Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

59. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Missions⁰

Washington, January 19, 1963, 8:57 p.m.

1277. Paris for Embassy and USRO. Brussels and Luxembourg for Embassy and USEC. US foreign policy towards Europe rests on two premises. One, the inexorable move toward closer European unity and integration and, two, increasingly close, cooperative relations between this Europe and the United States. In this movement toward the growing unity of the West, there may well be temporary diversions which challenge both our patience and ingenuity. We are, however, firmly convinced of the inevitability of a more closely knit Atlantic partnership. Man’s achievements in science and technology, which can be used for constructive as well as destructive purposes, give the contradiction to the presumed ability of the leading nations of the West to act for their own narrow self-interest.

We believe Europe will not be turned away from the progress and prosperity these relationships make possible, but will move closer together and join with us in a common approach to common problems.

In view of the current situation in Europe resulting from de Gaulle’s public reaffirmation of views long known to be held and the difficulties which now confront the negotiations for British membership in the EEC, the Department believes it important to reiterate the above views in official and non-official contacts.

In addition to the general policy background outlined above specific points listed below should be used.

1. US foreign policy is guided by judgment that in fundamental sense security and progress of Western Europe and US are indivisible. Specifically, defense of Western Europe is the defense of the US, and in our view, the reverse is equally true for Europe. Neither area can go it alone without imperiling survival and progress of both. This applies to security, economic and political action. We see the course of history in the Atlantic area moving irresistibly toward closer integration.

2. In our constant and unswerving post-war support for European integration we have always envisaged full British participation as essential to the process of unity. Further the UK can perform a uniquely constructive role in the developing Atlantic Partnership.

3. Our policies are based on the hard realities of geography, history and common interests. It is in recognition of these realities that the US provided Europe tremendous and critical support under the Marshall Plan; gave full support from the beginning to the movement for closer economic and political integration in Europe, including the Common Market; continues to maintain in Europe 400,000 troops and has committed its full military power in support of the defense of Europe. US policy will continue as it has for 17 years and not be deflected by short-term developments or attitudes.

4. Nassau and post-Nassau proposals for a NATO multilateral force are also direct results of long-term US policy and explicit recognition that nuclear defense of North Atlantic area is indivisible. Proposals at Nassau designed to begin the process of increasing European participation in nuclear defense. By building upon the letter and spirit of these proposals, the Alliance can avoid the ineffective and dangerous consequences which would flow from the creation of small national nuclear forces. To imply that Nassau constitutes a turn away from Europe is a gross distortion of the intent of the agreement.

5. The crisis arising out of the UK-Six negotiations may raise questions about the continued effectiveness of the Common Market, ECSC and Euratom as viable European institutions. We do not hold this view. For reasons stated above we believe the historical imperatives that led to the creation of European integration remain: The US for its part will continue to work to the maximum feasible extent with these institutions.FYI. There will of course be speculation whether French intransigence will carry over to calculated use of the Community institutions for narrow, national French purposes. We see no merit at this juncture in anticipating this as an inevitable development or in fact in discussing now the kinds of actions that might be taken should this situation develop. End FYI.

In summary, there is no change in broad direction of US policy. Nor do we believe there will be a long term change in European moves toward integration. Immediate events, regardless of how serious they are in fact or appearance, cannot long delay this trend. The immediate next steps in Europe are a matter for the Europeans themselves. It is their economic growth and defensive capability which are at stake. They should understand that the US as in the past, stands ready to assist and work with them in maintaining their security and prosperity.

FYI. It would be counterproductive to US policy to enter into a public dispute with de Gaulle and therefore any comments on the French action should be limited to the above. End FYI.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.40/1–1963. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Cleveland and Freedman (EUR); cleared with Schaetzel, Ball, P, RPM, WE, and the White House; and approved by Tyler. Sent to Ottawa and 18 missions in Europe.