Office of the Historian

144. Memorandum From David Klein of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)0

Washington, October 28, 1962.

SUBJECT

  • Berlin—Some Random Thoughts—Late Sunday Night
1.
The Soviets might now—conceivably—push hard on Berlin to offset their Cuban losses.
2.
On balance, however, this seems doubtful. A move against Berlin would ultimately end in negotiations (unless the Soviets wanted to resort to the use of force, which hardly seems likely, at least under current Kremlin management). And this is not the most propitious time for the Soviets to enter into negotiations on Berlin. Therefore, if all other things remain equal, admittedly a large assumption, we should not have an early major push on Berlin.
3.
The question then is whether we should not try to take the initiative and do something about Berlin at this time.
4.
In many ways this is a good time for us, particularly if Cuba is settled on the terms that now seem likely. Our bargaining position is incomparably better than it was several weeks back. And since we would be negotiating from greater strength, we would have a greater degree of maneuverability than we have had at any time since 1953.
5.
Also, if we could put together an interesting package, Nikita (assuming he remains at the helm) might find it useful to give it serious consideration, if only as a means to recover some of the substantial ground he lost by his Cuban adventure.
6.
If all this is so, might we not try to see what kind of an arrangement we would want in Berlin—an arrangement that was also saleable to the Soviets—and let the Soviets know what was possible. In this connection, a reexamination of the 10-point declaration might be a useful starting point for an internal U.S. exercise which should be fully completed before it is discussed anywhere else.
7.
For the negotiations themselves, Thompson/Dobrynin might be the best channel. I doubt that Nikita would now be eager for an early confrontation with the President. Gromyko is also an unlikely discussion partner since he is a discredited figure at this juncture and should [Page 404] be treated as such. And even though the New York channel has some possibilities, it has several clearly built-in disadvantages.
8.
As for timing, if my working assumptions are correct (and all of them are clearly debatable) an early approach to the Soviets on Berlin would seem to make considerable political sense.
David Klein1
  1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin. Secret.↩
  2. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩