Office of the Historian

58. Memorandum of Conversation0

Washington, January 16, 1963, 3 p.m.

SUBJECT

  • European Integration

PARTICIPANTS

  • Italy
    • Amintore Fanfani, Prime Minister of the Italian Republic
    • Sergio Fenoaltea, Ambassador of Italy
    • Edoardo Martino, Director General of Political Affairs
    • Giovanni Fornari, Director General of Political Affairs
    • Carlo Marchiori, Foreign Policy Advisor to the Prime Minister
    • Umberto La Rocca, Chief of Secretariat to the Under Secretary
    • Giuseppe Bartolomei, Chief of Secretariat to the Prime Minister
    • Gian Luigi Milesi Ferretti, Italian Minister
  • United States
    • The Secretary
    • Under Secretary Ball
    • Under Secretary McGhee
    • Mr. Bell, Administrator, AID
    • Ambassador Reinhardt
    • Assistant Secretary Tyler
    • Mr. Francis E. Meloy, Jr., Director, WE
    • Mr. Samuel R. Gammon, WE, Italian Desk

The Secretary stated that he did not wish to detail the U.S.’s distress at de Gaulle’s press conference. However, on the topic of European unity, he wished to state that the current troubles within the Soviet bloc give us a chance to write a new chapter in developing the strength and unity of the West. We had supposed the UK application to enter the EEC was a great chance to enlarge this unity and to build toward a new Atlantic partnership as described by President Kennedy in his speech last July 4.1 On the other hand, if the West splits into factions, it gives the Kremlin great comfort and all of us serious discouragement. The Secretary expressed his worry at the effect on American public opinion if the West appears to falter, stumble, or pull back.

Asking for Prime Minister Fanfani’s comments, the Secretary stated that he presumed to say that Italy had now a chance to play an historic role at a time when others are faltering—a chance to find ways and [Page 145] means to keep up the momentum of the West’s progress toward strength and unity despite a temporary setback. The Secretary said that the U.S. feels deeply that these developments affect the quality of the Atlantic relationship. We refuse categorically to accept the false suggestion of some that it is we and not the Soviets who somehow threaten Western Europe or are trying to swallow it. The U.S. wants partners. Our one million men in uniform in every continent want to return home. The Secretary asked Prime Minister Fanfani whether at this crossroads the rest of us might move ahead without one or two members or whether the present situation was a genuine crisis in which we could not move ahead without the participation of all countries.

Prime Minister Fanfani stated frankly that de Gaulle’s speech had exceeded his worst expectations and had surprised many people. He had feared such an attitude by de Gaulle and on the previous Saturday, through the French Ambassador, had passed on to de Gaulle Italy’s concern and modest advice toward moderation. The result had not been very encouraging, even though Italy’s opinion had been sought. Nevertheless, it might have been worse without this advice. Even before de Gaulle’s press conference, the Prime Minister had told Italy’s Ministers at Brussels, Messrs. Colombo and Rumor, by telephone to press on to find a solution which would result in the UK’s admission to the EEC. Prime Minister Fanfani asserted that he would not let himself become discouraged over external acts. Minister Colombo had also been authorized to pass on Italy’s views to Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak who had solicited them. These views appeared to be shared by representatives of all five countries at Brussels. It was feared that French Foreign Minister Couve might be bringing a veto to Brussels that very day, but the Prime Minister, though concerned, did not think this likely. He hoped that a solution to individual technical problems might bring a joint EEC agricultural solution acceptable to the UK and within the EEC principles which would allow gradual conversion of the UK system and would also protect Prime Minister Macmillan at the polls.

Concerning financial problems, German Foreign Minister Schroeder had told the Italian Foreign Minister that in the UK-EEC negotiations Germany favored a solution which would satisfy France. Italy counted on, and hoped that we would assist, the UK in making some practical concessions on this topic to create a new situation which would permit de Gaulle to accept it and escape from the impasse created by his press conference.

Replying to the Secretary’s question, Prime Minister Fanfani asserted that the UK must show a new attempt to evolve in this direction. If the UK really wanted it, if Macmillan could act in this way before elections, and if it would not alarm British labor, Britain could perhaps take a less critical attitude. In that case—perhaps not now but in February—it [Page 146] might be possible to find an acceptable solution. In the meantime, if de Gaulle can see that his fears of American hegemony in the UK and in Europe are exaggerated, well and good.

Under Secretary Martino then took up the question of UK-EEC negotiations. He pointed out that the European group in the European Parliament at Strasbourg was unanimously in favor of UK entry, favoring particularly its effect on the political balance in Europe. Italy also accepts this viewpoint at face value. Foreign Minister Piccioni, he said, was now endeavoring in Brussels to obtain a successful outcome in the negotiations. Mr. Martino added that Italy strongly favored UK entry into Europe and also welcomed President Kennedy’s concept of Atlantic partnership. These two developments would lead to even greater political stability and would guarantee peace in the world. If accomplished quickly, they would be deeply positive factors for peace. Even the Soviets now see that the EEC is not a threat to the peace but rather an element of balance in the world.

The intention of the six in developing the EEC was to build a tool for harmony and peace and a better world. Without the UK in it, the EEC would become a weakening or divisive factor. This is why Italy favored British participation in a greater Europe.

The Prime Minister concluded by suggesting that the discussion be continued at dinner.2

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 375.700/1–1663. Secret. Drafted by Gammon and approved in U on January 23 and in S on January 24. The meeting was held in the Under Secretary’s Conference Room.↩
  2. For text of this speech, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962, pp. 537–539.↩
  3. No record of any further discussion has been found.↩