60. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany0
1698. Following based on uncleared memcon:
[Page 149]Ambassador Knappstein called on Secretary this afternoon to transmit copy of letter from Chancellor to President (text in immediately following telegram) which he had delivered to President few hours earlier.1
Knappstein commented that while he had felt he was delivering good news to President, latter had expressed disappointment over Chancellor’s letter and had in fact been quite outspoken to point of suggesting he considered Franco-German Treaty signed in Paris Jan 22 “an unfriendly act” on FedRep’s part. According Knappstein, President had said he was disappointed that only a week after de Gaulle press conference FedRep should embrace de Gaulle. Knappstein said he had pointed out that principles of treaty had been agreed to long ago and that date of signing merely coincidental. (Secretary interjected that date might not have been coincidence from French point of view at least insofar as timing of de Gaulle press conference was concerned.)
According Knappstein, President had stressed to him that US had consistently fought off de Gaulle’s idea of tripartite directorate because of our desire to protect interests of FedRep and had gone on to express disappointment that latter had now concluded a directorate with France. Knappstein said he had taken line that no directorate was involved but only principle of mutual consultation in which FedRep would retain complete liberty of independent decision. Furthermore it was now necessary under terms of treaty for France to consult with FedRep before taking major decisions; this would give FedRep opportunity to present its own viewpoint, which in fact coincided with those of US on all issues of importance including Nassau accords and UK accession to Common Market.
Knappstein commented to Secretary that based on preliminary reports he had received first beneficial effect of treaty was already being felt since it appeared de Gaulle had acceded to Chancellor’s request in Paris that UK accession issue be kept alive by procedure of commission study of points of agreement and disagreement.
Knappstein also said President had impliedly charged FedRep with taking sides with France against US and had made several references this connection to New York Times article of Jan 21. Knappstein told [Page 150] Secretary he wished to stress most emphatically that FedRep had made no choice between France and US because they believed “the two things went together”. Chancellor and all Germans after centuries of conflict regarded reconciliation with France as of vital importance but it would be suicide for Germans to take sides with France against US.
Secretary said he agreed it was fundamental to bring about Franco-German reconciliation and this was in fact a great historical achievement. As concerned Chancellor’s letter, he found it encouraging on the specific points commented therein on. Issue which really concerned us at this time (and this was not just a matter affecting the US) was where center of gravity of policy was going to be in this relationship. Over last 3–4 years de Gaulle had been pursuing broad role of abstention from affairs of Western community (for example French engaged in minimum participation in NATO, their participation in UN proceedings was at a minimum, they were not filling their chair in current disarmament discussions, they had been a minority of one out of fifteen in NATO on the Berlin issue, they had threatened to resign their commitments to SEATO). If center of gravity of policy making in new Franco-German relationship were to shift to Paris, there would be serious problems ahead. Over past years our friends in Bonn had repeatedly asked us for reassurances. Now in fact things had shifted somewhat to point where we might wish reassurance from the Germans. We needed to understand where we were going.
Knappstein commented that FedRep’s vital interests were closer to those of US than to France, and opportunity was presented here for FedRep to help get de Gaulle out of his current isolationism. Secretary replied that if things worked out that way we would welcome it but this had unfortunately not been our experience of how consultation with de Gaulle worked. We had for example learned more about his thinking from his press conference than from months of diplomatic discussions. However to extent that German policy could be sustained vis-à-vis French he agreed this would have important influence on situation.
Knappstein reiterated that first effect of such influence had already been felt in de Gaulle’s reported agreement not to close door on discussions on UK accession to Common Market. Franco-German treaty did in fact afford Germans excellent opportunity to work on de Gaulle. He would be very happy if President could see this possibility.
Secretary said he thought it would be wise to adopt position of wait-and-see as to how things worked out under the treaty. We could evaluate the situation better when we saw more clearly where center of gravity of policymaking would rest. Meanwhile there was absolutely no argument over point re beneficial effect of French-German reconciliation.
[Page 151]In conclusion Secretary asked Ambassador to seek clarification from Foreign Office regarding clause in Franco-German treaty making it applicable to Berlin. We would have to study this matter within context our reserved powers in Berlin. We were not sure that as one of the powers involved we would like to have Berlin Senat ratify this treaty, since it was questionable whether we could accept this kind of special bilateral interest in Berlin.
FYI. Contrary to Knappstein report to Secretary the President did not refer to New York Times Reston article of January 21. However, President did express concern over meaning of reference to “private consultation” outside NATO by France and Germany bilaterally on NATO matters. End FYI.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 651.62A/1–2363. Secret; Priority; Eyes Only. Drafted by Creel (GER) and cleared with EUR and in substance with Bundy.↩
- Knappstein met with the President from 11:30 a.m. to 12:10 p.m. (Kennedy Library, President’s Appointment Books) and with Rusk for 30 minutes at 2 p.m. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book), but no other record of these conversations has been found. In the letter Adenauer informed the President that he had signed the Franco-German treaty, which he believed would promote the unification of Europe and strengthen the whole free world, and that he would continue to support “vigorously” the British application for membership in the Common Market. (Telegram 1701 to Bonn, January 24; Department of State, Central Files, 651.62A/1–2463) For text of the Treaty, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 486–488.↩