Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

62. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the European Communities⁰

Washington, January 28, 1963, 9:53 p.m.

Busec 312. Eyes only Ambassador from Secretary. Brussels for Ambassador Tuthill, Please deliver following personal message from Secretary to Foreign Minister Schroeder prior to meeting tomorrow morning:

“We have been giving the most careful and anxious consideration to the underlying causes of the present crisis in Europe. We cannot escape the conclusion that one government is proposing to deny British entry into Common Market because of a historic relation between the United Kingdom and the US and as a part of a calculated policy to eliminate the American presence in Europe and the intimacy of trans-Atlantic relations. This runs directly counter to the most elementary notions underlying the NATO Alliance, namely, that the defense of Western Europe and of North America is indivisible and that the vitality of the Alliance depends upon mutual confidence on both sides of the Atlantic.

We have regarded the problems between the UK and the European Community as matters to be resolved by the participants. We have from the beginning recognized the possibility that these negotiations might fail through an inability to agree on a wide range of economic and technical problems which affect the daily lives of the citizens of the countries involved. It is obvious, however, that such negotiations have not failed. Instead, in the very prospect of success, one government is seeking to halt them on grounds which seem to us to be a part of a campaign to break up the North Atlantic Alliance. These present decisions are essentially for Europe to make, and particularly concern the Federal Republic, but if this negotiation should fail on the grounds mentioned above, there would result a most serious injury to Western cohesion in cooperation across the Atlantic. I would be strongly opposed to any developments which would set in motion events which could separate the two sides of the Atlantic and lead to the exposure of Europe to pressures from the East which it cannot possibly withstand alone.

I am sending you this message because I know that you understand what present decisions mean for Europe as a whole and that you do not wish to see the very heart of the free world weakened by decisions now to be taken. We fully appreciate the difficulty of your position in facing a possible choice between two great objectives of German policy, namely, European and Atlantic unity and cordial and closer relations with France. I send you this message to express my full personal appreciation for your own attitude in these difficult days. I am fully aware of the complexities you face but I wanted you to know that we have a deep appreciation for the transcendent issues which are of the deepest concern to all of us.”¹

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 375.42/1–2863. Secret; Niact. Drafted and initialed by Rusk and cleared with Ball, Tyler, and the President. Repeated to Bonn.
1. On January 29 Tuthill reported that he had met with Schroeder shortly before the 9 a.m. meeting with his Common Market colleagues. Schroeder read the message from Rusk and said: “I agree with every word.” The Foreign Minister also told Tuthill that he was not optimistic about the negotiations with the United Kingdom, but would do everything he could to keep the French from obscuring the reasons or responsibilities for their failure. (Ibid., 375.42/1–2963)