Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XV, Berlin Crisis, 1962–1963

139. Memorandum From the Acting Chairman of the Office of National Estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency (Smith) to Director of Central Intelligence McCone⁰

Washington, October 23, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Survivability of West Berlin¹

ASSUMPTION: SOVIET BLOCKADE OF WEST BERLIN IN RETALIATION FOR US ACTIONS IN CUBA

1. West Berlin is economically prepared for a total blockade. We estimate that existing stocks of critical items are sufficient to maintain the physical well-being of the West Berlin population for at least six months. With respect to particular categories of critical supplies, we estimate:

• Food: At least six months (with selective rationing)
• Fuel (Coal): About 1 year
• Medicines: Six months
• Industrial material: Sufficient to maintain employment for 4–5 months.

2. The critical factor, however, is not physical or economic but psychological. Everything would depend on the context of the Soviet move, and how quickly and forcefully the US reacted. A total and uncontested blockade would cause the West Berliners to lose all hope in a matter of weeks. A blockade contested by a successful airlift would probably relieve initial apprehension and sustain morale for a few months. Over a longer period, however, morale would deteriorate rapidly in the absence of a reasonable expectation that the US would break the blockade. The West Berliners would become extraordinarily sensitive to, and suspicious of any indication from either side that the Cuban crisis might produce an accommodation at their expense.

Abbott Smith²

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Intelligence Materials. Top Secret. At the 10 a.m. meeting of the Executive Committee of the NSC on October 23 President Kennedy had asked McCone for an analysis of the effect of a blockade on Berlin. (Minutes of the Executive Committee; Department of State, Central Files, 611.3722/10–2362)
1. This memorandum has been coordinated with the representative of the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, and the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency. [Footnote in the source text.]
2. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.