Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

57. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State⁰

Paris, January 15, 1963, 7 p.m.

2804. Brussels for Embassy and USEC. The views of General De Gaulle on the subjects treated in his press conference¹ were on the whole fairly well known and have been previously reported. The only surprise at the press conference was that he should have stated these publicly with such frankness and brutality.

1. In describing the reasons why Great Britain was not suitable to be included in the Common Market of the Six, De Gaulle did not dwell on any of the particular points at issue in the negotiations but went behind these matters to emphasize certain fundamental factors in the British picture which it should be noted are not questions which are susceptible of correction in short order, indeed if ever by any British Government. De Gaulle therefore made it plain that in his view (which certainly means that of France in the present circumstances) there were profound and unchangeable considerations which would prevent this development. In addition he pointed out that the entry of England would probably mean the adherence of other countries which would transform the Common Market into a free trade area and lead to the creation of a “colossal Atlantic Community dependent on and directed by the Americans”. This, he said, did not at all coincide with what the French wanted—an entity essentially European. He did however hold out as bait the possibility that there could be between the Common Market and Great Britain an “agreement of association”, a nature to safeguard exchanges. (This tentative hint has already been rejected by Great Britain).

In short insofar as France is concerned De Gaulle slammed and locked the door to an immediate British entry into the Common Market. It remains to be seen whether the attitude of the other five members of the Market will be able to persuade France to modify these views and exactly what will be the British tactic in relation to this publicly declared position.

2. In his remarks on the Nassau agreements² De Gaulle went considerably farther in the direction of complete rejection than had been anticipated. According to information that I had from various French ministers it was not expected that he would be so negative but would in effect leave the door open for future discussions. In addition to restating the well-known reasons why France desires to have its own independent nuclear deterrent, De Gaulle in this section also confused the elements of the American offer by speaking disdainfully only of a multilateral force. He either had not absorbed or deliberately disregarded the explanations which Ball gave to NAC on Friday.³ It is of course possible to read into his remarks a hint that a more extended offer from the United States in regard to submarine construction and warhead secrets might be acceptable, but I think that this is too slender a possibility for us to base any action or policy upon.

It also will be noted that he referred to “technical” and “strategic” cooperation if desired by France’s allies.

His interpretation of the meaning, from the point of view of Europe, of the Cuban crisis was of course completely inaccurate and lacking in elementary logic. It will be recalled that he advanced this interpretation to me during our meeting on January 4⁴ and was apparently not affected in any way by my reply. This view appears to have become a French dogma.

3. On the subject of Franco-German relations he seemed to be emphasizing the “special relationship” which has developed in the last year or so between France and Germany, but in reply to a question his statement that it is entirely up to Germany what she wished to do in the nuclear field disregarded completely the effect of the WEU treaties.

A Foreign Office clarification subsequently stated that these remarks did not indicate any change in French policy on the subject. His flat rejection of any integrated multilateral force was in ironic contrast with the German acceptance on the same day of this concept and I imagine that this will be an active subject of consideration at his meeting next week with Adenauer.

The conference was indeed the “conference de choc” that one French paper predicted several days [ago] as it involved in effect French rejection of two major American objectives, 1) on the question of Great Britain’s joining the Common Market, and 2) the NATO nuclear force. In the face of these two rejections I strongly believe it would be most unwise and indeed dangerous for us to attempt any further move towards France in the unwarranted hope that the sweetening of the Nassau offer might produce some fundamental change in French thinking. I should point out in this connection that the views expressed by De Gaulle, although more sharply put than in the past, represent little more than continuance of certain basic ideas which De Gaulle has consistently held since his return to power in 1958.

I believe in the present circumstances we should press forward on Polaris agreement with Great Britain and also with other NATO powers on multilateral force. In regard to France I would undertake no new initiative but merely stand pat on our present positions and await the course of events and avoid insofar as possible at this juncture US official reaction.

Bohlen

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 375.800/1–1563. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London, Bonn, Rome, and Brussels.
1. For a transcript of de Gaulle’s press conference on January 14, see Major Addresses, Statements and Press Conferences of General Charles De Gaulle, May 19, 1958–January 31, 1964 (New York, undated), pp. 208–222; see also American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 441–443.
2. For text of the Statement on Nuclear Defense Systems issued by President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan at Nassau, December 21, 1962, see ibid., 1962, pp. 635–637.
3. See Document 164.
4. See Document 263.