Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

262. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France⁰

Washington, January 1, 1963, 6:49 p.m.

3198. Personal from the Secretary for the Ambassador. Eyes only.

1. The principal objective of your initial exchange will be to impress on the French that the decision to offer them the Nassau proposals¹ represents a major turning point in United States policy. It implies a willingness to recognize France as a nuclear power and to bring substantially to an end the exclusive quality of the US-UK relationship. With the offered help France should be in position to contribute the kind of nuclear capability to Western defense that will be relevant to the 1970s.

2. At the same time it must be made apparent to the French that the offer cannot be considered apart from the principles of Nassau, which are founded on the propositions of interdependence and the indivisibility of Western defense and which include, as an essential element, the creation of a multilateral force, the assignment to that force of missile systems provided under the Nassau proposals and an equitable sharing of the burden of conventional defense.

3. In essence, therefore, the points that should be given particular emphasis are, first, that the United States is prepared to make a major decision of policy and to accord to France—at least so far as the Nassau proposals are concerned—the same status as Britain, but only on the understanding that the French themselves revise their policy to accept that multilateral principle.

4. In your initial conversation you should, of course, make it apparent that you recognize the importance of this matter to both sides and that it cannot be resolved over night. What is involved, after all, is the shape of the alliance, including the organization of the nuclear power of the West, and the major decisions under discussion cannot possibly be translated into force in being before 8 or 10 years from now. The United States is prepared to examine this problem in all of its aspects. However, the French cannot at this juncture be apprised of the exact nature of further US assistance, beyond the offer of a “similar arrangement” as suggested by the President in his letter to de Gaulle.² As you know, we are developing urgently with Defense and AEC possible lines of US aid to France, what political, legal and Congressional problems such aid would entail, and finally, the reciprocal cooperation we would require from the French.

5. Against this background it would seem desirable in your initial exchanges with the Foreign Minister and subsequently President de Gaulle to cover the following points:

(a) We are not pressing for a French reaction to the President’s proposal; a proposal has been put forward and we shall assume that in due time the French reaction will be forthcoming.

(b) It should be stressed that the public documentation is the totality of the Nassau agreement. In this connection you may make available to the French on a confidential basis the two Minutes (the President’s Minute of December 21 to the Prime Minister and, secondly, the memorandum by the Prime Minister of December 20)³ should you consider this desirable.

(c) The French will undoubtedly realize on the basis of your outline of the Nassau agreement that much work remains to be done in developing the broad principles and courses of action settled upon at the meeting between the President and Prime Minister Macmillan. The French may therefore have questions to which there are no answers yet. But you should indicate willingness to forward any questions that occur to Washington for further guidance.

6. You should concentrate during your first conversation on preventing Couve⁴ from reaching a negative conclusion based on an inadequate understanding of the full implications of the American decision and the Nassau arrangements. It is recognized that you may feel it tactically desirable to say less to Couve in your initial conversation than you would be prepared to say in the course of subsequent talks with General de Gaulle.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 741.5612/1–163. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Schaetzel, cleared with Kitchen and Bundy, and approved and initialed by Ball.
1. For text of the Nassau Agreement, December 21, 1962, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 635–637.
2. Transmitted to Paris in telegram 2 from Nassau, December 19, the letter reviewed the agreements that had been reached with the British at Nassau and concluded “that the United States is prepared to join with you in an arrangement on the same basis as with the British.” (Department of State, Central Files, 375.75611/12–1962) Telegram 2 also contained a similar letter to Adenauer without the offer of an arrangement similar to that offered the British.
3. Documents 409 and 408.
4. In a meeting with Couve de Murville on January 2 Bohlen followed these instructions with particular emphasis on paragraphs 1 and 4. The French Foreign Minister’s only question was whether congressional action would be needed on the agreement with the British. In commenting on the meeting Bohlen stated that, as expected, the conversation offered no concrete indication of French thinking, but did confirm that they were not closing the door to further discussions on the question. (Telegram 2654 from Paris, January 2; Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2217)