Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

263. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State⁰

Paris, January 4, 1963, 7 p.m.

2684. Eyes only for President and Secretary. In a forty minute interview this afternoon I discussed with de Gaulle the various aspects of the Nassau offer and agreement with the British. I began by saying that since both our countries obviously considered that the Alliance was of vital importance to the defense of the West any general problem which concerned the Alliance should be of interest to both of us. I mentioned that the Nassau Accords with the British, which as de Gaulle knew, began with the decision of the U.S. to cancel the Skybolt Operation, represented in themselves a new approach to the problem of nuclear armaments and the Alliance and represented for the U.S. a considerable major shift in its attitude towards this question. I said that the problem obviously was one of the reconciliation between nuclear powers, of which I listed the U.S., U.K. and France, and the non-nuclear powers on the other. At this point de Gaulle interrupted to say that France was not yet a nuclear power but was determined to be one. I continued by saying that this was a very real problem for the future of the Alliance and had particular relevance to the question of Germany since that country had the necessary scientific, technical and industrial resources to become a nuclear power but that it was very much part of the problem that had been discussed. De Gaulle admitted that such a problem existed but said in regard to the Germans that for the immediate future there would seem to be no danger of Germany becoming a nuclear power although he himself was convinced that at some time in the far distant future Germany would also have atomic bombs. When I asked him whether France accepted this he immediately replied no, that France, because of past history and other reasons, would never be in favor of Germany acquiring the atomic weapon on a national basis but he merely felt that in the long run it was inevitable. In reply I stated that we did not regard this as entirely inevitable but that if it did happen it would cause great divisions in the Alliance and would be a subject of great concern to the Communist Bloc, with which de Gaulle agreed.

Returning to the question of the Nassau Accords and the offer which had been made, de Gaulle said that the French Government had no intention of closing the door on future discussions but that he did feel, given the French circumstances as compared to those of Britain, that there was very little that could be done in the immediate future in regard to this offer. He said that Great Britain, who had always participated with us in nuclear matters with the exception of a short period immediately after the war, was in a very different situation than France in regard to the Nassau offers. For example, he understood that the British were much nearer to the completion of a suitable submarine and would be able to manufacture the warheads, whereas France did not and would not have this capacity for a considerable number of years and that therefore the offer had very little immediate practical value to France. I told him I could see his position if he was operating simply on the bare basis of the Nassau offer, but that we regarded this as a beginning and not an end in itself. De Gaulle replied that they could only go on what had been offered at this time, to which I repeated that as far as the U.S. was concerned there was no aspect of the entire problem of nuclear weapons and the effect on the Alliance which we would not be prepared to discuss with France. De Gaulle went on to state that as we well knew he had a very poor opinion of the possibilities of a multilateral force which he said would be merely the present situation under a different guise since it would inevitably be an American commander. I took him up on this point and told him that for the future there could be absolutely no certainty that it had to be an American commander in any form of multilateral force and that this indeed was one of the questions which could be discussed. I asked him, leaving aside for the moment the particular interests of France, how he envisaged the nuclear problem for the Alliance as a whole, particularly the difference which would certainly arise in the future between the nuclear powers and the non-nuclear powers.

De Gaulle replied that for the immediate future he thought the Germans would confine themselves to “grumbling” but that he had always thought that Germany should be regarded as a forefront of the Alliance and the place where the first attack from the East would be received. He said he had always thought that the solution was to make provision for all weapons, including nuclear weapons, to pass over to German command at the moment of the outbreak of war but he did not favor the turning over of any nuclear weapons to Germany during peacetime. I inquired whether he felt that in regard to modern warfare that there would be time to make the transfer in the event of a Soviet attack, but he tended to wave this aside saying that if proper precautions were taken in advance this could be done. He then went on to develop an already well-known thesis to the effect that if he had been an American he would have adopted the same policy as had President Eisenhower and President Kennedy; that we had felt it necessary in our own interest to safeguard our atomic secrets, which he well understood, but the fact remained that this had created a difference between England and France in the atomic question.

He then developed at considerable length his view of the Cuban developments, which I find of considerable interest although full of holes. He said that the events in Cuba had brought to his attention a factor in regard to the American defense policies which he had thought about but had not fully accepted. He said the U.S. had suddenly found itself with a menace on its doorstep in Cuba and had taken swift and energetic action to force its removal, of which he was very complimentary. He said, however, the lesson he had drawn from it was that the U.S. had given greater priority to matters affecting its own immediate security than for example the defense of Europe. He said up to this time he had generally, along with other Europeans, felt that the U.S. had given number one priority to the defense of Europe as a means of defending the U.S. I took issue with him on this point stating I did not think it was a question of where the menace lay. I said that I thought it was a mistake to assume that because we reacted so vigorously in regard to a Soviet base in Cuba that we would not have reacted equally as vigorously, in fact probably more so, if the menace had been as direct to Western Europe. I told him I thought this was merely a manifestation of the simple fact that the U.S. had commitments of interest which were global; that we had alliances for defense in South Korea, Formosa, the Philippines and Japan and places in the Far East which we would most certainly honor if threatened. That the real issue here I felt was that the U.S. with these global commitments could at any time find itself menaced by Communist action and that our reaction thereto could always bring with it the threat of general war. I said that this aspect of the matter stemmed largely from the fact that the North Atlantic Treaty did not cover all the U.S. engagements indeed as it did not all of the involvements of Great Britain or France. De Gaulle seemed somewhat impressed with this analysis of the problem I had presented and did not pursue the matter any further.

I told him during the conversation that we were particularly pleased that France had not shut the door on further discussions of this matter, but I had no success in drawing him into any specific suggestions for the continuation of these discussions. In regard to the technical aspect he said that France had had a number of hints from the U.S. which had led them to send missions to Washington to discuss certain technical questions but as soon as any matters touched on atomic affairs the discussions were halted by the U.S. I told him that while for the moment I could not go beyond the terms of the Nassau offer that these were considerations which applied primarily to the past and I could only tell him that we were prepared to discuss any aspect of the atomic question and its relation to the Alliance. I pointed out to him, however, that the Nassau Accords contained some commitment on the part of Great Britain to the multilateral principle, but exactly how this would be applied was a matter for further discussion.

De Gaulle throughout was extremely amiable and indeed for him cordial, but obviously had no intention of committing France even to any definite form of negotiation or discussion. It was quite clear to me that he definitely had decided that the advantage to France in the Nassau offer is not sufficient to bring him to any degree of commitment to the multilateral idea. It also seemed clear that he was holding back with a view to having us make the next move of a somewhat more concrete nature, particularly on the question of submarine construction and possibly the question of warheads. He spoke several times of the period of seven to eight years which would be required before France would see anything particularly to her advantage in the Nassau offer and also was quite clear on his opposition to the multilateral force. He seemed to be less sure in his outline of how to handle the German problem and I imagine he will be giving further thought to the idea of multilateral force as a means of dealing with the problems of the Alliance in the immediate future.

At the close of the meeting he told me that if I had anything further I wished to say to him on this question that he would be very glad to see me.

Bohlen

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D110, CF 2217. Secret; Niact. A note on the source text indicates that it was passed to the White House on January 4.