Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XV, Berlin Crisis, 1962–1963

11. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State⁰

Geneva, March 13, 1962, midnight.

Secto 27. Eyes only President and Acting Secretary. USBER—Eyes only Clay. General Clay called me KY–9¹ this evening (confirmed Berlin Tel 36)² to express concern about effect air corridor situation on morale West Berliners. I urged him send telegram³ topside Washington in order to get his views clearly before you. Unfortunately, I cannot establish effective KY–9 communication with Norstad from here.

Key question is effect on West Berlin morale both of present level Soviet actions and countermeasures we may take. I see Clay’s dilemma as to attitude he should take in Berlin. If he says there is no physical danger to air access (which he believes is true) he might invite increased Soviet action. If he says there is danger he could start panic. I have some sympathy his suggestion that we send armed aircraft through corridors but have some concern that this might create panic regarding air travel we are trying to avoid. In this connection believe it would be important obtain estimate Bonn as to whether introduction fighters would affect willingness Panam and other civil airlines continue operations under these circumstances. My own first reaction, however, is that we should not refrain from sending occasional armed aircraft through fear of escalation corridor situation because (a) indefinite prolongation present Soviet practices cannot be accepted and (b) strong line taken by Home and me to Gromyko ought to be backed up with some sort of reaction.

Suggest State, Defense with full access contingency planning Joint Chiefs and ambassadorial group consider urgently what we should recommend to you on suitable steps. Concerted administrative harassments communist bloc airlines at free world terminals, as already planned for somewhat different circumstances, might be one such measure. Extending Norstad’s tripartite authority to use air space above ten thousand might be another. Fighter escort military transport scheduled during period Soviet activity might be another.

I am reluctant to make exact suggestions from here since Geneva cannot be headquarters this problem. But I feel we should devise steps to be used in immediate future if our warning to Gromyko produces no tangible result in air corridors.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Chron. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Rusk and concurred in by Kohler. Repeated to Berlin.
1. This conversation had taken place at 7:40 p.m., but the record in the Rusk Files indicates that it was not monitored. (Ibid., Telephone Conversations)
2. Telegram 36 from Berlin to Geneva, March 13, reported that Clay was “seriously disturbed” by General Norstad’s proposal to regulate civilian transport schedules in the face of Soviet harassment. (Ibid., Central Files, 962.72/3–1362)
3. At this point in the source text Rusk wrote: “Clay’s telegram is attached,” but it was not, nor has it been further identified.