Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XV, Berlin Crisis, 1962–1963

130. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, October 9, 1962, 4 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Berlin

PARTICIPANTS

• US
  • The President
  • The Secretary of State
  • Ambassador Bohlen
  • Mr. Tyler, Assistant Secretary
• France
  • Couve de Murville, Foreign Minister
  • Ambassador Alphand

The President asked the Foreign Minister for his judgment on the situation. He replied that the Soviets seemed not to have made up their minds as to what they would do. The Wall had settled the physical problem of the flow of refugees from east to West. What was now left was largely a question of prestige. He thought the Russians would have to do something one day. The question was how much risk they were prepared to take. He thought they were prepared to take some risk but not a major risk leading to war. He thought Khrushchev would want to pull off something like a treaty with the GDR to show that he had brought about a change in the situation from what had existed previously. He thought it not unlikely that Khrushchev would come to New York under cover of the General Assembly in order to talk over Berlin with the President.

The Secretary asked if Berlin had been discussed between De Gaulle and Adenauer during the recent German visit. The Foreign Minister said the subject had been mentioned but not really discussed.

The President said he was worried about the slowness of measures foreseen under our contingency planning and the time needed for a military probe to be carried out. According to present plans, four days would be required to put our troops onto the Autobahn. He felt we should have improved planning not only in the area of possible contingencies, but with regard to the centralization of responsibilities in Berlin. He thought that the idea of a 60-day pause for mobilization was unacceptable.

The Foreign Minister agreed that the contingency planning was not very realistic. He felt it had been in a direction contrary to what should have been done. He said our present position was to probe the Soviets although we knew what the result was going to be. Then we would get stuck and we would then merely think the situation over. He felt that if something were to be done at all, it should be immediate. He said that in 1948 we had been able to carry out an airlift while accepting ground blockade because the Soviets did not then have nuclear weapons. This time if ground access were cut, we would run the risk of being dragged into war. He thought that our present posture was ineffectual, and potentially more dangerous than something more incisive would be.

The Secretary said our planning had been conducted on a basis of Allied forces in being. If the West had had more forces under NATO, we would have had more choice.

The Foreign Minister referred to the reoccupation of the Rhineland by Hitler in 1936, when France didn’t move because of the restraining influence of her military advisers. He felt that military advice does not sufficiently take into account essential political factors. He felt we should not wait and think things over while the Russians were mobilizing. It may well be that the Russians feel we are putting on a show to try to impress them, but that they would not be persuaded by this that we mean what we say. The President said we ought to have forces ready to go within one or two hours on the Autobahn.

Commenting on the small number of French troops on German soil, the Foreign Minister explained that he thought it was a little risky to have such a large concentration of troops in Germany itself and that there might be some advantage for them to be deployed in greater depth. At this point the Foreign Minister sought to buttress this view by referring vaguely to views which he claimed General Norstad had expressed to him in the same sense. However when the President commented that he thought he was familiar with General Norstad’s views and that he had always been in favor of forward strategy, the Foreign Minister did not comment further.

The President read from and discussed a report by General Taylor on the time required to move troops in the event of crisis.¹ The Foreign Minister said it was evident that the time envisaged was much too long and that we should react within 24 hours. He said if ground access was cut, the West needed to move immediately on (1) economic and other measures in the field of blockade and (2) sending a small unit onto the Autobahn within 24 hours. He said it should not be difficult to keep a few hundred men on an alert basis. They need not be massed on the Brunswick airfield but should be in a position to be rapidly transported to the checkpoint. The President commented that point 2 above was more important and urgent than point 1.

Ambassador Bohlen commented that one trouble was that governments were unwilling to commit themselves and to delegate authority for action ahead of events, except for matters relating to air access which was a simpler problem. Thus governments had to react and take decisions after the events with which they were confronted.

The President said that Khrushchev was probably counting on a slow reaction from the West. The President thought he might write a letter to De Gaulle setting down some of the things that were bothering him with regard to our present contingency planning, and see whether perhaps General De Gaulle would favor the idea of trying to obtain certain advance commitments by governments. The Foreign Minister said he thought this would be useful.

The Foreign Minister reverted to the subject of the two French divisions under NATO and said he could see that the President was interested and even worried about this matter. He exposed at some length the political reasons why it was desirable to keep French troops on French soil. Twenty years had passed since the French Army had been stationed in France. It had lost contact with the people of the country and this had caused serious trouble. It was necessary to readjust the relationship between French forces and the French population. If they were on German soil, they would still be in a foreign country and out of touch with domestic sentiment (the Foreign Minister stressed the sensitivity of what he had just said, adding that this was something which General De Gaulle would never tell the President himself).

The Secretary wondered what interpretation Khrushchev would place on the absence of French troops from German soil.

The Foreign Minister said he didn’t wish the President to believe that France was relying on the US nuclear capability as an excuse for not doing her conventional share. He said the problem was to try to prevent misunderstanding on the part of Khrushchev.

The President said that Khrushchev had not moved to seize Berlin militarily because he knew what this would entail but we had a real problem with regard to ground access. He asked for the Foreign Minister’s view as to what we should do on the ground after we found our access blocked.

The Foreign Minister said things would move fast either we would begin to talk right away or there would be war.

The Secretary asked the Foreign Minister whether he would favor talking at this point. The Foreign Minister’s reply was unclear and generally evasive.

Ambassador Bohlen suggested that consideration be given to a Four Power communication to the Soviet Union, which would include the Germans.

The President referred to the points which Gromyko had made to the Secretary in their conversation² in relation to the withdrawal of troops. He said Khrushchev would have to drop his insistence on this point. This was not a matter which could be negotiated.

The Secretary said we were taking an urgent and searching look at the whole access question. He thought there was a possibility of the Soviets dropping the troops issue. He thought study should be given to the possibility of some variant of the Soviet arbitral commission.

The Foreign Minister said that Khrushchev would not wage war over Berlin. What he was doing was asking us to quit. The Foreign Minister thought that there might be the danger of a new uprising in east Germany, as had happened in 1953.

The Secretary said Brandt felt we had underestimated the potential role of the east Germans.

The Foreign Minister said that a crisis would not last long, but would come to a head rapidly.

The President said that as a result of the Soviet actions on Cuba, there was much less prospect of reaching agreement on Berlin. Thus Khrushchev might try to force something. He asked the Foreign Minister what the French would do if the Soviets were to cut access on the ground. The Foreign Minister replied that if this were to happen both in the air and on the ground, we should begin by taking appropriate action in the air. He said that if they were to cut both military and civilian traffic on the ground, we should use force and go ahead with the probe. If only military traffic on the ground were cut off, we should consider whether it was necessary to use force ourselves by undertaking a probe, because air access could be used for supplying the military garrisons.

The President pressed the Foreign Minister again and asked if his thought was that if military traffic on the ground were cut off, we should not have recourse to a military probe. The Foreign Minister’s answer was evasive.

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, France, General. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted and initialed by Tyler and approved in S on October 12 and in the White House on October 24. The source text is labeled “Part 1 of 4 Parts.” Parts 2 and 3 dealt with Laos and the Congo respectively; Part 4 also dealt with Berlin, containing a 2-paragraph discussion between Rusk and Couve de Murville on contingency planning. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/10–962) Couve de Murville was in the United States to attend the 17th session of the U.N. General Assembly.
1. The President is referring to CM–7–62, October 6, which, inter alia, provided an analysis of the actions necessary to put the West in position to launch a battalion-sized probe on the Berlin Autobahn. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 B 3542, 091 Germany)
2. See Document 129.