145. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Regional Organizations0
Topol 581. Subject: Relationship Cuba Crisis to Berlin. In Quadripartite meeting UK representatives, supported by those of France and FRG, have strongly urged US to elaborate during NAC meeting October 30 on its assessment of relationship of Soviet action in Cuba to possible showdown on Berlin. In this connection German Embassy provided us with short and useful paper (which has been sent separately as airgram)1 indicating FRG expectation that Soviets may shortly take action in context Berlin. They foresee possible barring of Allied, mainly US, access to East Berlin as well as harassment of Allied military traffic to Berlin.
Circular 7442 sets forth in general terms assessment Soviet policy with respect to Cuban crisis, concluding that in general terms US tends to believe Soviet action was probably primarily geared to showdown on Berlin, intended to be timed with Khrushchev’s arrival in US and completion of installation of nuclear missiles in Cuba. Following comments are designed to expand somewhat on this general concept as well as to assess possible Soviet resort to “adjustments” in plans for Berlin stemming from US action to eliminate Soviet missile bases. You should draw [Page 405] on Cirtel 744 and this message as guidance for comments in October 30 meeting.
General credibility. You should emphasize that in view of previous clear statements that US could not tolerate Soviet offensive-type missile deployment in Cuba, these missiles must obviously be eliminated if US determination to honor commitments, including those concerning Berlin, is to remain credible throughout world. Allies appreciate US firmness is cornerstone their defense against Soviet aggression. Equally important, however, USSR must fully realize there exists no basis for miscalculation of US intentions. Otherwise, gravest possible risk of war might arise from Soviet underestimation US resolve to maintain vital interests of Alliance in Berlin.
Military significance. You should also emphasize that Soviet nuclear missile bases in Cuba are not just another complex of overseas bases. These bases have special significance since missiles based in USSR and targeted on US nuclear forces are still relatively few in number. In addition, we have radar systems which pick up missiles coming over ice-cap from Soviet Union. The limitations on Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile capability provides West with margin of nuclear superiority which is heart of Western deterrent. If Soviets had been permitted to complete substantial missile program in Cuba, balance of nuclear power could have been significantly shifted. IRBM’s in Cuba would be free of radar detection and with zero alert time both ICBM sites and SAC bases could come under attack without warning and with greater accuracy due to short range. This could seriously prejudice US nuclear posture and with first strike from Cuba Soviets could seriously impair US capability to cover all necessary targets.
Timing. Obviously Soviet timetable for Berlin showdown upset by US action. Now remains to be seen whether Soviets will attempt to move against Allied interests in Berlin, as expected by FRG. If Soviets now reduced from what we estimated to be larger objectives to level of harassments they may choose to engage in harassment before Cuban missile sites are liquidated. Should Soviet Berlin action be directed mainly at US we would expect full Alliance support. In this respect FRG has indicated it would consider Soviet action against US traffic as an action against Allied traffic as a whole.
FYI. At quadripartite meeting October 27, it was agreed four Perm Reps should concert on handling discussion in NAC, on basis this message, UK assessment of effect of Cuban crisis on Berlin, and German paper referred to above. In view Limitel, request you obtain UK assessment from UK delegation.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/10–2862. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Ausland and Kranich; cleared by Kitchen, Hillenbrand, Tyler, R/PM, and the Department of Defense (ISA); and approved by Johnson. Repeated to Bonn, Berlin, London, Moscow, SHAPE, U.S. Element Live Oak, CINCEUR, USAFE, and USAREUR.↩
- CA–4547, October 26. (Ibid., 762.00/10–2662)↩
- Document 141.↩