Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

158. Scope Paper Prepared for the NATO Ministerial Meeting⁰

LSP/S–3

Washington, December 6, 1962.

NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING

PARIS, DECEMBER 13–15, 1962

The December Ministerial Meeting assembles at a moment of transition and flux. While it may serve as a vehicle for stimulating movement in beneficial directions, it is unlikely to provide an occasion for major decisions. The dominant note may be a sense of elation and relief at the outcome of the Cuban crisis; there will surely be satisfaction at the demonstration of Allied solidarity the crisis has provoked. On the other hand many questions will be raised regarding the next phase of Soviet-American relations, East-West negotiations in general, and the shape of future developments within the Communist bloc. Perhaps more than at any time in recent years, the United States will be expected to provide leadership and guidance in these matters.

In this outward-looking sense the general condition of the Alliance is good. The same cannot be said, however, of its inner cohesion. While the long-term perspectives of Western unity have not changed, the pace at which it is being achieved has undeniably slackened. The critical negotiations between the EEC and the UK have lost momentum. De Gaulle’s political triumph will hardly contribute to greater flexibility on the side of the EEC or to a venturesome approach to closer European unification. Indeed, it may result in a greater degree of French obstruction both to European integration and to joint efforts in NATO.

All of the Ministers will be addressing themselves in one way or another to these matters. At the same time, they will wish to exchange views on other important political problems of concern to the Alliance, notably the future of Berlin; the prospects for limited measures of disarmament such as a nuclear test ban, denuclearized zones, and measures to reduce the risk of unintentional war; residual colonial problems of NATO members, particularly Portugal, and the unsettled Congo question; the evolution of relations with the less developed countries; the implications of the Sino-Indian hostilities; and other matters of similar import. In discussing these subjects the Ministers will recognize that, as the Cuban affair demonstrated, NATO’s interests are affected by developments which take place outside as well as inside the NATO area.

On the military side NATO is moving slowly toward a resolution of great issues of basic strategy. The Cuban crisis demonstrated the value of a broad spectrum of military power—power which permitted the application of a carefully measured response sufficient to deal with imminent danger without triggering a nuclear exchange. Certain European members, however, will be inclined to attribute the American success mainly to nuclear superiority. It will be important to set the record straight on this matter, because it will profoundly influence NATO’s actions across the board in the military area.

In this context, the Ministers will doubtless wish to consider future force requirements, the level of defense efforts, and the apportionment of defense expenditures among the Allies. These subjects are of special concern to the US at a time when balance of payments and budget problems are in the foreground. The US will wish to reiterate its views on these matters, particularly on the continuing major importance of strong conventional forces in the types of confrontation likely to occur in the years ahead. Firm but moderate statements in this area will set the stage for comprehensive military studies the US will present to NATO in 1963 as a basis for a thoroughgoing joint re-evaluation of Alliance defenses. Among the specific strategic problems under review will be the question of the MRBM requirement for European defense. There will be some informal discussion of the Ottawa-type, multilateral seaborne MRBM force, now for the first time under serious review by European members. Finally the problem of financing the Greek defense effort may be added to the agenda.

General Objectives

At the Ministerial Meeting the general US objectives should be:

1. To preserve the heightened Alliance solidarity visible as a result of the Cuban experience.

2. To urge improved consultative procedures and to clear the way for ultimate organizational changes designed to increase NATO’s effectiveness in reacting to East-West confrontations wherever they occur.

3. To avoid divisive action or debate which could prejudice our discreet efforts to encourage UK-EEC negotiations.

4. To extend the range of Alliance support already attained on Berlin.

5. In the military field, to demonstrate to the Europeans the need for larger and better non-nuclear forces adequate for a prolonged defense in forward areas; to induce them to assume their fair share of the Alliance military burden; and to reiterate the US willingness to move forward toward a multilateral, sea-based MRBM force, if our Allies desire.

There are listed below some of the major issues likely to be raised at the meeting, with an indication of the recommended US attitudes.

Political Issues

1. Cuba and Consultation

The Allies will no doubt be principally interested in the effects of the Cuban crisis on the Communist world, and in the next moves in Soviet foreign policy. They will expect a full exposition of US thinking on these subjects, and particularly of their impact on the Alliance. Though highly satisfied with the outcome so far, they will recall that circumstances did not permit consultation when the quarantine was imposed. They will be asking whether the US means what it says when it stresses the need for more effective political consultation in NATO.

In his political review the Secretary should be prepared to deal with these matters. Statements should aim at preserving the improved morale resulting from the Cuban affair, without inducing complacency or relaxation. While the NAC has already been briefed fully on Cuban events, there is now an opportunity to present a longer range view of Alliance prospects. The difficulties of crisis management in a coalition will be appreciated even if not explicitly explained. There will probably be a generally favorable response to our advocacy of more effective consultative arrangements. There will also be lively interest in tentative proposals for organizational changes pertinent to this problem, although there is no sign that any action of this kind is immediately practicable.

2. Berlin

Though temporarily quiescent, the Berlin problem will remain a primary focus of Allied concern. The states represented in the Quadripartite Ambassadorial Group will be expected to express their views on future Berlin developments. Recent NAC action on contingency plans has eased some of the disagreements on Berlin within the Organization. The US statement should stress the continuing long-term threat to Berlin, as well as the desirability of effective alert measures, to prepare for possible eventualities.

3. Arms Control

The Allies will also be eager to receive our assessment of the prospects for arms control measures in the wake of the Cuban crisis. While the French and Germans will be sensitive to anything resembling denuclearization or disengagement in Europe, the Scandinavians and Canadians will press for greater accommodation to Soviet views for the sake of agreement. A full exposition of our estimate of the prospects for initial measures to reduce the risk of war and for a test ban will be useful, and will allay apprehensions without arousing false hopes.

4. Other Area Problems

The Allies will await the Secretary’s assessment of the Sino-Indian situation, with particular reference to its implications for future relations between China and the Soviet Union. Questions may also be raised regarding developments in Southeast Asia, though for the moment relatively little is heard on this subject. The Secretary will probably not be expected to dwell heavily on African, Middle-Eastern and other Asian problems, but his views may be sought on the question of the Portuguese colonies and the Congo. If the Portuguese continue to be unwilling to extend the Azores base agreement, the Secretary may wish to raise the matter in bilateral conversations.

5. Integration and Partnership

Because the UK and the EEC negotiations are at so delicate a stage, it will be advisable to touch on them only with great circumspection in full meetings. In bilateral conversations the Secretary will wish to point out that all those concerned, the United States included, have a major stake in the success of the negotiations. While the reference to Atlantic Partnership may be muted, no one should be left in doubt that it remains an ultimate objective of American policy.

Military Issues

The US objective in military matters should be to have NATO come to grips in 1963 with issues of basic strategy, future force requirements, the level of the defense effort and national defense contributions, and the future of the Alliance nuclear deterrent including the organization of a multilateral MRBM force. The indications are that this will not be easy. Despite the Cuban experience, it is not at all clear that the European Allies will be willing to alter the current strategic concept, with its heavy emphasis on deterrence entailing the early use of nuclear weapons in major operations. Nor have they been willing to contemplate a conventional force build-up to meet established force goals or an increased level of expenditure comparable to that of the US. Moreover, recent European press comment emphasizing American opposition to individual national nuclear forces in Europe has heightened European sensitivity on this matter, especially among the French.

The US presentation on these matters will lay emphasis on the following factors: (1) the contingencies NATO forces are most likely to be called upon to meet will dictate the use of non-nuclear rather than nuclear forces; (2) conventional forces adequate for a prolonged defense of Europe in forward areas are well within NATO’s economic and social capabilities; (3) the European Allies can and should shoulder a greater proportion of the burden of meeting NATO force requirements; (4) there should be systematic coordination of strategic objectives, force levels, and budget outlays among the Allies on the basis of long-term, integrated plans; (5) the US is willing, if the Europeans so desire, to facilitate the creation of a multilateral, sea-borne MRBM force, provided such a force is coordinated with other NATO deterrent forces in regard to military planning and does not displace or reduce the level of conventional forces. While the US will not press for specific decisions on these matters at the Ministerial Meeting, it will want to stimulate Alliance efforts to deal with them expeditiously, on a cooperative basis.

The US effort in this regard will be supported by the presentation of comprehensive back-up studies demonstrating the cogency of its approach. Such studies are now in preparation. It will be useful to announce at the meeting a firm date for delivery of the information on the use and effects of nuclear weapons (Defense Data Program), to which the US was committed at the Athens meeting last spring. We should bring to the attention of our Allies the MRBM force educational effort now under way. We should also be prepared to exploit the planning cycle now about to begin in the NATO Military Committee, looking toward end-1969 force goals, to propound our views on strategy questions. As a related matter we should carry on the effort initiated during the recent triennial review of the status of NATO forces, to work out more satisfactory methods of bearing the burden of sustaining balanced forces capable of meeting Alliance requirements, without impairing the military task of formulating such requirements.

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2204. Secret. Drafted by Popper and cleared by Tyler, Schaetzel, Seymour Weiss, Owen, and the Department of Defense.