140. Record of Meeting No. 1 of the Berlin-NATO Subcommittee0
1. Provision of Information to Allies.
[Here follow paragraphs a-f on Cuba.]
[Page 396]g. With regard to a possible political problem in Europe (some elements may blame the US for the Berlin crisis), the US should emphasize that the Soviet actions in Cuba led to a heightened Berlin crisis, and that if we had not acted toward the current Cuban situation the Berlin crisis would have been much worse. Consensus was to conduct a background briefing on a broad basis to include the possibility of releasing additional Gromyko talk material. (Action: Ambassador Thompson will discuss with Secretary Rusk)
2. Functions of the Sub-Committee.
The President desires this group of officials to focus on the combined crises of Berlin and Cuba. The Sub-Committee may not act on a day-to-day basis, but it must tie together long range policies and day-to-day operations. In addition, there may be items from the NSC meetings which this Sub-Committee may need to address urgently.
3. Evacuation of Dependents from Moscow.
This proposal was discussed briefly. (Action: Ambassador Thompson to have paper prepared for agenda)
4. Nuclear Cooperation with France.
An OSD paper was tabled for subsequent consideration.1 (Action in State: Mr. Schaetzel)
5. Soviet Inspection of US Traffic to Berlin.
Considerable discussion on inspection included: question of linking Cuba and Berlin, need to include both East Berlin and West Berlin, requirement to coordinate with FRG, problem of possible blockage or inspection of traffic of all three Powers versus that of the US alone, the tail-gate problem in that the current UK and US practices are different, the possibility of Soviet demands to inspect rail traffic, and the question of “elbow room” or facesaver for the Soviets.
Consensus was that the US should not initiate this subject, but should be prepared for it if it comes up in the UN or elsewhere. A new paper will be prepared. (Action: Mr. Hillenbrand, State)
6. Dramatic Berlin Action to Surprise Soviets.
The need for this type of action was noted.
7. Nuclear Weapons in Berlin.
Consensus was that this would not be a useful undertaking.
[Page 397]8. US Build-up in the Berlin Crisis.
An OSD paper was tabled.2 A short paper should be prepared to answer the President’s question concerning the possibility of build-up in Europe if forces are frozen for Cuban contingency plans. This paper will request authority to initiate exploratory discussions with our quadripartite Allies. (Action: Mr. Nitze)
9. Economic Countermeasures.
The readiness of governments, US and Allied, to implement economic countermeasures was reviewed. State will prepare a paper on status of readiness of Allied governments. (Action: Mr. Schaetzel, State)
10. Breaking of Diplomatic Relations.
The possibility that the Soviets may break relations with the US was briefly discussed. Two questions arise: a. Would the US want its Allies to break relations with the USSR?; b. Would the US want to break relations with the satellites? These questions require study to include the implications upon intelligence. (Action: Ambassador Thompson; and General Twitchell and Mr. Murphy)
- Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Cuban Missile Crisis. Top Secret. The source text bears no drafting information. At the second meeting of the Executive Committee of the NSC, October 23, at 6 p.m., President Kennedy confirmed Nitze as the chairman of the subcommittee on Berlin-NATO preparations and invited him to meet regularly with the Executive Committee in this capacity. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Executive Committee Meetings, Record of Action for Meeting No. 2) In an attachment to his record of the Daily White House Staff Meeting on October 24, Legere indicated that, in addition to representatives of the JCS, CIA, USIA, Treasury, and OSD, Nitze, Thompson, Hillenbrand, Schaetzel, Klein, and he were members of the subcommittee. Legere and Klein sent their joint account of the meeting to Bundy on October 24. (Ibid., Countries Series, Germany, Berlin)↩
- Not found.↩
- The preliminary draft of this paper has not been found; for the final text, see Document 143.↩