143. Memorandum for the President0
SUBJECT
- Buildup and Deployment in Phase II of a Berlin Contingency
The Department of Defense has prepared in broad outline a plan for the buildup and deployment of forces which is contemplated, if and as required, in Phase II of a Berlin contingency as described in NSAM-109.1 It is based on the projection of information provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and has been coordinated informally with the Department of State. It does not yet, however, constitute a governmental position.
The purpose of the plan is to make available on call varying levels of augmentation of forces, and to make possible rapid deployments, which will be appropriate to the degree of threat posed by Soviet action, and to provide alternatives to piecemeal expediency or premature general mobilization. It is intended to provide necessary forces, and their support, to meet a developing situation, and to deny to the Soviets the advantage of the accordion tactic of forcing us to oscillate between the extremes of normal readiness and all-out mobilization, with the severe national disruption this would entail.
The plan is divided into four increments, each of which, if ordered directly into effect, would encompass all the provisions of the preceding increment(s). There is no built-in automaticity, however, which would require implementation of a later increment if the previous one has proved sufficient to the need.
Each increment includes appropriate reserve alert and call-up and logistic measures. The first increment provides the heaviest force increase (a Corps force of 3 Army divisions, 1 Marine Division/Wing Team with amphibious task force, 10 Air Force Fighter Squadrons and naval units), the second a lesser ground force but more naval and air force (2 Army divisions, 1 Marine Division/Wing Team with amphibious task force, the US 2nd Fleet, and up to 25 TAC fighter squadrons with necessary combat and logistic support forces), the third includes 1 Army division force, and the fourth calls for general mobilization. No [Page 402] increment is directly dependent on any pre-set date or event for its execution but can be implemented when required. Each increment requires approximately 30 days for execution of the measures which it contains; execution of the increments in succession, if so ordered, is on a cumulative time scale.
Although the buildup and deployment plan is primarily oriented toward Berlin, it is adaptable in appreciable measure to a crisis anywhere and at any time. For instance, in the present Cuban context there remain substantial US strategic reserves to reinforce Europe on schedule by utilizing expanded commercial air and sea lift. Without regard to the timing of Cuban contingency plans, a modified first increment would include two Army Divisions forces slated to “marry up” with the equipment already positioned for them in Europe, a third Army division without support elements and 10 TAC Fighter Squadrons released from the Cuban contingency or mobilized from the reserves.
It would be useful if the corresponding plans of our Berlin partners could be generally built on the same incremental framework as our own. This would ensure that our mutual plans dovetail as closely as possible so as to present a united deterrent if the necessity to implement them should arise. It would, in addition, facilitate development of similar plans by the remaining NATO Allies, and lend added emphasis to the message conveyed to the Soviets.
In order to undertake discussions in the Quadripartite Military Sub-Group directed toward this end, authority is therefore requested to discuss on a no-commitment basis with the representatives of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the United Kingdom this general outline plan as discussed above, and to solicit from them their plans, in turn, for discussion ad referendum. Plans will be referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment and concurrence prior to progressing beyond the informal discussion stage in the Quadripartite Military Sub-Group.
A supporting study is being prepared which assesses the implications for the budget and the Balance of Payments.
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin. Top Secret. The source text bears no drafting information, but is attached to a memorandum from Nitze to the Executive Committee of the NSC, October 27, stating that it had been agreed by the Berlin-NATO Subcommittee at its meeting that day. A record of the fourth meeting of the subcommittee, held at 11 a.m. on October 27, is in Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Miscellaneous.↩
- Vol. XIV, Document 185.↩