155. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State0
Polto 476, Policy. Herewith short report Norstad Council briefing 17 Oct. Full report for security reasons being transmitted Polto A–4381 (Limit Distribution S/S, Pouch No. 2–4600, invoice C–172; ETA Washington 21 October).
SACEUR wanting to keep “temperature” low stated he not arguing or opposing anything, merely wanted state most plainly urgency and reason for MRBM requirement.
He listed in substantial detail extent and nature of priority threat list of targets bearing on defense of ACE.
He detailed weapons systems available to his command to meet this threat.
He noted potential of external strategic forces but questioned their direct relevance because of time and other considerations.
He stated that he had no bias in favor of any method for fulfilling requirement, be it under bilateral arrangements or multilateral arrangements. He is trying to keep his mind open on question of nature of MRBM deployment but admitted to being partial to a mix of sea land based systems suggesting that land basing might be even more survivable a system than sea basing.
He stressed importance of relationship between range and accuracy and demonstrated nature of his constraint policy with chart showing [Page 448] increase in civilian casualties which would result from taking out an airfield in vicinity of a city by means of high yield intercontinental system as opposed to low yield more precise medium-range system.
He concluded with equation no MRBMs in a relatively few years equal no defense equal no NATO.
Questions from UK, Germany, France, Denmark and Canada and SACEUR answers reported fully in airgram.
Comment: General Norstad’s presentation was most able and had considerable effect on PermReps. Its main conclusion was there was an important military requirement for MRBMs in ACE not only to replace existing weapons but also to handle more effectively than is now possible numerous targets, notably Russian IRBMs, of especial importance to Europeans.
I believe difference between General’s presentation and June 15 US paper is one of degree only, for two reasons. First, General’s presentation dealt primarily with existing state of affairs whereas thrust of June 15 paper is almost wholly on programmed forces, that is, on conditions in the future as they will be as result of increases in external forces now programmed but as yet in important measure not in being. And, second, June 15 paper recognized that “regardless of any feasible addition to programmed forces, a variety of Soviet weapons of different ranges would survive that could threaten both Europe and the US” and that “surviving Soviet forces would be great enough to inflict heavy civil damage on both European and North American NATO no matter what additions we might make to programmed nuclear strength.”
Furthermore the US position on subject of MRBMs has been based largely on position that quite apart from question of extent of any requirement, US is opposed to introduction of nationally-owned and operated MRBMs into ACE system; will not assist in any such introduction; and that if “Allies wish to add MRBMs to NATO forces and to participate in an MRBM force, US is prepared to join them in creating a multilaterally owned, financed, controlled and manned seaborne MRBM force.”
For these reasons seems to me that we should now wait for any initiation by other delegations or by International Staff looking to reviewing discussion of NDP/62/10. My recommendation that no such move be initiated by US. Our position has been stated quite fully already in June 15 document, and I think we should stand on it unless and until initiative to dispute it is taken by someone else.