Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

177. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, February 25, 1963, 5 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Tour d’Horizon

PARTICIPANTS

• Germans
  • Defense Minister Kai-Uwe von Hassel
  • Ambassador Karl Heinrich Knappstein
  • Minister-Director Franz Krapf, German Foreign Office
  • Mr. Horst Blomeyer-Bartenstein, German Embassy
  • Mr. Fruedenstein, Interpreter
• Americans
  • The Secretary
  • Assistant Secretary William R. Tyler, EUR
  • Mr. Robert
  • M. Brandin, EUR/GER

The Secretary opened the conversation by saying that we had been disturbed by events of the past month or so, but that our compass bearings were being clarified. We were distressed by our problems with de Gaulle. Keeping to defense questions for the moment, we were surprised by de Gaulle’s January 14, 1963, press conference.¹ At Nassau we thought it important, after settling the Skybolt question, to get UK support for a multilateral force. If Europe wanted to be partners in this force, we were ready to cooperate. For over a year we had been asking for European views and were perhaps optimistic in expecting that the various European countries could agree on a proposal. Therefore, it seemed to us that the agreement with the UK was an important step. At Nassau it was also our intention to bring the French into the picture. We talked to de Gaulle and thought he would examine the Nassau Agreement in the light of France’s own nuclear program, capabilities and requirements. In the meantime, we would have worked out our agreement with the British, which we have been trying to do this past week. It was our thought that on the basis of the agreement with the UK and the French study, we could then have talked with the French. These talks would not have been circumscribed in any way and we had hoped they would develop the relevance of the French nuclear program to the Nassau Agreement. As it has turned out, however, we know very little about the French program, in some ways less than we know about the Russian program, although NATO knows all about ours.

The Secretary went on to say that since the French had indicated they would study the Nassau Agreement and discuss it further, de Gaulle’s press conference came as a shock. We had reason to believe this matter would not be settled without warning at a press conference. De Gaulle’s action limited the possibilities even from the French point of view. We did not consider the conversations closed however. We were where we were before January 14, but it is more difficult to proceed now.

Minister von Hassel said the multilateral force had not been discussed in his meetings earlier in the day at the Pentagon, but it would be discussed during his trip to SAC the following day.² The discussions at the Pentagon concerned German military procurement in the US, cooperative logistics and cooperative R&D.

Minister von Hassel said State Secretary Carstens had informed the Secretary of the German position on the Franco-German Treaty. As regards de Gaulle’s press conference, Germany was also caught by a surprise. The Chancellor attached the greatest importance to UK entry into the EEC, Prior to and during the Franco-German discussions in Paris, the Chancellor tried to influence de Gaulle regarding this matter.

Minister von Hassel emphasized that, as the Chancellor and he had said to Mr. Ball, who happened to be in Bonn on January 14,³ Germany would fully support the multilateral force. Afterward in Paris de Gaulle said he fully understood the German attitude toward joining the multilateral force, although the French attitude differed. During the Paris talks de Gaulle also said he fully understood the German intention to give 100% support to NATO. The Germans made it clear they supported the NATO strategy and political concepts and that these would be the guidelines of German policy. The Franco-German Treaty would be within the framework of the Alliance and could not be interpreted as affecting NATO or any other treaty commitment of Germany.

Minister von Hassel said the military part of the Franco-German Treaty covered four points. First, an effort would be made to reach as much common ground as possible on strategy and tactics. Second, there would be an exchange of officers, instructors, trainees and units up to the company level (the last for a week or so). Third, there would be joint development of weapons where this was appropriate. Fourth, there would be cooperation on civil defense.

Minister von Hassel acknowledged that the first point raised the question of whether France and Germany intended to develop their own separate strategy. The answer, as the Germans made clear to the French, is that the German strategic concept will continue to be based on NATO. As the map shows, however, there is a strategic relationship between Germany and France. France is essential to Germany as a rear area, particularly as concerns logistics. Germany is important to France as a forward area. For the first time France has now agreed (in writing) to support the forward defense strategy. France will move one division from Trier to Bavaria and will set down logistic support for a third division inside Germany as a basis for wartime deployment. Another French home division will be moved to Alsace. It is the German view that France now agrees to the concept of forward defense. This change in the French attitude can be attributed to the excellent relations between France and Germany.

Minister von Hassel then turned to the discussions with the French on joint R&D. The French originally proposed that all R&D be on a joint basis, but the Germans would agree only to joint R&D where appropriate. The agreements clearly reflect the German viewpoint. The Germans made it clear that the Franco-German Treaty could not disturb Germany’s arrangements with the US and the UK on cooperative logistics and cooperative R&D. Consequently, there would be no sudden diversion of German military procurement from the US to France. The US would continue to be the main source of German foreign military procurement.

Minister von Hassel said Mr. Gilpatric had told him of meeting the Italian Prime Minister Fanfani who had said that all the laws and regulations now being drafted in the Common Market—e.g., common agricultural policy—would make UK entry more difficult. Minister von Hassel said he had discussed this with Hallstein who denied that this was the case. In fact, Hallstein maintained the reverse was true. Minister von Hassel said that in talking to de Gaulle he had made the point that he favored Franco-German reconciliation, but such reconciliation would have a solid basis only if the UK were in the Common Market. De Gaulle, however, thought the UK was not ripe for membership in the EEC. Nevertheless Germany would do everything to bring the UK into the EEC. Public opinion and all political parties in Germany favored this step.

Turning to the NATO nuclear force, Minister von Hassel said he was looking forward to meeting Mr. Merchant to see what could be done in creating this force and how Germany could contribute. From a political and military viewpoint, Germany supported the NATO nuclear force as a vital instrument of NATO policy. It was difficult to answer the question of whether France would eventually participate, but a start should be made. When the NATO nuclear force was in being perhaps France would reconsider its attitude, particularly when it saw that there was genuine sharing. De Gaulle was clearly worried about a US-Soviet deal at European expense. The creation of a NATO nuclear force might help dispel this fear.

Minister von Hassel then assured the Secretary that Germany would not do anything to help France develop its own independent nuclear force. This had not been discussed with the French. They were going ahead on their own initiative.

The Secretary said he would like to make a few remarks preparatory to Minister von Hassel’s meeting with the President.⁴ Concerning our reaction to the Franco-German Treaty, Germany should be aware that Franco-German reconciliation had been an objective of US policy for 17 years. To illustrate the problem in our mind, however, we knew what the German attitude was on the larger issues at stake because we had been in close touch with each other. We did not know what de Gaulle had in his mind; nor did his own Ministers apparently. In this marriage of a known and unknown therefore, we wondered what the children would look like. During 1947–1949 the US made the basic decision that its own defense required concerting US and European defense. US troops in Europe were not there as tourists or as a gesture to Europeans; they were there because it was basic to our own defense and the defense of US and Europe together. It was our impression, however, that de Gaulle intended to participate less and less in NATO. This raised the question of what was in his mind. We had the impression that he made a distinction between the Atlantic Alliance, which he supported, and NATO, about which he had reservations. His reservations about NATO might have something to do with its organization. The French had proposed establishing a tripartite directorate in NATO, which the US had refused in deference to Germany and others. The French had also made some references in Paris to the reorganization of NATO, but had said nothing positive. The central point in our mind was that the US and German lines of policies on defense were clear, but we did not know about the French line.

The Secretary pointed out that if things were said from across the Atlantic which gave the impression that the US was no longer needed in Europe, the instinctive reaction of the American people would be to bring our troops home. This was not yet a serious problem, but it could be one. For this reason, the strong reaction of the Five at Brussels was very important.

Turning to the multilateral force, the Secretary said we had noted Paris press stories discounting the Merchant Mission. The fact was, however, that the US has moved from a position of neutrality on this matter. After Nassau we considered we had an obligation to try to develop such a force. We did not intend to be dogmatic and we recognized the necessity of consultation to give Germany and others a chance to express their views. The multilateral force in our opinion could strengthen the Alliance. It would also convey the right signals to Moscow. There was a danger that the wrong signals were being received in Moscow since January 14. There was no real difference in the West regarding the USSR, but the Soviets might get the wrong idea. If a genuine opportunity opened up for discussions with de Gaulle on the multilateral force, we would not reject it. It seemed to be difficult to establish contact however.

The Secretary then asked Minister von Hassel if the Germans thought there was any difference in the French mind between the Atlantic Alliance and NATO.

Minister-Director Krapf said the Foreign Office had never thought about this and he wondered how the two could be regarded as separate.

Mr. Tyler said de Gaulle was opposed to political integration because it diluted sovereignty and to military integration because it diluted the patriotic spirit. Hence, he might be opposed to NATO as a sort of military equivalent of the UN in which national identity was lost. His effort to establish tripartism in NATO was not successful. He did not like the integration aspects of the NATO multilateral force. Although the French had recently been stressing cooperation between Europe and the US and their loyalty to the Alliance, they said nothing about NATO.

Minister-Director Krapf observed that the French seemed to be taking a similar attitude in the European community toward political integration.

Minister von Hassel said de Gaulle had a problem of restoring the morale of French troops and modernizing the French Army. The French Army in fact had to be rebuilt. This would only be possible by stimulating patriotism. De Gaulle realized Europe would be lost if left alone by the US, but he feared a US-Soviet deal at Europe’s expense and wanted to take measures to offset it.

The Secretary said it was important to the Alliance that we try to banish a number of historical ghosts, such as de Gaulle’s fear of US-Soviet deal, the US fear of a European third force, Germany’s fear of a Franco-Soviet deal, etc. Ghosts could be manufactured at will, but if we all made clear our commitments, they would not materialize.

With respect to negotiations with the USSR, the Secretary said we did not see any basis for any agreement at this time. There was no indication that the USSR was ready to recognize our vital interest in Berlin; the prospects for an agreement on nuclear testing were gloomy; there were difficulties in Laos because the Pathet Lao was not performing as it should; there was no significant movement in the disarmament field; and Cuba would remain a major issue as long as there was a single Soviet soldier there.

The Secretary observed that whenever the Soviet pressure rose, quarrels seemed to break out in the West.

The meeting concluded with Minister von Hassel referring to his forthcoming trip to SAC in Omaha. The Secretary took the occasion to note that there had been a massive increase in nuclear deployment in Europe since 1961. Minister von Hassel responded that this information had been given to the Germans by the Defense Department.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, Pol Ger-US. Confidential. Drafted by Brandin and approved in S on March 1.
1. See Document 57.
2. A memorandum of von Hassel’s discussions with Secretary McNamara on the plane trips to and from Omaha is in Department of State, J/PM Files: Lot 69 D 258, McNamara/von Hassel.
3. See Document 166.
4. A memorandum of von Hassel’s conversation with the President on NATO strategy is in Department of State, Central Files, Def 4 NATO; a memorandum of their conversation on the Nassau Agreement is ibid., Def 12 NATO.