Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

157. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, November 14, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Cuba, Berlin and NATO (The President’s Meeting with Chancellor)¹

PARTICIPANTS

• US
  • The President
  • The Secretary of State
  • Under Secretary Ball
  • Ambassador Thompson
  • Ambassador Dowling
  • Mr. McGeorge Bundy
  • Mr. William R. Tyler
• Germany
  • Chancellor Adenauer
  • Foreign Minister Schroeder
  • Ambassador Knappstein
  • State Secretary Carstens
  • State Secretary von Hase
  • Dr. Reinkemeyer

[Here follows discussion of Cuba.]

The Chancellor said that he thought a major problem was a reorganization of NATO, which he said left room for much improvement. He said he had talked with Secretary General Stikker before his recent illness, and praised his qualities of reliability, persistence and thoughtfulness. However, it was no secret that Stikker had not felt very happy in his NATO role, and now he had had this serious illness. This meant that one must envisage a replacement for Stikker in the foreseeable future. Norstad was also of this view. The Chancellor said he felt that the Secretary General of NATO should be an American citizen and that this would give the Council an entirely different character. He rapidly characterized the role of Ismay as having been that of housekeeper for the organization, while Spaak loved to talk and indulge in fascinating discussions. Stikker, on the other hand, had ideas with regard to reforming NATO, and had felt keenly the absence of a military adviser.

The President said that we were not so much disturbed by the organization of NATO as by its military weakness. Europeans already considered the organization to be too much dependent on the US, and an American Secretary General would merely increase this feeling. The real problem, said the President, was that we should increase our forces and strengthen their conventional capability.

The Chancellor said he could not agree with the President that a NATO military build-up was something that could be considered separate from reorganization. He felt that if there had been an American Secretary General, de Gaulle would never have avoided receiving him personally, as had been the case with Stikker until the Chancellor had personally spoken to de Gaulle about the need of doing so. The President commented that perhaps de Gaulle would have received the Secretary General if he had been German.

The President went on to say that the number one task of the Alliance was to strengthen our forces and that this was the most convincing way in which we could impress the Russians.

The Chancellor engaged in a somewhat lengthy analysis of de Gaulle’s personal position in France, pointing out that the latest assassination attempt had been planned and carried out by military personnel in active service. He recounted the anecdote of de Gaulle’s having avoided shaking hands with a French General at a reception at the Elysée when Adenauer was last in Paris. This particular General had been relieved of his duties on the following day, and had evidently been invited because he had been on the list of people who would normally be there. This was the kind of thing which de Gaulle was up against, and the Chancellor felt that the Algerian question had not at all been settled yet in certain military circles. All this imposed restrictions on de Gaulle’s freedom of action.

The President said that what was needed was not merely diplomatic strength and initiative but military strength as well. Both were needed. Of course, we all had worries. De Gaulle had his; we had ours—among them our balance of payments problem. However, we were all faced with the Soviet threat in equal measure, and appropriate means must be taken to enable us to face up to it.

In the light of this, it was strange to hear de Gaulle talking about the battle of France beginning after the battle of Germany had ended. This was a totally outdated and unsound strategic concept for the defense of the Alliance. We needed to have our troops as far forward as possible in as great strength as was required. The Chancellor defended de Gaulle by saying that in 1958 de Gaulle said he was for the reunification of Germany because he did not want the Soviets on the Rhine.

Turning to the UK, the Chancellor said that it did not have conscription. As a result, we did not really know how many troops and reserves the UK had, and the British Armed Forces certainly contained too high a proportion of civilians and half-trained personnel. However, he wished to say that he agreed in the main with the President and that he would try to have a conversation with de Gaulle about military matters and Europe when he sees him again.

The President came back to the need for more conventional troops to meet the Berlin situation. While you could defend Western Europe as a whole with nuclear weapons, this simple concept was not relevant to the Berlin situation. The plain fact was that Europe was not doing enough in 1962. The President compared figures of the US military and aid efforts, in relation to population and resources, with those of the Federal Republic. We were faced with a situation in which the UK refused to do more, and de Gaulle refused to do more. This meant that the Federal Republic of Germany must make a greater effort. In addition, we must have sufficient military strength to defend Berlin and to give us an alternative to nuclear war or surrender. The Chancellor asserted that the Federal Republic stood shoulder to shoulder with the US. The Chancellor then introduced the subject of tactical nuclear weapons and the difference between US troops, which had tactical nuclear weapons in the field, and German troops, which did not. The President said that the point was that we needed to have greater conventional power so as to be able to give a convincing military reply to aggressive actions by the Soviets before having to move into the area of tactical nuclear weapons. Once the latter were used, you ran the danger of rapid escalation. The Chancellor said that modern tactical nuclear weapons were very small and sophisticated. One must assume that the Soviet troops also had similar nuclear weapons. Thus, a situation had arisen in which German troops were standing face-to-face against Soviet troops, and that the latter were better armed. He said the German troops should be armed with tactical nuclear weapons so as not to be at a disadvantage in the face of Soviet aggression. The President returned to the subject of the need for more conventional divisions in Europe, which, in addition to our nuclear strength, would put us in a good position. The Chancellor said that the major question was whether troops in the front line should be equipped with small nuclear weapons so that they could stand up against Soviet troops which had similar weapons. The current situation was that German troops did not have such weapons and were in a position of inferiority. The President said that the reality of the situation was that once you get to the point of using small nuclear weapons, you are very close to the big blow-up. So what we must do was to strengthen non-nuclear forces and give ourselves more flexibility of response. He said that, as things are now, we have enough troops armed with nuclear weapons. The Chancellor said that he could not share the President’s view that once you get into the front you start using small nuclear weapons and are necessarily doomed to move into big nuclear warfare. He quoted General Heusinger as subscribing to his view. The fact was that German troops felt uncomfortable when neighboring troops were better equipped than they were. The President returned to the subject for the need for larger conventional forces and said this was the single most important need for the defense of the Alliance, and in particular to meet the requirements of the Berlin situation.

The Chancellor said he agreed with the general proposition that more forces were needed for NATO, and that General Norstad had recently complained publicly about the present shortcomings.

The Chancellor said that General Norstad and President Eisenhower had both warmly praised General Lemnitzer as a successor to Norstad, and the Chancellor wanted to make it clear that he and everyone else knew that General Lemnitzer was a most highly qualified and respected successor to General Norstad. He said he would be speaking with de Gaulle again about all the matters that had been discussed. He said there were some very real differences of opinion within the Alliance on the nuclear question and the composition of forces, and that the French Permanent Representative, Ambassador Seydoux, had recently been strongly criticized in the Council by the Belgian Permanent Representative because of France’s military policies in relation to NATO.

The meeting broke up at about 1 o’clock.

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2181. Secret. Drafted by Tyler and approved in U and S on November 19 and in the White House on November 29.
1. Adenauer visited Washington November 13–16; see footnote 1, Document 51.