178. Memorandum for the Record0
SUBJECT
- Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting with the President, February 28, 1963—Force Strengths in Europe
The President pointed out to the Joint Chiefs that we must now examine the question of “how much we can reduce our forces in Europe in the next twelve months.”
The President stated that by the time we have the NATO meeting in Ottawa in May we must have some specific plan in this regard. He feels [Page 517] that it is incongruous for us to be planning on ninety days of conventional warfare in Europe when the other allies have such varied capabilities of four to thirty days. He mentioned that Secretary McNamara is working on a reduction of the “backup.” He mentioned that the French, acting up as they are, and Lord Mountbatten’s promotion of a “plate glass” concept, it did look like an appropriate time for us to reconsider our position. Fundamentally, the question is this: If no one else is going to do it, why should we? The President feels that May would be a likely time for us to face our allies with our decisions on the matter.
General Wheeler pointed out some of the dangers inherent in a heavy reduction of forces. We might entice the Russians to take a venture like Cuba. They might be tempted to seize Hamburg or Munich. This is the hostage city concept. There was conceivable discussion about the doubt of the Europeans of our will and determination to defend Europe, and that if they seized a city like Hamburg or Munich, a doubt that we would ever use nuclear weapons to force the Soviet Union back.
The President pointed out to the Joint Chiefs that there was also a great danger of doubt in the Soviet Union about whether or not we would use nuclear weapons and that it would be unlikely that the Soviet Union, with this doubt in their minds, would take up a venture such as the seizure of a city in Western Germany. The President expressed in no uncertain terms that de Gaulle has money and not much else on his side and that it is absolutely essential for us to protect our monetary position. Otherwise, we might be so poor that we would have to withdraw everywhere, not just reduce our forces in Europe. He challenged the Joint Chiefs to think in terms of using our military strength to get an economic adjustment that, in the long run, would protect our interests vis-à-vis our allies. The President stated that as far as he could see right now, Europe was probably about eighth on our list of dangers. The President assured the Joint Chiefs that we should do more than they do in Europe, but not so much more as we are doing now.
General Taylor said that this was the area to explore. One point is that we are giving a great deal of direct support to the allies for which we do not charge them. We furnish manpower and money to pipelines and other support operations which have grown up over the years when they desperately needed it, and it is time to examine this area to see how much money we could get from them. The President pointed out that we lose money via tourists, a factor which is almost impossible to control. We lose via investments and these we are doing something about. This leaves us only the military as our major expenditure in Europe. Eventually we will have to confront them with the fact that either they must pay or we will have to cut back.
Strategically, the President said that the Joint Chiefs are faced with this problem: if others aren’t going to do their conventional tasks, we [Page 518] should examine our own to see that it makes sense. He stated that he felt that we were caught by habit in Europe in our thinking of our support and force levels. He directed the Joint Chiefs to think of this problem in terms of the funds available to us vis-à-vis our really pressing dangers. He pointed out to them his own grave doubt that our most pressing dangers are now in Europe. He gave as an example the danger of the Chinese Communists taking India and the whole subcontinent of Asia while all our money was being directed toward the support of Europe and a conventional war, which would more than likely not occur.
Except for the specific decision on the Berlin garrison, the President gave them no other guidelines but left the clear impression that the Joint Chiefs were to come up with a reappraisal of the conventional force structure in Europe, including our own, in time for specific government proposals for the NATO meeting in Ottawa in May.