Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XV, Berlin Crisis, 1962–1963

129. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State⁰

New York, October 6, 1962, 10 p.m.

Secto 89. Paris pass USRO. entire three hour post-luncheon Gromyko-Secretary conversation devoted to Berlin. Following summary main points based on uncleared memcon which being pouched.¹

Gromyko opened by asking whether Brandt had exerted much pressure on US. Secretary denied Brandt put pressure on US, emphasizing US speaking for itself since its vital interests involved. Referring to Khrushchev’s remarks to foreign visitors that everybody in West except Adenauer agreed with Moscow, Secretary stressed if that impression really prevailing in Moscow it totally incorrect. Secretary noted Brandt anxious find way ease situation in Berlin and also referred to contacts between FRG, Berlin and east-Germany directed at same objective, stating relaxation tensions in Berlin in constructive manner would make difference in situation.

Gromyko denied Soviet Government under impression US speaking only for Adenauer and had no position of its own, but claimed Adenauer’s extremist position influenced US position, which evidenced by chain of facts relevant to substance US–USSR talks in Geneva and earlier in New York. Re FRG’s efforts decrease tensions, claimed no evidence to that effect so far. Reiterated standard Soviet argument re existence two independent German states and that Soviet position based on that fact. Stated US–USSR talks so far had produced narrowing of gap on some points but there are still obstacles on road toward agreement. Asserted US–USSR’s first preference still to reach agreed solution and said that if US doesn’t wish sign peace treaty with GDR, then agreement could be reached on status West Berlin, presence Western forces West Berlin, and access to West Berlin. Gromyko thought that if West unwilling reach agreement on these points, the time approaching when one should take stock of situation to see where both sides stood emphasized question of peace settlement with Germany not one of prestige but rather of peace in europe.

Secretary recalled Soviet statements that unification should be left to Germans themselves, noted that difficulty was Soviets apparently meant it was up to Ulbricht rather than German people as such, stressed importance of not closing door on unification by what we say or do and pointed to dangers that might emanate in time from divided Germany. Secretary stated our first choice is peace treaty with one unified Germany, but since there is no agreement as to how World War II should be ended legally, we had to look at factual situation, which includes two parts of Germany and Western presence in Berlin as third fact to be fully taken into account. Provided this done arrangement could be reached.

Re US–USSR exchanges so far, Secretary deplored lack of reciprocity on Soviet part and noted that the more we tried to close gap the more USSR backed away and attempted put pressure on us to move where we could not do so.

After Secretary had reviewed US positions on such matters as status West Berlin and presence Western forces West Berlin, he referred to Gromyko’s remark re taking stock of situation and emphasized US prepared sit down and analyze situation at any time. Noted no need wait for US elections.

Gromyko then reiterated along well-known lines Soviet position re revanchism in West Germany, and respect for sovereignty GDR. Re stock-taking, stated he meant no bookkeeping operation but rather political analysis respective positions two sides and drawing appropriate conclusions. Stressed main problem now, which would influence settlement of entire set of questions, was presence Western forces West Berlin. Reiterated Soviet position on that issue and Soviet argument re NATO bases West Berlin. Denied USSR had retreated from points of rapprochement achieved so far.

Gromyko then summarized Soviet analysis situation as follows essential elements German peace settlement are: (1) Recognition German borders; (2) NATO-Warsaw Pact non-aggression pact; (3) Non-armament FRG and GDR with nuclear weapons; (4) Cessation subversive activities West Berlin against GDR; and (5) Complete respect for GDR sovereignty. Asserted USSR would use all its prestige and influence to ensure with Western powers or with UN free and uninterrupted access to West Berlin by land, water and air and noted there were other, minor questions to be resolved such as non-introduction nuclear weapons to West Berlin, transit and customs arrangements, et cetera, but reiterated main stumbling block is US insistence on perpetuation stationing Western forces and occupation status West Berlin. Concluded by saying he had expounded Soviet position again on behalf Soviet Government and Khrushchev in hope it would meet with understanding on part US Government and that both sides would be able move forward on that basis. Said USSR would deeply regret if it had to act without US or its allies. Noted Secretary’s remark that there is no need wait for US elections and stated USSR always prepared exchange views if warranted by situation.

Gromyko then referred to Home’s remark re possibility of creating international air access authority.² While noting Home had spoken only in general terms, Gromyko wondered how such an authority could be reconciled with respect GDR sovereignty and recalled Soviet proposal for creation arbitration organ to act in case of dispute re transit and communications. Suggested US and UK might take another look at Soviet proposal since it could perhaps accommodate Home’s suggestion.

Secretary pointed out Gromyko’s use of term revanchist appeared indicate all Germans who sought unification their country were revanchists. Refuted claim Berlin NATO base, pointing out western troops were there for political and not military purpose. Stressed fact all Soviet proposals re composition forces West Berlin were aimed at undermining Western presence West Berlin and changing character West Berlin. Re Home’s reference to access authority, Secretary stated it was application of idea discussed sometime ago. Soviet suggestion for arbitral body had not led to detailed discussion because question very quickly arose to what kind of city access would lead. If understanding were reached on that question, then technical problems would be easier to resolve. Secretary wondered how Soviets could expect West rely on fresh agreements at very time they wished break existing agreements. Questioned value suggestion for non-aggression pact between NATO and Warsaw at very time when Soviets applying aggressive pressure with respect West Berlin. Soviets asking for confidence at very time they destroying confidence in existing arrangements. Secretary concluded he would report conversation to President and we would study it very carefully to see whether anything opened up. Stressed, however, we could not leave West Berlin so on that point we were back to Vienna.

Gromyko reiterated Soviet arguments re revanchism and NATO base West Berlin and again referred to air access authority. Stated parallel discussion latter question useful, but agreed it ran into main question of to what access would lead. Reiterated suggestion US take another look at Soviet proposal for arbitration organ and noted that proposal could perhaps be discussed again at later date.

Secretary stated we would review carefully problem of access. Believed access as such not impossible to resolve, but pointed out main question would still remain.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/10–662. Secret; Limited Distribution. Repeated to Bonn, Paris, Berlin, Moscow, and London.
1. SecDel/MC/92. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2153)
2. Home had advanced this proposal at meetings with Gromyko in New York on September 28 and October 1. Minister Hood briefed the Washington Ambassadorial Group on the proposal and the meetings with Gromyko on October 9. (Topol 487 to Paris, October 9; ibid., Central Files, 762.00/10–962)