156. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations0
Topol 594. 1. As reported telecon, Nitze regretfully unable schedule visit to Paris at this time.
2. Reviewing Poltos 513 and 5181 Department struck by tendency number of members to cite lessening of tension because of immediate Cuban denouement as ground for slowdown in meeting shortfalls in force levels and equipment and, prior to today’s meeting, for delay in approval Bercon–Marcon plans. We wish to urge caution against assumption that critical period is past. We note with approval U.S. Perm Rep statement (Polto 518) opposing relaxation. Indeed, this is moment to press ahead with the unfinished business of the Alliance. Improvement in our defense posture is indispensable to subsequent utilization of situation to seek new openings in disarmament and other East-West problems.
3. We get impression sense of euphoria could, if it makes headway, result in rapid destruction of impressive Alliance solidarity achieved during crisis last week. This points up need for further improvement consultation procedures in order to capitalize on backing we now enjoy in NAC. We know you have this requirement very much in mind, and we ourselves are searching for ways in which we can maintain psychological momentum. As appropriate, we still hope to create sense of immediacy among Perm Reps by occasionally sending senior officials intimately involved in handling of Cuban crisis to brief NAC.
4. Meanwhile, however, we hope you will react quickly and often against any suggestion that Alliance can let down its guard because of immediate outcome of Cuban situation. In Cuban affair we have had virtually all military chips in our hands: geographical proximity; land, sea and air superiority; and SAC readiness. No reason to believe Soviets would have withdrawn so quickly if crisis had come over Berlin or other area considered vital to their security and geographically closer to them [Page 450] than to us. Consequently, NAC must beware of assuming that in any confrontation outside Western Hemisphere and in the absence of further NATO strengthening Cuban result would necessarily be duplicated.
5. Cuban affair strengthens our conviction that firm but moderate posture which is best calculated to restrain Soviet adventures can be maintained only if it is backed by adequate level of armed force in high state of readiness. U.S. was able last week to prepare for wide range of possible military actions; it was not constricted by need to rely unduly on this or that particular arm or weapons system. Conclusion as related to Europe would seem to be that Alliance should accelerate, not relax its efforts to build up spectrum of forces permitting flexible response to Soviet initiatives.
6. At same time it is noteworthy that succession of U.S. moves on Cuba flowed from intensive contingency planning which helped to clarify objectives to be sought and instrumentalities to be used. Similar process as applied quadripartitely to Berlin and presented to NAC seems to us already to have paid large dividends and to be necessary for enabling NAC to face up to all eventualities. If we can maintain our military readiness and keep our plans up to date, we need not fear ability of Alliance to measure up to future tests; we will indeed thus help to avoid them.
7. Paras 4 through 6 can be used at you discretion with NAC.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 375/10–2962. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Popper; cleared with Thompson, Hillenbrand, Nitze, and Schaetzel; and approved by Tyler.↩
- Polto 513, October 29, summarized that part of the NAC meeting on October 29 at which the Acting Secretary General had read from a paper urging all countries to meet the shortfalls in force levels. (Ibid.) Polto 518, October 29, reported that at the session on October 29, de Staercke, speaking for his government and as Dean of the Council congratulated “President Kennedy for clear-sightedness, courage, firmness, as well as moderation, with which he handled most difficult and serious Cuban situation.” (Ibid., 737.56361/10–2962)↩