Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

260. Instruction for the Ambassador to France (Bohlen)⁰

Washington, undated.

1. Basic Objective. Our policy in the nuclear field reflects our basic objective in Western Europe: To work for an ever closer partnership between an increasingly integrated Europe and the US. This objective would be prejudiced by US aid for politically divisive national nuclear programs; it would not be prejudiced by US aid for a genuinely multilateral effort which brought the European countries together in a common enterprise closely linked with the US.

2. Basic Tactic. Your posture in regard to matters nuclear should reflect US confidence that the movement toward greater unity in Europe and toward a closer US-European partnership will eventually make itself felt in the nuclear field, as elsewhere. In the meantime, we should not seek out debate, which would be as useless as it would be harmful, on the nuclear issue with the French. We should be clear as to our own policy, and equally clear that French policy is for France to decide.

3. Substance. In making clear our own policy, you should indicate:

(a) General. We recognize that a Europe reviving in strength and confidence may wish to play a greater role in the nuclear field. We are ready, if our allies desire, to join them in examining steps to this end. We are not, of course, ourselves pushing for change in this field. Nevertheless, if it should turn out that a NATO or European force—genuinely unified, multilateral, and effectively linked with our own—is what is needed and wanted, we would be prepared seriously to consider this possibility. The most tangible manifestation of this basic posture is our willingness to facilitate creation of a multilaterally manned, owned, and controlled MRBM force, if one can be set up in a way that makes political and military sense, and if our allies are prepared to shoulder the very substantial burdens involved.

(b) Strike Air Force. If the French ask what would become of their intended national strike air force, in the event they join a multilateral MRBM force, you should answer that this is for them to decide. As General Norstad has pointed out, aircraft are phasing out as an effective Europe-based system for delivering nuclear weapons. We can let time do its work—here as with the British V-Bombers. We should, therefore, neither provoke needless controversy about an obsolecing program by denying aid for the production of aircraft nor needlessly enhance the status of that program by seeking French agreement regarding future uses of their intended strike air force before that force has even come into being.

4. Aid for National Programs. It follows from the basic policy described in paragraph 1 that we should not now provide aid for French national production or procurement of warheads or of the missiles to carry such warheads. If the French argue this involves discrimination between France and the UK, you may answer that:

(a) In respect of MRBM’s, our policy is symmetrical between the two countries. You may refer to Secretaries Rusk and McNamara’s statements to NATO that we would not facilitate MRBM procurement for allied forces which were not genuinely multilateral.

(b) In respect of warheads, there is an asymmetry and it is to be explained—as the French know—by historical circumstance. If there is a fault in this asymmetry it lies in what was done in 1958, rather than in what has not been done since. We do not intend to aggravate the situation by extending the special nuclear bilateral relation with the UK to new fields, or by extending it to other countries. Rather, we look to the long-term possibility that this relation may eventually be subsumed in a comparable relation with an integrated European effort.

5. Timing. The policy outlined above will, we recognize, not lead to an early and radical change in French policy. Time will be required for European-minded groups in France, which favor the multilateral over the national approach, to continue to grow in strength; for the repercussions of continuing progress toward European integration to make themselves felt; and for the difficulties, costs, and limited advantages of a national program to become more widely appreciated. While this is going on, France may or may not participate in a multilateral MRBM program; in any event, it will continue its own national program and a great many people in France will assure us that this program is here to stay.

Through this transitional period, we should bear in mind that the nuclear issue is one on which we and the French have agreed to disagree, and we should have both the tact to avoid reopening this difference and the patience to await the verdict of history upon it. We should be clear that our view of the matter reflects neither doubts as to the constancy and stability of France nor an insistence on relegating Europe to second class status. We should seek the closest and most confident relations with France in all other respects, and make clear our willingness to treat a uniting Europe as a full nuclear partner whenever it manifests the will and resources to act as such.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 123-Bohlen, Charles E. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text, but it was attached to a memorandum from Rusk to the President, dated October 16, which stated that he had approved it and that he believed it would be helpful to Bohlen. Also attached to the instruction was a 5-line memorandum for Rusk, stating that he had given Bohlen oral instructions on the general nature of his mission and now wanted to add specific instructions on the nuclear issue.