Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XV, Berlin Crisis, 1962–1963

12. Memorandum From the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant (Weiss) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Kitchen)⁰

Washington, March 14, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Berlin

1. Following the Berlin Task Force meeting this morning, a smaller group was convened in Mr. Davis’ office to discuss current happenings in the Berlin air corridors.

2. The sequence of events is about as follows:

a. Norstad requested and was granted authority to schedule civil, as well as military, air transport flights.¹

b. General Clay raised a major objection to this authority (Berlin 1729, TS)² on the grounds that adjustment of civil schedules would have a highly adverse effect on the Berlin population and would be looked upon as a major inroad on access.

c. This problem seemed fairly well under control by virtue of (i) Norstad’s previous conservative attitude toward attempting to adjust flights of even military transports and (ii) caution expressed in the cable giving him the authority to adjust civilian flights, to the effect that such adjustments should be kept to a minimum.

d. In Berlin’s 1733³ concern is expressed over the continued Soviet harassment, with the proposal that fighters be put in the corridors and that a transport be flown above 10,000 feet.

e. The Secretary cabled (Secto 27)⁴ that he talked to Clay. He stated that he was sympathetic to the idea of fighters and that he believed that we could not indefinitely delay responding to Soviet actions. However, he also stated that he did not want the authority for calling the shots on Berlin to be transferred to Geneva, but rather wanted Washington to be aware of his views.

f. Subsequently a call from Geneva (Hillenbrand to Ausland)⁵ disclosed that the Secretary was forwarding a second message which amplified, and perhaps modified, some of his previous views. Also, Hillenbrand indicated that discussion with Stoessel revealed that Norstad was sending a message to McNamara. Exact content uncertain.

g. Mac Bundy called requesting State’s views indicating he was going to be talking to the President. In brief, Ausland indicated that in connection with use of fighters in the corridors there were three points to be assessed (i) the effect of such action on Berlin morale, (ii) possible effect on the Geneva Conference and (iii) consequences for escalation. He also indicated that it might be more logical to first fly above 10,000 feet and then resort to fighters if this seemed necessary.⁶

3. The purpose of our meeting was to discuss all of the foregoing events. In the course of our discussions these points were brought out:

a. With regard to use of fighters, Norstad had been very reluctant to resort to this in the past for two very good reasons (i) once used we have played what amounts to almost our last trump before actual fighting and, (ii) militarily, Norstad is not sanguine about the outcome. Also the question was raised as to the various alternative ways that fighters could be employed. Although armed escort is possible, it is difficult and would probably not be a first choice. On the other hand, simply flying armed escorts occasionally through the corridors, though it might sound a warning, would have no direct effect whatsoever on Soviet tactics of scheduling specific transport flights in the corridors, which is what has given rise to our annoyance.

b. With regard to flying over 10,000 feet, the question was raised as to whether this should be first done with a military or civilian aircraft, and if the latter, whether empty or with passengers.

4. I raised the question of necessity to distinguish carefully the basis for our taking a further action. Clearly the Soviet harassment has had no significant effect upon our access. In fact, in this regard, up to this point in time, one might say that the Soviets are failing in their activity. On the other hand, the need to respond to the Soviets might nevertheless justify an action. In this event, I raised the question of a possible ultimatum of breaking up the Geneva Conference within a specified period if the Soviets did not cease and desist.

5. Our meeting has been temporarily adjourned pending receipt of the second message from the Secretary and Norstad’s message to McNamara.⁷ The White House has asked for an interim reply by 2:00 p.m., as to where matters stand. It is then likely that we will attempt to reach a more definitive position before the end of the day.

p.s. Norstad’s cable has just been received. He strongly recommends against either going above 10,000 feet or using fighters. He feels that the Soviet attempts have been ineffectual and that accordingly a response beyond that heretofore utilized is not required. (We have also received a telephonic message from Geneva indicating that the Secretary supports Norstad’s view.) Accordingly, I do not believe anything will go out on this matter tonight. However, I have suggested to EUR that we send a cable to the Secretary in Geneva pointing out that in light of the Norstad position, the question really boils down to whether we feel it is necessary, as a matter of principle, to respond to the arrogant Soviet actions which result in our negotiating in Geneva under duress. If we do, then rather than take action in the corridors we might better give the Soviets a direct warning to the effect that unless the harassment in the corridors ends we will end the discussions at Geneva. This course of action would only be logical if one assumes that the Soviets do not desire a break-off in the Geneva talks. This is a point which must be weighed in the balance, and we have obviously not had time to do so.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3–1462. Top Secret. Drafted and initialed by Weiss.
1. Norstad asked for the authority in SHLO 5–00207; a copy of the JCS telegram granting the authority was transmitted to Paris in telegram 4889, March 13. (Ibid., 762.72/3–1362)
2. Dated March 13. (Ibid.)
3. Telegram 1333 is the same as telegram 36 to Geneva; see footnote 2, Document 11.
4. Document 11.
5. No record of this conversation has been found.
6. No record of Bundy’s conversation with Ausland has been found, but at 5 p.m. Ball called Bundy to review the latest discussion within the U.S. Government, including his own conversations with Secretary Rusk. Their conversation followed the lines described in numbered paragraph 3 of this memorandum. (Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations)
7. One of these two messages (probably the second) is ALO BW 247, March 14, received in the Department of State at 6:29 p.m. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/3–1162) The second message has not been further identified.