Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

165. Memorandum for the Record⁰

Washington, January 12, 1963.

SUBJECT

• Meeting with the President, January 12, 1963, 11:00 AM, (President’s Office)—Nassau Implementation

OTHERS PRESENT

• Vice President, Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, General Taylor, Director McCone, Assistant Secretary Nitze, Assistant Secretary Tyler, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Mr. Jeffrey Kitchen, Mr. John McNaughton

Secretary Rusk gave a brief report on Under Secretary Ball’s presentation to the NATO Permanent Representatives in Paris.¹ He described the allied reception of Ball’s summary of our views on the Nassau Agreement as friendly but reserved.

Secretary Rusk said the British would, for political reasons, push very hard publicly the concept of a British independent nuclear force. He said Macmillan will be emphasizing a national nuclear capability and understanding the multilateral aspects of the Nassau Agreement.

Secretary Rusk expressed his hope that de Gaulle would not reject the Nassau offer until we had had time to explain to him what it entailed. He noted that de Gaulle had asked for a study of the existing French nuclear program and its prospects. Thereafter, de Gaulle would decide where the Nassau offer fitted into the French program. He mentioned reports that de Gaulle, at a press conference on Monday, would reject the Nassau offer.

With respect to Germany, Secretary Rusk said we must push immediately for discussions in NATO of a multilateral force in order to meet Adenauer’s demands for German equality. He called attention to German opposition to a three-power (U.S./U.K./France) directorate. Germany, he added, wants quality of treatment and would oppose any arrangement which did not provide equal status for Germany. Italy will also be interested in ensuring that its participation in the nuclear deterrent is on the basis of its status as a big power.

Secretary Rusk thought that one way to meet the political side of the problem would be to initiate a NATO training program at once, even before there was progress on working out problems of the control of multilateral nuclear force.

Mr. Kitchen made a progress report on the activity of interdepartmental groups engaged in planning further steps to implement the Nassau Agreement.²

a. Ambassador Reinhardt had opened discussions with the Italians and further discussions would take place during Prime Minister Fanfani’s visit to Washington.³ The Italians, in giving up their Jupiter capability, will try to establish some bilateral nuclear arrangement with us.

b. Ambassador Hare will initiate discussions with the Turks this weekend.

c. General Lemnitzer, who has taken a negative view of the removal of the Jupiters,⁴ will be talked to by Mr. Nitze, who is leaving shortly for Europe.

d. Technical talks with the British on proceeding smoothly and a U.S./U.K. agreement is being drafted following a strict interpretation of the Nassau Agreement. A second paper is being prepared which will present the alternative of widening U.S./U.K. cooperation beyond that envisaged in the Nassau Agreement.

e. No interdepartmental agreement has yet been reached on the U.S. nuclear force to be assigned to NATO. It is hoped that by next week a paper listing the types of U.S. forces to be assigned to NATO will be ready for Presidential consideration.

f. As regards negotiations with the French, a study is being made of what we can offer to the French with and without changes in the legislation. In response to the President’s question as to what we would offer to the French, Mr. Tyler said that if de Gaulle accepts the concept of a multilateral NATO force, then we might give the French nuclear submarines and nuclear warheads, but if de Gaulle opposes the multilateral concept, then our position will be considerably different.

There ensued a general discussion of the problem of negotiating with the French. Secretary Rusk called attention to the importance which the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy attaches to any U.S. offer of nuclear assistance to France and urged that any offer to the French be kept in phase with the known views of the Congressional committee members. He foresaw serious difficulty if our talks with the French include offers of assistance which were unacceptable to Congressional committee members. He said he agreed that, if the committee members approved, we could give nuclear technological information to the French equal to that which we know the Russians already have.

Secretary McNamara said de Gaulle might take the offer, he might charge us with bad faith by making the offer because the French could not take advantage of it since their program was not far enough along, or he could turn down the offer on grounds other than French technical inadequacy.

The President thought that we should push ahead on the Skipjack project because it was not directly related to Nassau. He recalled that he would be meeting with the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy members next week to discuss both the Skipjack project and the Nassau Agreement.

Mr. Bundy said that if the French accept fully the concept of a multilateral nuclear force, then the case for giving the French real nuclear assistance is very strong.

Secretary Rusk urged that in our talks with the French we emphasize all of the Nassau Agreement, not just the offer to them. He recalled that the French have not been helpful to us and in fact have left the alliance as far as all matters are concerned except full support in the event of the outbreak of war. If we give the French nuclear assistance in these circumstances, he added, and do not insist that they join with us in all matters involving the alliance, other alliance members will think that the way to get assistance from us is to behave as the French are now behaving.

The President asked that General Norstad’s views be heard by those working on the Nassau followup. He reminded the group that in his view we were engaged in negotiating a multilateral force because of the German problem.

Secretary Rusk said that possibly a way to satisfy the Germans would be to create an Executive Committee of NATO composed of the five major powers, with representation on a rotational basis of the smaller powers.

The President stressed the importance of developing our plans for control of the multilateral force.

Mr. Bundy emphasized the importance of the management of this force and thought that it was important that we move promptly so that the British will not slip away from their commitment to a multilateral force. If the British move away from the multilateral concept, the Germans will create major difficulties.

It was agreed that a letter from the President to Adenauer⁵ would be prepared and sent in an effort to reassure the Germans that they would have meaningful participation in any arrangements arising out of the Nassau Agreement.⁶

Bromley Smith⁷

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Meetings with the President. Top Secret. Prepared by Bromley Smith on January 15. A copy of Kitchen’s notes on this meeting, which give more detail on the work of the Steering Group, is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2217.
1. See Document 164.
2. Documentation on the work of the Steering Group on Implementing the Nassau Decisions is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2217–2219.
3. Regarding Fanfani’s visit to Washington, January 16–17, see Documents 312 and 313.
4. On January 11 the Embassy in France had reported that Lemnitzer, on military grounds, could not support the substitution of Polaris submarines for Jupiter missiles since this would result in a net reduction in the total strike capacity of ACE. (Telegram 2758; Department of State, Central Files, 740.5611/1–1163)
5. Dated January 12 and transmitted to Bonn for delivery to the Chancellor in telegram 1589, January 12, it stated that the United States was prepared to join Germany and any other interested country in preliminary steps leading to a multilateral sea-based MRBM force. (Ibid., 740.5611/1–1263)
6. In a January 14 memorandum Kitchen wrote the following about this meeting: “The Secretary said he thought the meeting with the President had gone well and that we had succeeded in conveying to both the President and Secretary McNamara the necessity for keeping an open and flexible approach to following up on Nassau and especially in our approach to the French.” (Department of State, Central Files, 740.5611/1–1463)
7. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.