61. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany0

1712. Brussels also for Embassy. Paris inform USRO. Next crucial phase of UK-Six affair is January 28 Foreign Ministers meeting at which decision will be taken on future of negotiations. This decision, though technically procedural, will probably be determining. We must therefore concentrate on insuring decision which will bring negotiations to rapid conclusion; this is probably last crisis in negotiations, and if it passes without conclusion, negotiations liable to peter out with no clear assignment of responsibility.

We understand Germans will probably propose at Monday meeting procedure whereby EEC Commission would be asked take stock of issues in negotiations. In our view success requires that two elements be added to proposal, and that “five” insist on adoption of entire proposal with no dilution. Two additional elements are (1) on basis assessment of situation Commission be charged with job of bringing forward specific proposals on basis of which agreement can be rapidly concluded; and (2) that charge by the Ministers to the Commission contain early deadline for concluding the study and recommendations.

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Seems clear that in Paris meetings de Gaulle agreed with Chancellor to avoid spectacular breakdown negotiations. Seems equally clear from Embassy Paris reporting that French will do everything they can to prevent decision on above lines which would vitiate their ability to draw out negotiations while avoiding responsibility for breakdown. Presumably French efforts will be addressed to limiting Commission to report on issues or even on “feasibility” of a seven-nation community, with no deadlines and with later resumption of negotiations subject to French veto.

However, our judgment is that if other five hold firm to proposal along lines second paragraph above, and Germans make absolutely clear they will accept nothing else, de Gaulle may be induced to yield. Firmness of German position at all levels is therefore key to situation, but others must also play their role.

Action:

For Bonn: Separate instruction in preparation for possible further approach to Chancellor.1 In meantime, however, you should approach Erhard and Schroeder and make clear we consider they hold key to situation and everything depends on their taking the initiative in Brussels on above line, and holding absolutely firm. Our intervention should be explained on ground our serious concern over effect recent events on Western unity and consequences of appearance Western disarray on Soviet calculations re Berlin and other danger points, and our conviction that only rapid successful conclusion UK-EEC negotiations can restore that unity.

For Embassy Brussels: You should explain our view situation to Spaak, and urgently request him to give full support to proposed formula. Whatever his reservations about French motives (which we share), a common position of five on a practical proposal is key to success on Monday, and we hope he will play usual constructive role in achieving it and in persuading Germans to take the lead. You may also say we are convinced that if given this mandate Commission will use it constructively to move negotiations towards a successful conclusion.

For London: You should approach Heath, explain our thinking as above, and express our judgment that (1) British should accept suggested procedure without quibbling on details; and (2) they should be prepared to help Commission by putting forward to it their last concessions. This is moment of truth and we believe Heath aware of fact.

For Rome, Hague, Luxembourg: You should take whatever action you feel appropriate to help bring about common front on proposed procedure and to persuade your clients to stiffen German position along these [Page 153] lines. Last opportunity may be bilateral talks with German delegation in Brussels on Sunday.

For USEC: You should see Hallstein and impress on him importance we attach to rapid success conclusion negotiations using line of argument suggested in instructions for Bonn above. You should urge him insure that Commission stand solidly with “five” in favor broad terms of reference and deadline, and be prepared act promptly if mandate received. We have been disturbed by rumor Commission might take as long as two months to make report; in our view this much delay could be disastrous to success negotiations and we count on Hallstein and his colleagues be prepared move much faster than this.

Rusk
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 375.42/1–2463. Confidential. Drafted by Cleveland, cleared in substance with Schaetzel, and approved by Ball. Also sent to Rome, Brussels Busec, The Hague, London, and Luxembourg, and repeated to Paris.
  2. No instruction along these lines has been found.