261. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State0
Secto 8. Secretary,1 accompanied by Bohlen and Tyler, called on de Gaulle at 3:30 pm Dec 12. De Gaulle said he was glad to see Secretary and had written to President to congratulate him on handling Cuba crisis.2 The successful outcome had been result of President’s “firmness and lucidity.” De Gaulle said he did not know how things now stand but essential objective had been reached of withdrawal missiles and bombers. Secretary conveyed warm personal greetings from President and [Page 740] congratulations on support he had received from French people in recent elections. Secretary expressed our pleasure at prospect visit by “Mona Lisa” to Washington and added we would greet her safe return to France with sense relief. De Gaulle said he was sure no harm would come to the lady and wanted Secretary to know that France would not have entrusted her to any other country. Secretary expressed appreciation for de Gaulle’s remarks about Cuba and for his firm support at the time. The Secretary then gave de Gaulle extensive account present Cuban situation, stressing that problem not yet resolved. De Gaulle thanked Secretary and said French support had amounted to little because it had been principally a US affair. If world war had resulted, France would have been at the side of United States. Secretary said we hoped that Cuba had been wholesome experience for Soviets and had removed any illusions they might have entertained as to any US hesitancy in comparable circumstances. Should crisis occur over Berlin we feel most important we should be in best position to meet it. This would require increased consultation to harmonize our policies and to organize ourselves so as to be able to respond quickly and efficiently. De Gaulle agreed and revealed some familiarity with contingency planning. Asked Secretary what he meant by saying that we should go further in our preparations. Secretary gave example of better and faster communications in crisis, need to speed up military moves envisaged under Live Oak, and to be prepared to apply rapidly economic and other counter measures. De Gaulle concurred in need for developing and refining agreed measures for execution of plans. Said we had to foresee three categories of events with regard to Berlin: (1) Soviets might harass and threaten Western [Sectors] to point barring ground access short of hostilities. In this case we should apply counter measures. (2) Soviets might cut off West Berlin from rest of world. In this case we should cut off Soviet links with rest of world. (3) There might be Soviet military attacks on Berlin. This would mean all-out war. Said that if question of completing plans for counter measures, he agreed we should do this and if Soviets want to make things rough for us in Berlin, we should react with appropriate measures. Secretary said question was how we could prevent Soviet leaders from miscalculating in Berlin as they had in Cuba. All reports received by Moscow should be such as to bring home to them our determinations. De Gaulle agreed and said if Soviets miscalculate it is their business not ours. This was why he had never been very happy about interminable talking and probing by US and British Govts on Berlin. This made it seem as though we thought that some agreement could be reached, whereas all we have to do is to wait until Soviets realize that they cannot obtain anything by their pressure. Secretary said the issue was really one of credibility about intentions. We had always stressed to the Soviets that presence Western [Page 741] troops Berlin non-negotiable. However it was fact that we are short of our force goals in NATO. If we had too few forces, Soviets could expect they could not last more than a few days. Thus we must reconcile our public actions with our private words. Secretary stressed that we had not discussed other questions than Cuba with the Soviets either in New York or with Mikoyan in Washington. Our impression from latter’s visit was that Soviets not prepared to talk seriously at this time. De Gaulle picked up reference to deficiencies in NATO. He agreed that Soviets may be impressed by thought that forces of Alliance couldn’t last very long. France was very conscious of this fact. Whole NATO military planning was based on the assumption of one battle which would be over very quickly, whether waged by nuclear or conventional weapons. France was concerned about her own defense, had felt she must have defense in depth. As things stood, everything would be destroyed after the first onslaught. “Norstad might well be wiped out.” France could not accept this situation and had to assure her own defense in depth to the extent she could. Secretary said we were proceeding on assumption that Soviet offensive on such large scale as to break through Western forward forces would lead us directly to a nuclear war. De Gaulle said President Kennedy had also said this to him but things go fast and France ran the risk of being invaded. France was not the only country which did not have all her forces committed to defense Germany. US and British did not have all their forces on German soil either. Secretary pointed out we have substantial forces in Germany. De Gaulle said he did not know what kind of battle would take place there nor what United States would do. Should events develop in such a way as to justify it, France would possibly be prepared to throw her troops into the battle for Germany. Secretary asked what greater certainty we can give as to our role than our 400,000 troops committed to NATO and our solemn commitments to Alliance. He said we were not concerned with what we would do in the event of Soviet attack, but rather about the kind of signal we are sending to Moscow in advance. NATO had planned for thirty divisions and this figure had not yet been met. The question [is] what inferences the Soviet Union would draw from this deficiency. De Gaulle said Soviets could not doubt that France would defend herself. She was increasing and modernizing her forces and was developing a national nuclear force. However the number of divisions assigned General Norstad was a different matter. Secretary insisted that we must all together bring Moscow the conviction of our determination. De Gaulle said that we must face the fact that the Western Alliance was an alliance of individual states. This might have certain theoretical disadvantages though he wasn’t sure. At any rate the joint power of the West was what counted. He was sure of one thing which was that integration is not a good solution. The Secretary said we had been concerned [Page 742] by what Khrushchev had been saying to his numerous visitors. He frequently attributed varying attitudes about Berlin to individual states. It was important we should all think this over so as to make Khrushchev convinced that there is no doubt about our resolve. With a faint smile, de Gaulle said it was possible that Khrushchev sometimes indulged in “wishful thinking” (in English).
Turning to Africa the Secretary stressed the importance of aid to the less developed countries. There was need for increased consultation among the major industrialized powers of the West—US, UK, France and Germany—on discharge of their responsibilities in this field. The industrialized countries should work more closely together. Our thoughts were moving toward the idea of a better division of labor or apportionment of responsibilities. We should work out a more efficient basis for certain countries to play a more prominent role in given areas in which historical and other circumstances gave them the best chance of being effective. He said that we have no desire for competition. We really needed to create a basis for a more efficient utilization of our resources. De Gaulle said he had taken note of the Secretary’s views. He thought that the major difficulty came from the less developed countries themselves, which tended to shop around to get aid from whatever they could. He agreed that we should try not to “eat the wool off of each other’s backs,” and that there are situations where individual countries were in a position to play a primary role.
Comment: De Gaulle gave impression of being relaxed and, for him, relatively forthcoming and receptive to discussion of views expressed to him. His tone was friendly, if not cordial, throughout. He concluded the meeting, which ended shortly after 4:30, by thanking the Secretary for having come to see him and saying that he hoped things would go well at the NATO meeting.