welcome greater autonomy but there probably would be real problem overcoming widespread German anxieties. Major effort would be required to show that contractual agreement to defend city affords adequate protection.
Sovs might of course refuse to discuss any plan that incorporated West Berlin in FedRep. In that case we would at least have shown our reasonableness and fact we not wedded to status quo. It would appear as serious offer to end what must seem to many people, particularly in uncommitted countries, to be anachronistic prolongation of military occupation.
Mission’s earlier suggestions to make Berlin eleventh Land were conceived of as unilateral actions to improve Western bargaining position or as retaliation against some major Sov harassment or against a separate peace treaty. Senator Schiller’s recent suggestion which included contractual basis for Allied forces was proposed as question to be put to West Berlin people in plebiscite. New suggestion is based on thought it might be put up as part of package to the Russians for negotiation, since it goes considerable distance in meeting many of their demands. At appropriate time some kind of plebiscite in West Berlin with reference to this package might be desirable.
Before any such package could be mentioned to Sovs even as trial balloon it would presumably have to be discussed with Brit, French and Germans. This in itself could be delicate matter. Discussion among Germans would reveal certain differences in outlook between SPD-influenced Berlin and CDU-influenced Bonn govt recognition, ties, access, etc. (We submitting separate analysis this trend.) Hence believe somewhat futile to expect much in way of new initiatives from Germans. As in past new proposals unlikely to be made unless they originate from American side.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/11–562. Secret; Limit Distribution. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to Paris and Moscow.↩