Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XV, Berlin Crisis, 1962–1963

136. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, October 18, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Germany and Berlin

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.
  • The Secretary
  • Mr. Akalovsky
• U.S.S.R.
  • Foreign Minister Gromyko
  • Mr. Sukhodrev

After dinner, the Secretary and Mr. Gromyko conversed alone.

Mr. Gromyko said that since he was going to leave soon, he wished to make some clarifications with respect to the points which he had discussed with the President earlier today,¹ and particularly on the question of a German peace treaty and of the normalization of the West Berlin situation on the basis of such a treaty. Reading from a prepared text, he said that the major obstacle to agreement between the two sides was the question of the withdrawal of Western forces from West Berlin. If agreement were to be reached on this question, the Soviet Union believed that the path to agreement would be cleared. The Soviet Union could not accept the present situation, no matter what arguments the U.S. adduced in contending that West Berlin was not a NATO military base, because objective reality was objective reality. The Soviet Union did not underestimate, or to put it in a positive way, it appreciated the significance of the rapprochement on a number of questions relating to a German peace settlement, which had resulted from the USSR exchanges of views. The Secretary, of course, knew what those questions were. This rapprochement was a definite and substantial step forward, but it did not resolve the main issue. Mr. Gromyko went on to say that during his last conversation with the Secretary, certain important points relating to a German peace settlement had been touched upon. The Soviet Union was prepared and believed it to be useful to clarify the respective positions and to set forth in more specific terms its own attitude on certain points raised by the Secretary. He said that he now wished to discuss certain points in greater detail than he had discussed them with the President.

Mr. Gromyko continued that the Secretary, as well as Lord Home, had touched upon the question of an international access authority and of an international air access authority. The Western side had emphasized that this proposal was based on respect for the sovereignty of the GDR and on the existing international practices. If such were indeed the intentions of the U.S., then, as he had said to the President, the USSR could take account of the Western position. The USSR was prepared to agree to the creation of an international arbitration authority to deal with air access to West Berlin and to act in settling frictions if they were to arise in the course of the actual implementation of an agreement on access. He said he wished to stress that such an authority would be an arbitration body and not a body that would be incompatible with the sovereignty of the GDR. The Soviet Union proceeded from the premise that technical services related to air traffic to and from West Berlin would be handled with the participation of GDR authorities. Alternatively, and this would represent a broader arrangement, the USSR could also agree to West Berlin’s being a party to the proposed international arbitration body; the Soviet Union was willing to agree to such an arrangement in order to facilitate agreement. Basically, the Soviet Union proposed a choice between (a) an international arbitration body to deal with all types of access, i.e., land, water, and air access, and the US was familiar with the Soviet proposals for such a body; or (b) an international arbitration body to deal only with air access. Thus, as the Secretary could see, the Soviet Government was guided by the desire of satisfying the wishes of the Western Powers and of meeting the Western Powers half way. The USSR believed that these proposals by the Soviet Union offered a basis for understanding, assuming that a solution of other problems, and primarily that of the withdrawal of Western forces, was found.

Referring to the Secretary’s remarks at the last meeting regarding the desirability of contacts between West and East Germans, Mr. Gromyko noted that he had already said to the President that the Soviet Union appreciated the Secretary’s statement to the effect that the U.S. Government favored such contacts. He wished to reiterate that such a position of the U.S. could further the alleviation of tensions in Germany and Europe, particularly if measures were taken to stop provocations against the GDR and to guard the Western side of the GDR border. Of course, the U.S. Government was aware of the fact that the Soviet Union had always been in favor of the development of cultural and trade relations between the GDR and the FRG and between West Berlin and the GDR. Development of such contacts and relations would contribute to a more tranquil situation and to more normal relations between the GDR and West Germany. However, it could not be overlooked that the development of such contacts would not mean a solution of the main problems facing the U.S. and the USSR in connection with a German peace settlement and the normalization of the West Berlin situation, and above all the question of the forces of the three Western Powers in West Berlin.

As to the question of German unification, Mr. Gromyko said that he had already indicated to the President what could be said about German unification in the process of concluding a German peace treaty, together with agreed solution of other questions linked with such a treaty. He wished to emphasize that the Soviet Union desired an agreed solution of the questions relating to a German peace settlement, including a peace treaty with the GDR; if such a solution were reached then a provision might be included concerning the possibility of German reunification. In this connection, he wished to state that such a provision would not be contrary to the position of the Soviet Union, because the Soviet Union had never believed that the door to unification should be shut tight. The Soviet Union had always expressed the view that if the Germans were to agree on a platform for unification, the Soviet Union would accept it as a fact. As was well known, the Soviet Union considered that the question of German unification was a matter for the two sovereign German states to resolve. As to the provision concerning German unification, such a provision could be incorporated either in an agreed joint statement of the Powers concerned or in a peace treaty with the GDR. In any event, the Soviet Union believed that if agreement were reached with the West on the questions which must be resolved in connection with a German peace settlement, including the major issue of the withdrawal of the occupation forces of the three Western Powers from West Berlin and the elimination of the NATO military base in West Berlin, a mutual understanding on this point would not be a problem. Mr. Gromyko said that he deemed it necessary to make these remarks in the hope that they would find due understanding on the part of U.S. and the other Western Powers and would facilitate agreement on other questions which must be resolved in connection with a German peace settlement.

The Secretary thanked Mr. Gromyko for this further elaboration of the remarks he had made to the President. Referring to access, the Secretary said he believed that agreement on this problem should be possible. Basically, if the Four-Power arrangements contained in the Jessup-Malik agreement on access were to be adhered to, there should be no problem. In other words, access would not intrude in the activities of the East German authorities, nor would those authorities intrude in access. For instance, when planes flew from Vienna to Athens over Yugoslav territory, they did so with the permission of Yugoslav authorities and thus they did not intrude in Yugoslav sovereignty; on the other hand, Yugoslav authorities did not interfere in that traffic. If the Four Powers could agree on a type of arrangement similar to that contained in the Jessup-Malik agreement, there should be no difficulty. We had no intention of intruding in the activities of GDR authorities. It was standard practice for aircraft to fly over the territory of a country without that country interfering in such flights.

The Secretary then stressed that the major problem was that of the presence of Western forces in West Berlin and stated that in all seriousness there was no agreement on that question. On that question, the Soviet Union must decide whether it wanted to go to war to remove those forces. This point was fundamental to the West, but it appeared that the more we explained our point of view, the greater the appetite became on the part of the Soviet Union to accomplish its objective. There was certainly no agreement on this question. We had sought to meet the Soviet Union on such questions as boundaries and nuclear matters, but on this point there was no understanding. No one could speak in terms of eternity, but at present this was an utterly fundamental question. The Secretary said that the U.S., and the President personally, would study most carefully what Mr. Gromyko had said to see whether anything could be done.

The Secretary pointed out that when Lord Home had spoken about air access, he had not been speaking for the U.S. or the Western group as a whole. As far as we were concerned, we supposed that all types of access, and not only air access, should be considered. Since Mr. Gromyko had put forward two alternatives, we wished to indicate our belief that the general problem should be treated as a whole.

The Secretary then emphasized that he did believe that there was considerable advantage in contacts between West Germany and East Germany and between West Berlin and East Berlin, because such contacts could promote the interests of both sides and decrease tensions. Thus, we were entirely in agreement that steps should be taken in that direction.

The Secretary continued that the U.S. had tried to take certain steps in the direction of narrowing the gap between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., although this has created certain tensions between the U.S. and some of its allies. However, there was a point where vital interests were involved, and with reasonable effort on both sides a solution to such problems should be found. The Secretary recalled that we had interposed with regard to the provision in the West German Constitution declaring West Berlin a Land of the FRG. Likewise, we had pursued a policy in the nuclear field which eased the problem the Soviet Union appeared to have with regard to nuclear matter in Central Europe. The Secretary also recalled that he had indicated privately to Mr. Gromyko that the Eastern boundaries were not a problem in a de facto and practical sense. However, there were some points where we just could not agree. He hoped that the Soviet Union would introduce some evidence of reciprocity in those questions so that vital interests of both sides would be taken into account.

The Secretary then observed that the President was leaving town tomorrow and that he was to call on him tonight. He said we would discuss access with Ambassador Dobrynin. We were already engaged in discussions with our allies and hoped that we could bring the positions of the two sides close together. However, he wished to stress once again that the basic problem was that of the Western forces in West Berlin.

Mr. Gromyko said that as far as the sovereignty of the GDR was concerned, the Soviet Union could never agree to dividing the GDR sovereignty in two parts or to any arrangement encroaching on that sovereignty. The Soviet Union could never sign any agreement providing for such an arrangement. What the U.S. appeared to have in mind was respect for the sovereignty of the GDR in form, with actions which would contradict the principle of observance of that sovereignty. Such plans should be cast aside. What the Soviet Union had in mind was that standing international practices must be applied in full.

Mr. Gromyko continued that the Soviet Union was negotiating with the U.S. on a German peace settlement in the hope that a solution could be reached on an agreed basis. If there were no such hope, the Soviet Union would not have negotiated with the U.S. and would not have wasted its time. However, if it were to be impossible to reach an understanding, there should be no doubt in anybody’s mind that the Soviet Union would sign a peace treaty with the GDR and that all measures would be taken which must be implemented in connection with a peace treaty and which would safeguard the GDR sovereignty, including measures related to access. It depended on the Western Powers what would follow then. The Soviet Union wished to sign a peace treaty and proposed peace. The Soviet Union was in favor of reducing tensions in the world. If there was to be war, the West would have to make it, but the Soviet Union would be able to stand up for itself, and this also went for a number of other states which wished to sign a peace treaty. This was the Soviet position, which he wished to emphasize once again.

Mr. Gromyko went on to say that the U.S.S.R. could not agree to the West’s maintaining a military NATO base in the center of the GDR. The West had come to Germany and West Berlin as a result of the defeat of Nazi Germany, and so had the Soviet Union. He wondered why the West wished to stay there indefinitely. He said he wished to reiterate and reemphasize that the Soviet Union was proposing a peaceful act.

The Secretary stressed that the presence of the Soviet Union in East Germany was also a result of Nazi Germany’s defeat; there was no difference between Soviet presence in East Germany and our presence in West Berlin. He suggested that the possibility of a few survivors deciding who was right on this question be set aside and that both he and Mr. Gromyko as Foreign Ministers were in duty bound to avoid such disastrous results. If the Soviet Union meant by GDR sovereignty that the GDR would control access, that was totally unacceptable. Our view was that there should be no interference by the GDR in access, in accordance with standard practice of international law. If the GDR would not interfere, there would be no problem. However, if the GDR wanted to supervise a restricted access there was no prospect for agreement. We agreed that the Soviet Union was a great power; however, the Soviet Union must accept that the U.S. was also a great power.

Mr. Gromyko asserted there was no analogy between Western presence in West Berlin and Soviet presence in East Germany. The U.S.S.R. was in the GDR on an entirely different basis, on the basis of contractual commitments, just as the U.S. was in West Germany on the basis of some contractual commitments with West Germany. The Soviet Union had proposed that all foreign troops be withdrawn from foreign territories, but unfortunately the U.S. had refused. As to West Berlin, that was an entirely different matter and there was no analogy whatsoever here, because the troops in West Berlin were occupation troops and the occupation regime still prevailed in that city. As to sovereignty, it was easy for the Secretary to rationalize. The Secretary apparently meant if the GDR should intervene in access that would be unacceptable and would not correspond to the U.S. concept of sovereignty, whereas things would be all right if the GDR refrained from such acts. Mr. Gromyko said he wished to stress that there were no two types of sovereignty; there was only one notion of sovereignty and only one norm of international practice, and such practice must be applied to the GDR as to any other country. International norms which were standard practice must fully apply to the GDR. Access could not be a barrier here, because the GDR had stated its willingness to assume obligations to ensure unrestricted access. The Soviet Union had stated that it was prepared to underwrite those obligations together with the Western Powers or with the UN. The Soviet Union had always stressed its belief that it should be possible to make unrestricted access compatible with the GDR sovereignty; in fact, the Secretary himself had said this. Thus, he could not understand why the Secretary was taking such liberties in treating sovereignty; little could remain of sovereignty as a result of such treatment, and the Soviet Union could not agree to that. Mr. Gromyko said he wished to make these clarifications because there was perhaps some lack of understanding of the Soviet position on the part of the U.S. Both sides were negotiating and their respective positions must be understood correctly. He had been patiently clarifying the Soviet position because perhaps there was some misunderstanding which should be eliminated.

The Secretary then said he wished to ask a direct question. He wished Mr. Gromyko would tell him whether today, as of this day, he considered that the Soviet Union had obligations to the U.S., the U.K, and France, with respect to the presence of Western forces in and access to West Berlin. He wondered whether Mr. Gromyko regarded this as existing obligations.

Mr. Gromyko said that, speaking briefly, the Soviet view was that the occupation regime in West Berlin had outlived itself and that it could not live forever. The U.S. Government appeared to believe, in spite of the fact that 17 years had passed since World War II, that the occupation regime and the occupation forces in West Berlin represented a normal situation. Yet the Soviet Union believed that this was not a normal situation; indeed it was an absolutely abnormal situation. It was impossible to conceive that the Western Powers could really believe they could tear up such allied obligations as were not agreeable to the West, while insisting on those obligations which were to its liking. The U.S.S.R. could not accept such an approach, which was tantamount to an arbitrary interpretation of the situation. Moreover, a free and demilitarized city of West Berlin would not harm anyone; a German peace settlement and normalization of the West Berlin situation on the basis of such a settlement could not injure anyone. Everybody would gain from a solution of this problem on that basis, and particularly the cause of peace. Whatever concessions, if the term concession could be used at all, that the West would make would be not to the U.S.S.R. but to the cause of world peace, and that would be a significant concession indeed.

The Secretary pointed out that Mr. Gromyko had failed to answer his question. He asked again whether the Soviet Union believed it had formal obligations to the Western Powers with regard to the presence of Western forces in Berlin and with regard to access.

Mr. Gromyko asserted that he had answered the question.

The Secretary said that leaving aside whether the Soviet Union wanted to change the situation, he wanted a yes or no answer to his question.

Mr. Gromyko replied that, briefly speaking, the Soviet Union believed that the occupation regime in West Berlin with all of its attributes had outlived itself. Seventeen years had passed since World War II and that regime must be ended. This was required by the U.S.S.R., it was needed by the U.S. and it was needed by all countries. The U.S. should not look for any devious motives behind this position. The Soviet Union was against basing foreign policy on such motives and if anybody did so it was not the U.S.S.R. Mr. Gromyko then said he wanted to ask the Secretary a question of his own. He wondered why the West believed it needed a NATO military base in West Berlin and where were U.S. vital interests in that connection. After all, the U.S. was here and West Berlin was there. As to what the Secretary called freedom of West Berlin, the Soviet Union had suggested that a joint agreement be signed to guarantee West Berlin’s way of life. But the U.S. did not want to do this; it seemed not to trust its prestige and might which would underlie such an agreement. Gromyko wondered what was wrong with this suggestion; after all, all of the great powers and, if necessary, the UN would back up such guarantee.

The Secretary suggested to take the peels off the banana and to look at the heart of the matter. The Soviet Union was a great power and so was the United States. We were in West Berlin, although one could not talk in terms of eternity, which was a fiction in the Soviet mind. At pres-ent we were in West Berlin and we would not be driven out. We were a great power and we would not accept defeat unless the U.S.S.R. fought a war and attempted to defeat us. This was not a threat, it was a fact, since we were committed to the people of West Berlin. The Soviet Government and the Central Committee must consider this. The U.S. wanted to resolve this problem peacefully, but it could not be resolved peacefully on the basis of U.S. defeat. Solution to this problem must be sought on the basis of a mutual recognition of the vital interests of both sides and on the basis of mutual respect. We had gone a long way to recognize the vital interests of the U.S.S.R., and the U.S.S.R. must recognize ours. There was a point beyond which lay surrender and we could not go beyond that point. The Soviet people were courageous, but so were the American people. What we asked for was mutual respect, and without that there could be no peace.

Mr. Gromyko said he agreed with the Secretary’s remark about mutual respect. He thought this was a good formula; agreement must be sought on the basis of mutual respect. However, the Soviet Union could not find such respect on the part of the U.S. The Secretary’s remark indicated that the U.S. wished to adhere to a one-sided position. It wished to preserve the NATO military base in West Berlin and to preserve Western forces in West Berlin, although U.S. interests in this connection were not guided by the interests of maintaining the freedom of West Berlin or of safeguarding U.S. security. What the U.S. wanted was to maintain the hotbed of fever which was shaking all of Europe. He wondered where was mutual respect here. The Soviet Union had no desire of placing the U.S. in a position of capitulation, and the Secretary had incorrectly described the Soviet position. Quite the contrary, the Soviet Union believed that the U.S. was a great power. The U.S.S.R. was also a great power and had considerable strength. The President and Mr. Khru-shchev had had a frank exchange of views on this point. However, the U.S. position on West Berlin did not indicate that the U.S. recognized this fact and that it based its policy on it. The U.S. had consistently been shying away from any proposal based on the interests of peace and respect for the sovereignty of the GDR. Thus, the Secretary’s reproach that the U.S.S.R. wanted to place the U.S. in a position of surrender was inaccurate. The U.S. position only strengthened the Soviet Union’s view that a solution of this problem was required by the security of the U.S.S.R. and many other states, by the security interests of all of Europe, and indeed of the U.S. itself. The U.S.S.R. was convinced that this was so. The U.S.S.R. and many other states wanted to draw a line under World War II. The Central Committee and other leading bodies in the U.S.S.R. had discussed the probable motives by which the U.S. was guided in clinging to West Berlin as a military base. United States security interests were certainly not among those motives. Thus, the conclusion had been drawn that the U.S. wished to retain West Berlin as a hotbed of tensions.

The Secretary replied that Mr. Gromyko had greatly distorted this question. The fact was that on one side the U.S.S.R. wanted to raise its flag in East Berlin and East Germany and on the other side it wanted to lower our flag in West Berlin. That was totally unacceptable. The U.S.S.R. was in East Germany only because of the Nazi surrender. We had voluntarily abandoned Thuringia and Saxony to abide by the arrangements concluded during the war. We would not allow a situation where the Soviet Union would abandon its responsibilities and obligations in Germany. The Soviet Union must reckon with our vital interests. After all, we were not children, we were adults.

Mr. Gromyko replied that the Soviet Union did not place this problem in the plane of the U.S. allowing or not allowing something. The U.S.S.R. proceeded from objective realities, which were not contingent upon U.S. actions. The U.S.S.R. did not intend to raise its flag, it only wished to raise the flag of peace. The Soviet Union had never signed any obligation providing for the West’s eternally staying in West Berlin and maintaining a NATO base there. Nobody in his right mind could have assumed such an obligation. In fact, there was no such obligation. It was the U.S. and its allies who had torn up their obligation and wished to keep only those obligations which were advantageous to them while discarding those which were not to their liking.

Mr. Gromyko then expressed regret that no agreement was discernible on the main question. This was clear from the present exchange of views, and he agreed with the Secretary on this point. This was a regrettable and sad situation.

The Secretary said that the basic problem remained where it had been since 1945, namely, whether the Soviet Union was willing to conduct its foreign policy on the basis of its solemn obligations and agreements or wanted to resort to the law of jungle. The U.S. wished a peaceful settlement, and there was no question about that. If such a settlement should prove impossible, the U.S. would not shirk its responsibilities. The Secretary then reiterated that we had gone a long way to resolve this question and all other questions relating to a German settlement, although our efforts to bring the positions of the two sides closer together had caused tensions with some of our allies. He wished to stress that the heart of the matter was whether the U.S.S.R. would recognize that the U.S. was a great power and could not be pushed around. He could assure Mr. Gromyko that the U.S. public would not be pushed around. Surely, agreement could be reached on the basis of reciprocity, but without reciprocity there was no possibility of agreement. So long as Mr. Kennedy was President and he, Mr. Rusk, Secretary of State, there would be no possibility of agreement without reciprocity.

Mr. Gromyko contended the Secretary’s reproach regarding Soviet policy since World War II was unjustified. The Soviet Union had carried the main burden in that war, and many U.S. statesmen, including President Roosevelt, had correctly and objectively appreciated the Soviet Union’s role and its burden in defeating the Nazis.

The Secretary interjected that the Soviet-Hitler agreement had opened the door to World War II, so that not too many tears should be shed over that.

Mr. Gromyko responded that this was an old story resorted to by people when they lost their equilibrium, and suggested that no time be wasted on this point.

The Secretary pointed out that the U.S. had never been an ally of Hitler, whereas the U.S.S.R. had in 1939–1940.

Mr. Gromyko continued that the aspersions the Secretary attempted to cast on Soviet policy were unjustified. It was not the U.S.S.R. but the West that had built bases surrounding the territories of other states, it was not the U.S.S.R. but the West that had started raising tensions, and it was not the USSR but the West that had torn up agreements. Thus, if the term law of jungle could be applied, it was the U.S. that had resorted to it in many instances since World War II. The Secretary was incorrect in saying that the U.S.S.R. was not dealing on the basis of reciprocity. The Secretary’s assertion could not be proven in one single instance. The Soviet Union had emphasized and suggested that solutions should be sought on the basis of mutual acceptability and complete equality of both sides. The U.S. was for the observance of this principle only in words, whereas in fact it had a narrow view of problems and looked at them from the standpoint of NATO and the Western Powers. The U.S. rejected almost automatically and out of hand Soviet proposals so long as it was able to retain West Berlin as a NATO military base.

Mr. Gromyko said that in general he wanted to tell the Secretary that solution to the various problems could not be found on the basis of strong language; one must be more reasonable and cooler, because much was behind words and much depended on what one said. If the Secretary and the President sought common ground with the Soviet Union, they would find no lack of similar desire on the part of the Soviet Union. However, unfortunately as of now the Secretary’s remarks did not indicate that the U.S. wished to pursue this course. Mr. Gromyko recalled that he stressed to the President today the Soviet view that it would be good if common language could be found between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. on questions dividing them, including the question of a German peace treaty and of normalizing the West Berlin situation on the basis of such a treaty. He observed that apparently this conversation was drawing to an end.

The Secretary noted that Mr. Gromyko’s last formulation was the same as the one used in Vienna in 1961, i.e., “German peace treaty and normalization of the West Berlin situation on the basis of such a treaty.” He regretted that not more progress had been achieved, pointing out that the U.S. had tried to meet the U.S.S.R. on many questions involved in this problem. As to the main question, Mr. Gromyko and Mr. Khru-shchev must decide on what basis they were prepared to reach agreement. We knew on what basis we were prepared to reach agreement. The Soviet Union must decide whether there would be peace or not. We believed that all nations must live on the basis of peace, and if the U.S.S.R. joined UN members and lived in peace, that would revolutionize the world and there would be no problem with the U.S.

The Secretary continued that we would follow up on the points Mr. Gromyko had mentioned and try to narrow the differences. We had tried to narrow the differences in the past and would continue to do so in the future, in the hope that common language could be found. The Secretary then recalled Mr. Khrushchev’s remark to one of his visitors that the Rusk-Gromyko talks would produce no progress and that the situation would remain more or less as it was. The Secretary regretted that no particular progress on this problem had been made during Mr. Gromyko’s stay in the U.S., and stated that both sides must see whether they could bring these matters closer to agreement.

Mr. Gromyko expressed doubt that the Secretary had any reason to equate U.S. policy with the sentiments of UN members. He thought that the Secretary had attempted to place such a sign of equation. The Soviet Union was familiar with the sentiments in the UN and believed that the overwhelming majority of UN members favored a peaceful and just solution of acute international problems. Those feelings were not in accord with U.S. policy on most acute problems. Thus, the Secretary’s attempt to equate U.S. policy with those feelings was unjustified. Mr. Gromyko then thanked the Secretary for the dinner and his hospitality.

The Secretary pointed out that, to his recollection, not a single proposal or resolution advanced in the UN by the U.S.S.R. against opposition by the U.S. had succeeded or been adopted.

Mr. Gromyko agreed and said that the Soviet Union was also familiar with the weaknesses and the darker aspects of UN activities. However, he was speaking of the general feeling of UN members, who were in favor of peaceful solution of international problems, of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, and of peaceful coexistence. This fact was as unquestionable as the fact that the sun would rise tomorrow. Mr. Gromyko concluded the conversation by saying that he merely wished to point out that no sign of equation could be placed between U.S. policy and the sentiments of UN members. Any attempt to do so was a little too much.

The conversation ended at 12:20 a.m.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/10–1862. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Akalovsky and approved in S on October 23. The meeting, which was held at the Department of State, took place during Rusk’s dinner for Gromyko. A summary was transmitted to Moscow in telegram 953, October 19. (Ibid.)
1. See Document 135.