The Secretary has approved the Task Force’s proposal to have the
Ambassadorial Group reexamine Berlin contingency plans and take a
[Page 388]
careful look at the machinery
for handling the Berlin operation with a view to tightening the plans
and assuring that the machinery can provide the most effective responses
to Soviet moves in Berlin. (The approved Task force paper is
attached.)
This exercise could produce useful results. I am not sure about the
recommendations dealing with the single Commander in Berlin and a single
Ambassador in Bonn. Something more positive and specific is needed in
Berlin. The problem of a single Ambassador is far more complicated than
the paper indicates. But we will deal with these as we go along in the
exercise.
An important question, however, is how this set of proposals fits into
the broader scenario which you had in mind. On this we need a reading
from you on how this Ambassadorial exercise can be dovetailed with other
contemplated actions. One exercise need not exclude the other, but it is
important that they reinforce each other. Can we get a reading from you
on this?
Attachment2
Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State
for European Affairs (Tyler) to Secretary of State Rusk
SUBJECT
- Review of Berlin Contingency Planning
This memorandum is in response to your request that the Berlin Task
Force undertake a review of Berlin contingency planning, in order to
identify all elements of the planning which have been left for
further determination. You asked that this problem be discussed
quadripartitely, with a view to obtaining agreement to recommend to
governments advance commitments as much as possible.
[Page 389]
In addition, the President has recently discussed a basic review of
Berlin planning with the French and German Foreign Ministers.3
This paper examines three key aspects of planning: (1) organization,
(2) planning, and (3) delegation of authority. Organization is the
key to the preparation of plans and their application to specific
situations by the person to whom authority is delegated. Planning is
the key to the delegation of authority. Delegation of authority
(advance commitments by government) is the key to rapid response to
specific situations.
Organization
The present organization for the Berlin problem is illustrated by the
attached chart (Tab A).4 This, however, over-simplifies the problem, since
it implies that Berlin, Bonn, and Washington are organized on the
same basis as Live Oak. This is, however, not the case.
Live Oak is an integrated, full-time staff, with one man in
charge.
Berlin is run by three Commandants, with the help of a Governing
Mayor. Although there is a Chairman Commandant, he has no authority
to deal with most of the problems which arise in Berlin or on the
access routes. Although there is provision for a single commander in
event of “any grave emergency,” the staff that is supposed to assist
him—the Allied (Military) Staff—would be competent to handle only
certain problems, such as civil unrest and an armed attack.
Berlin problems are handled in Bonn by the Foreign Office and three
Ambassadors, assisted by a part-time quadripartite committee.
Although the Washington Ambassadorial Group is led by the US
Chairman, it has no full-time quadripartite staff. The sub-groups
are staffed by very few officers, particularly as far as the
Embassies are concerned, who often have other duties and are
invariably over-worked. Furthermore, the Ambassadorial Group (State
Department) is not tied in with the Live Oak communications
system.
If maximum improvements were desired in this organization, the
following steps should be taken:
- 1.
- Leadership. Make provision for the President to designate
a Single Commander in Berlin and Single Ambassador in Bonn
whenever “any grave emergency” arises in Berlin or on the
access routes.
- 2.
- Staff. Establish full-time quadripartite staffs with
military advisers in Washington and Bonn and an integrated
(political and military) full-time tripartite staff in
Berlin.
- 3.
- Facilities. Make available in the State Department, the
American Embassy in Bonn, and the British Headquarters in
Berlin adequate space and facilities for these
staffs.
- 4.
- Communications. Tie the Ambassadorial Group (State
Department) in with the Live Oak on-line telegraph
communications system.
It should be understood that these steps are closely related and none
can be fully effective without the other; on the other hand, we
believe that some improvements should be possible at this time.
Planning and delegation of
authority
The present state of Allied planning and delegation of authority is
indicated by Tab B.5
This indicates that the planning now underway relates to:
- 1.
- Military
- a.
- Quadripartite naval counter-measures:
Seaspray
- b.
- NATO
alerts/military build-up
- c.
- NATOBERCON/MARCON
plans/Tripartite-NATO relationship/preferred sequence
paper
- 2.
- Political
- a.
- Civilian ground access: Passports, visas, and
customs and possible Allied aegis
- b.
- Peace treaty
- c.
- United Nations
- 3.
- Counter-measures
- a.
- Military (tripartite autobahn patrols, autobahn
convoys for individual Allied travelers,
etc.)
- b.
- Non-military (selective economic and other
non-military counter-measures)
The chart also indicates that delegations of authority are primarily
related to military plans (Jack Pine and autobahn convoy rules of
conduct). Very little authority has been delegated in the
non-military areas, primarily because governments are unwilling.
Both planning and the delegation of authority could be facilitated if
the organizational suggestions made above were carried out. If there
were agreement for the President to appoint a Single Commander in
Berlin and a Single Ambassador in Bonn, plans could be prepared on
the basis of the assumption that they would exercise certain
delegated authority. This would require, however, that the Single
Commander and Single Ambassador have full-time staffs, supported by
adequate facilities and communications.
Conclusions
- 1.
- Organization. Although we should direct our efforts toward the
goal of ultimately obtaining quadripartite agreement to the
President having authority to appoint a Single Commander in
Berlin and Single
[Page 391]
Ambassador in Bonn, we should not introduce this into the
quadripartite forum at this time. We should concentrate rather
on the development of an integrated full-time tripartite staff
in Berlin and a full-time quadripartite staff with military
advisers in Bonn. In order to facilitate communication between
the Ambassadorial Group and Berlin, Bonn, and Live Oak, we
should arrange for the Ambassadorial Group (State Department) to
be linked to the Live Oak communications net. We should also
prepare space and facilities for a quadripartite staff in
Washington.
- 2.
-
Planning. The Ambassadorial Group should double its
efforts, in order to accomplish the following no later than
November 15:
- a.
- Establishment of Seaspray, for the coordination of
naval counter-measures.
- b.
- Submission to NAC
of quadripartite plans for a Phase II military
build-up.
- c.
- Submission to NAC
of quadripartite plans regarding a possible peace
treaty.
- d.
- A basic review of plans to meet a possible GDR demand for passports,
visas, and customs.
In addition, as suggested by Foreign Minister Schroeder, the Ambassadorial
Group could review existing plans to be sure they are
current and consistent with each other.
- 3.
- Delegation of authority. The Ambassadorial Group should also
review present plans, to determine if there are any further
areas in which authority could be delegated to Berlin, Bonn, or
Live Oak. It should examine in particular:
- a.
- Free Style and related Allied ground access
plans.
- b.
- Jack Pine and related air access plans.
- c.
- Plans related to civilian access.
Recommendation
That you authorize us to initiate a review of Berlin contingency in
the Ambassadorial Group along the lines indicated in the conclusions
above.6
