Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XV, Berlin Crisis, 1962–1963

146. Memorandum From David Klein and Colonel Lawrence J. Legere to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)⁰

Washington, October 29, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Meeting of the Nitze Subcommittee (October 29)

The principal item on the agenda was maintaining the momentum of the Cuban development, with specific attention to the question of strengthening NATO and the next steps in Berlin.

At the end of the meeting Paul Nitze suggested, and it was agreed, that insofar as Berlin was concerned, the next step was to examine possible arrangements which would stabilize the Berlin situation for a substantial period, and the tactical means for bringing this about. A primary consideration is to reach such arrangement without, if possible, forcing a direct U.S.-USSR military confrontation.

Although Ambassador Thompson went along with the proposed course of action on the understanding that the strictest security would be maintained, he clearly was out of sympathy with the project as proposed. He said that he was reluctant to touch Berlin at this time lest the Soviets become concerned that we were intent upon pushing them—and this time on a very vital issue for the Kremlin. In this context Ambassador Thompson dwelled at length on the differences between Cuba and Berlin in the Soviet view. Therefore he felt the immediate point of departure and concentration on talks with the Soviets should be disarmament or nuclear testing or non-aggression arrangements between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, all of which he believes would ultimately facilitate discussions on Berlin. Moreover, he is concerned that if Berlin is brought under consideration in the present climate, the Germans would push for a substantially harder position than we would want to take.¹

Nevertheless, the consensus was that Berlin ought to be looked at now—first substantively and then tactically and the discussions kept under wraps until there was a decision to bring it to the fore.

This led to the question of NATO—consultation and maintaining the present momentum.²Nitze indicated he was prepared, if necessary, to go to Paris this week—Thursday perhaps—to describe for NAC the Cuban developments—in historical terms—avoiding any attempt at a prognosis of future moves. He felt that this was necessary and if done properly could provide us with a lever for pressing NAC to take a hard look at issues it has thus far been reluctant to act upon.

• David Klein
• L.J. Legere³

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin. Top Secret. Initialed by Klein.
1. In a memorandum to Secretary Rusk on October 29, Thompson reported that Nitze had told him after the Executive Committee meeting that morning that the President wanted Nitze’s group “to work out urgently some alternative solutions to the Berlin problem.” Thompson informed Rusk that he had raised the objections described in this memorandum. In a subsequent meeting among Thompson, Bundy and Nitze, it was agreed that this work would be done by Nitze, Hillenbrand, Thompson, Rostow, and such staffers as were needed. Thompson added that it appeared that the President believed the United States could push its Allies harder following the Cuban crisis. (Department of State, S/AL Files: Lot 67 D 2, Thompson Memos)
2. At the meeting on October 29 the subcommittee also approved NSC/ExCom/BER-NATO #9, a 1-page memorandum for the President on consultation with the Allies, which stated that the Cuban crisis had highlighted the need for constant and systematic consultation and recommended that the Ambassadorial Group and both the civilian and military branches of NATO be regularly briefed on the situation. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin.
3. Printed from a copy that bears these typed signatures.