Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XV, Berlin Crisis, 1962–1963

13. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State⁰

Geneva, March 14, 1962, 11 p.m.

Secto 34. Eyes only for Acting Secretary from Secretary. Ref Tosec 25.¹ In putting forward elements of possible modus vivendi to Gromyko, I have taken into consideration Ambassador Thompson’s view that it would be tactically unwise at this stage to disclose categorically to Soviets that we would be prepared to accept GDR personnel at checkpoints. While I agree it may be useful to indicate that our approach is consistent with “respect for local rules and regulations,” I consider it important that Soviets not be aware of our full position on GDR personnel at checkpoints until we have more evidence of likelihood of Soviet willingness to reach agreement. Otherwise, effect might well be to cause them to abandon effort reach agreement and proceed with their separate peace treaty.

I have, however, as indicated para 12 Secto 29,² made points that we have no difficulty with known fact that East Germans administer certain parts of access and coordinate traffic by water, rail and Autobahn, that there thus already was considerable amount of direct East German participation in this matter, and that therefore there should be no particular problem.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/3–1462. Secret.
1. Tosec 25, March 13, is summarized in this telegram. (Ibid., 611.61/3–1362)
2. See the source note, Document 10.