Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

166. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State⁰

Bonn, January 14, 1963, 7 p.m.

1791. Paris also for Stoessel and McGuire.

1. Under Secretary Ball met with Chancellor, Schroeder, von Hassel and others for two hours this morning in meeting devoted exclusively to Nassau Agreements. Chancellor did all the talking on German side. General impression conveyed by Chancellor that although Germans had many questions they wished discuss in connection Nassau Agreements, they were prepared to cooperate fully in NATO study and, as he put it, “with vigor.”

2. Under Secretary began with presentation similar to one given before NAC,¹ stressing heavily our determination to proceed with planning multilateral force with other interested countries NATO Alliance. He said that Nassau decision to supply Polaris to British and similar offer to French affected shape of Western deterrent into 1970s and therefore it was our firm determination not to freeze pattern in such a way that major Western Allies could not work with US in control of such a force. Indivisability of Atlantic defense meant that there must be participation on equal footing of FedRep and others. He put great stress on bringing FedRep into arrangements on basis of full and equal participation. He said that our first preference had been to have British contribution solely to a multilateral force but that we recognized special problems of the British Govt and had therefore settled on an intermediate position whereby our agreement to supply Polaris to British was tied to their contributing that force to NATO and to supporting US in an effort to create a multilateral force. He said that we would be willing to proceed immediately to work on creation of this force as rapidly as possible. It is our hope that in long run we would be able to transform existing national forces into a multilateral force which would give effect to the principle of indivisibility and prevent nuclear proliferation.

3. Ball indicated that he hoped major countries would begin a study of structure of such a force. Problems of mixed-manning, financing and control in which all major countries could contribute. He referred to the President’s letter² which had suggested possibility of an executive committee in NATO as one solution to control problem. He also placed great stress on necessity for NATO Alliance to consult on all areas of confrontation, even beyond the geographical limitations of Alliance itself.

4. We have been talking about a multilateral force for some time but the principal difference in our position after Nassau is that we no longer are waiting for a European initiative but are now forced by decision to use Polaris to take initiative ourselves in proposing plan to key European countries. We are no longer prepared to proceed in leisurely fashion but wish to proceed as soon as possible. We are not prejudging final form that such a force would take, but we are willing to engage in free discussion promising substantial contributions and technical information, hardware and financing.

5. We feel that seaborne force whether surface or submarine is best. Presently we tend to favor a submarine force because of its greater security from a military point of view. However, surface force is cheaper and not subjected to some of mixed-manning difficulties of submarine force.

6. Chancellor thanked Ball for his presentation and the President for sending him and said that Prime Minister must have “launched his attack suddenly because there seemed to be many gaps in our plan.” He stressed, however, that this was a great project for the Alliance and these gaps would have to be discussed. He said that he would cooperate fully in this study but wished to make several observations. First, he wanted to point out the international commitment of the FedRep not to produce atomic weapons. He assumed, however, that this scheme is not prejudiced by that commitment. Second, he welcomed the change from a passive role in US position because he knew that Europe alone could not come up with proposals for a multilateral force. Third, he recalled that last US proposal made by General Norstad in 1960 had been shelved prior to last election. Fourth, he pointed to presence of large Soviet forces on the Eastern frontier including 22 well-trained reliable Soviet divisions and stressed German view that NATO planning must include use of intermediate range and tactical nuclear weapons. He raised question of whether or not creation of seaborne force might not call into question continuation of NATO forward strategy.

7. Ball immediately answered this observation by stating there was no intent on part of United States to diminish battlefield tactical use of nuclear weapons but that our strategy remained that we would use force necessary to stop and eject any move into NATO territory. He stressed that we would hope that this would not escalate but that we accept consequences of our strategy and are prepared for nuclear conflict.

8. Chancellor recalled recent letter from Premier Khrushchev³ in which he had promised immediate use of nuclear weapons in any conflict in Central Europe and said it must be NATO plan to retaliate with both tactical and strategic forces. Ball again replied it was not our intent to withdraw all nuclear forces to the seaborne force, that we must regard new multilateral nuclear force as an addition to European forces and not substitute for existing forces.

9. Chancellor then referred to position of General de Gaulle and Mr. Ball replied that we, of course, did not know what his final position would be but that we hoped France would cooperate. If not, we cannot wait and must proceed to plan a multilateral force. British understand this and understand that there is no condition of French acceptance for further planning.

10. Chancellor then referred to right of UK and of France to withdraw in event of national emergency. He assumed that this meant they could each order independent use of force and that all others would become involved if there were to be such a confrontation. Ball replied that problem at Nassau was to recognize fact of British independent capability and that French are determined also to have such capability, and yet to plan for future in such a way as to seek merging of these national forces into a multilateral force. Macmillan had recognized that there was little possibility of withdrawal and independent use, but he had public problem of past history and British image of 1940 to deal with. Our view is that by creating multilateral force as quickly as possible we will show example and actually attract national forces. Chancellor then commented that 1940 was a bad historical example and Ball replied that we all have to deal with tendency of people to deal in terms of past history and not appreciate change brought about by new technology.

11. Chancellor agreed that there was new element in situation but speaking frankly wondered whether Secretary McNamara’s statements about increasing conventional forces reflected understanding new strategy. Ball replied in long interchange that increasing conventional forces in the US view was a way of giving additional strength to the nuclear deterrent. We saw that as only way to stop any temptation to nibble away at NATO territory. Chancellor then referred to Cuban situation which he said was opposite of present European state of affairs. There in Cuba US had preponderance of strength. Here Russia has bulk of divisions, perhaps better equipped and tougher than German and American forces. Conventional war would mean defeat in Europe. Ball replied that building of conventional forces would mean that Russians would be less tempted to try any advance in Europe because they would be certain that response would escalate quickly and they could not have cheap victory. Chancellor then said real danger of nibbling was in Soviet economic offers of trade to West and in spy infiltration in Western Europe.

12. Chancellor ended by saying that he wished to make two points. First, he agreed with our Paris statement on importance of placing these forces under SACEUR, and second, on question of ordering use of forces, he recalled discussion he had with President⁴ in which President had said if he could not be reached others would always be available to give command for use of American nuclear power. Chancellor hoped same response arrangement could be made for multilateral force. Ball replied we would be willing to begin immediately to plan control mechanism. Perhaps along the lines of executive committee, which could act under appropriate guidance without any delay. He hoped that Ambassador Grewe would be given prompt instructions to begin work in Paris. Chancellor promised full cooperation in multilateral project, implying that Under Secretary had answered main faults which he had had in mind. After luncheon with Chancellor there was meeting with Defense Minister and members of his staff in which much of same ground was covered, and in which Germans raised several technical questions. To these, Ball replied that US had no preconceived notions and suggested that answers could appropriately be found in NATO consultation.⁵

Hassel agreed, and reiterated that Grewe would cooperate in immediate, intensive NATO consultations.

Dowling

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 375.75611/1–1463. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London and Paris.
1. See Document 164.
2. See footnote 5, Document 165.
3. Not further identified.
4. Presumably a reference to the conversation on November 14, 1962, see Document 157.
5. A 7-page memorandum of Ball’s conversation with von Hassel is in Department of State, Central Files, 375.75611/1–1463.