159. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State0

Secto 22. Eyes only for the President and Acting Secretary. This meeting of NATO has been marked by an almost “intolerable serenity”, as one delegate put it, but I wish to report certain personal impressions.

[Page 459]
(1)
Central theme of meeting has been deep satisfaction your handling of Cuban crisis, without criticism about lack of prior consultation. For first time in many years U.S. Secretary of State did not raise hand and swear that U.S. would indeed faithfully meet its solemn NATO commitments; no one noticed the omission in atmosphere of general confidence.
(2)
McNamara and I hit conventional force deficiencies very hard.1 My impression is that other Ministers are getting seriously concerned, partly because they sense that U.S. patience is running out. Whether this will result in effective action remains to be seen.
(3)
General de Gaulle’s interest in NATO continues at most minimum level. It was obvious however that his esteem for you had gone up many notches over Cuban affair and that atmosphere our relations has been significantly improved. For first time French passers-by waved to me on the street.
(4)
Perfectly clear that Nassau meeting will become Skybolt Summit2 and that British will make major effort to insure that we take whatever steps necessary to insure they have independent nuclear deterrent. McNamara and I should have chance to go over this with you at earliest opportunity.
(5)
NATO unanimous (except France) that open channels should be maintained between Washington and Moscow with minimum of nervousness about our exploration possibilities agreement on any subject but especially Berlin.
(6)
Have given drafts non-transfer nuclear weapons to British, French and Germans.3 British fully agree. Germans will agree if Peiping’s adherence is required. French are studying and will let us know. Am slightly encouraged that we have not had oracular rejection from Paris.
(7)
Spaak has been working hard and courageously on Congo. Believe our future course should be taken in closest consultation in view large number Belgians in Congo and Spaak’s ability to keep our NATO Allies reasonably quiet.
(8)
Am encouraged by talk with Nogueria about Azores bases.4 As minimum solution, I pressed for either a clear and simple one-year extension of existing agreement or an arrangement by which they would give us six months notice before the six months expiration period would begin to run. Nogueria seemed to understand the practical problem which force us to need definite assurance rather than to leave the agreement subject to cancellation on a day-by-day basis. Elbrick will follow up promptly.
Rusk
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–PA/12–1562. Secret; Priority. According to another copy this telegram was drafted by Rusk. (Ibid., Rusk Files: Lot 72 D192, Chron)
  2. The texts of Rusk’s and McNamara’s statements on the military situation were transmitted as enclosures to CA–7291, January 10, 1963, and CA–6769, December 21, from Paris. (Ibid., Central Files, 396.1–PA/1–1063 and 12–2162) A summary of the discussion of the military situation was transmitted in Poltos 697 and 698, December 15. (Ibid., 396.1–PA/12–1562)
  3. For documentation on the discussion of the Skybolt missile at the Nassau meeting between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan, December 19–20, see Documents 402407.
  4. Not found.
  5. See Document 349.