Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

179. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, March 6, 1963, noon.

SUBJECT

• NATO Matters

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• Mr. Stikker, Secretary-General of NATO
• Elbridge Durbrow, U.S. Representative to NAC
• George S. Vest, Staff Aide
• J. Robert Schaetzel, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Atlantic Affairs

The President welcomed the Secretary General and asked him to comment on some of the major problems which the Alliance would face in the next 12 months.

The Secretary General said that as a result of Brussels there was an evident need to make progress. He himself had not favored the rather vindictive position taken by Spaak and did not believe there should be a slowdown in the Common Market. He thought we should keep in mind the possibilities in GATT and also the fact that there will be an opportunity for the other five members of the Common Market to make progress in 1965 in the field of outside tariffs. The key thing was to go on with whatever progress was possible.

In the field of political consultation NATO had just had an excellent presentation by Assistant Secretary Martin on the Latin American situation and it would be useful to have further exchanges. He had talked to Mr. Rostow about some of Rostow’s ideas as to how political consultation could be improved; he was worried about any development which would not maintain the Council as the center of things and so he would not want to move fast along some of the lines advocated by Mr. Rostow.

In the field of defense, as Secretary General, he had to keep in mind the whole picture of NATO’s defense needs, which included the Interallied Force, the Mixed-Manned Force and conventional forces. He had to keep in mind how the available funds might be divided, because after all Finance Ministers would look at it just that way.

As for the Nassau communiqué, he urged that the US should cooperate in moving ahead with para. 6 or the Interallied Force just as rapidly as with the para. 8 or Multilateral or Mixed-Manned Force. As they knew, he had always favored the MLF. It was needed to meet the needs of an evolving Europe and particularly of Germany and Italy. Countries like these two needed to be included in the nuclear world and at the moment they, as well as a number of other European countries, did not have sufficient knowledge of nuclear facts and nuclear planning. To the extent that there was ignorance or dissatisfaction in these countries, de Gaulle could play on nationalism. Nationalism was always latent in France, but now it was blatant. Frenchmen who used to discuss subjects objectively were now falling into line solidly behind de Gaulle positions; he regretted that it reminded him of similar episodes which he could recall in the early Hitler days in Germany.

The President noted that after years of difficulty France was finally back in the world of power and prosperity, but de Gaulle’s focus is entirely on France and not on Europe. He talks about the French nuclear force, not a European force; and if you followed de Gaulle’s reasoning to its logical end, we would come to a situation where each country would want its own national deterrent, with all the dangers which this entails for Europe as a whole. He suggested that de Gaulle was not offering Europe very much.

The Secretary General said that in talking to de Gaulle he once asked him: if you had the bomb, could you assure me that you would use it for the rest of Europe. De Gaulle had replied No.

The French were going to go on being difficult, he thought, but there was an area in which the other members of WEU could exert some pressure; namely, under the Brussels Treaty the level of atomic stocks that any one of the partners can hold on the mainland of Europe has to be decided by a majority vote of the WEU Council. This was something to keep in mind, especially since what France did in the field could have its repercussions on later developments in Germany.

On the subject of Germany he thought that the West had been fortunate in the emergence of Schroeder and von Hassel, the latter, although new, seemed to be a good man too.

The President commented that von Hassel had made an excellent impression on his recent visit to Washington.

The President asked how the Merchant presentation had gone. Mr. Stikker said it had been a good one; it began in a quiet vein and this was the right way to start.¹ The President said that the US hoped to begin with the Mixed-Manned Force. This naturally had its limitations initially, but it still had the potential to grow into a European deterrent in due course, but it could not start on this basis. One could not now, for instance, answer the question, “Who decides for Europe?”. The President suggested that the first objective was to get the force at sea as an important symbolic move.

The Secretary General agreed, but said that it might take some time to get this force organized and in the meantime there were other things that could be done right away, such as the Interallied Force. The President asked what it was that could be done right away.

The Secretary General explained that there were three components of the Interallied Force which derived from para. 6 of the Nassau communiqué:

1. Pretargeted tactical weapons,

2. U.K. Bomber Command and the U.S. equivalent,

3. U.S. Polaris subs replacing Jupiters.

The first two elements existed at the moment and so it should be possible to move ahead rapidly in organizing them into an existing force. In doing so it would not be necessary to give too many rights or to introduce changes of command, but at least the work could begin.

On the MLF he thought he could predict the European response along the following lines: Cooperation and financial contribution from Germany and Italy; some money and a base from the Netherlands; interest but little money from Belgium; and finally possibly something from the Canadians. He believed the Canadian attitude was definitely changing and had heard indirectly, from recent conversations in London, that Diefenbaker and Churchill were looking into the possibility of nuclear arms for the 8 squadrons of F104—G’s which were based in Europe for NATO. If this first step were taken, he then thought the second and third would follow for NORAD and perhaps MLF.

The President interjected that the US would have to be very careful not to step in in any way during this preelection period.

The Secretary General thought that it was a poor idea to stress the rule of unanimity to a Mixed-Manned Force. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] For his part, he hoped that the members of the force would be willing to delegate the responsibilities for its use to four people, the US President, the Prime Minister of the UK, the Prime Minister of Italy and the Chancellor of Germany. There was some chance that this idea might be accepted.

The President asked if the group would decide on the basis of unanimity?

The Secretary General continued his explanation that, although he could see some cause for worry about other governments in the future, he was not worried about the US 10 years hence. The US, he thought, would not refuse if the European allies asked that the force be used because if it did so, the European countries would rush to Moscow. It was possible that there could be developed slowly an acceptance of the idea of a system of weighted voting. This would ease US Congressional attitudes; the practical result would be that no one European country would initiate the use of the force or could veto its use when it was needed. Once the European officials and authorities were more familiar with all aspects of the nuclear world, such a system might be acceptable. However, the nuclear secrecy of the US, while understandable, had been a major cause for the malaise in the European partners of the Alliance. This was of course notably true of the French, but in other capitals as well he encountered from time to time the complaint of chiefs of staff and other officials that they did not know what their own forces were to do in case of war.

[1 paragraph (6 lines of source text) not declassified]

The President suggested that the United States saying “no” was not the problem of control. In any event he said he wanted to wait until Ambassador Merchant returned from Europe and review the situation in light of his report. He also said he did not want to take up the difficult questions that must be resolved with the Congress until the general situation was clearer.

President Kennedy asked what would have happened if the US had assisted de Gaulle a few years ago in his nuclear program. The Secretary General said that if de Gaulle had had atomic weapons it would have made no difference; he would not have been more helpful in NATO. He would have wanted the veto for himself but he would not have wanted anyone else to have it. His motivation is French nationalism pure and simple.

President Kennedy said that the debates in the atomic area are rather like arguments in a rich man’s club; while we discussed nuclear sharing, the rest of the world stood around hungry and waiting. There was an enormous aid job to be done and the US would like to coordinate aid activities among the members of this club. The Secretary General pointed out that it had to be recognized that France was doing a very large job in the aid field although in a specialized area. The President agreed but said that it was very difficult to coordinate anything with the French. While on the subject of French expenditures, the Secretary General noted that France has had to reorganize its army, which takes time and money; officers have had to be shifted and it is a difficult and expensive undertaking.

The President explained that, after talking to Admiral Rickover, he had concluded that the Polaris submarine as contrasted with reactor technology was so advanced in relation to the Soviets, that it might well have raised excessive problems with Congress to make it the base for the Mixed-Manned Force. He described the virtues of a Polaris surface force with considerable enthusiasm: The surface ship was safer mechanically. There were less US problems politically with Congress since the Polaris sub is an extraordinarily vital development for US security. The surface force was not vulnerable as was evidenced by the 2-1/2 days the US spent searching for the Santa Maria in friendly waters.² It could be more rapidly produced than submarines and could be built in Europe. Mixed-manning would be simpler, and physical command and communication would be easier.

The Secretary General said that he had received a good briefing from Admiral Ricketts the day before and found it even more convincing than he had expected.

The President observed that the Polaris MLF would be linked with the external US nuclear force. The Soviets would not strike at the MLF alone since it would be 40% US manned and the US would certainly be immediately involved. Hence the MLF would be an essential additional element to the indivisible defense for the West; and if the Soviets touched it, it would thus initiate general war.

The President asked Dr. Stikker for his reaction to General Norstad’s suggestions regarding a control body. The Secretary-General replied that triumvirate control would not work and went on to refine his own thoughts somewhat. He explained that Belgium had indicated, for example, that it might be willing to allow a smaller executive group to decide the use of the force by simple majority. In such a case he thought the Dutch would follow suit and thereafter it would be most unlikely that the Greeks and Turks could ask for a better status since, if they participated, they would do so chiefly on the basis of outside financial assistance. Canada, which was beginning to show some interest, would, he thought, follow the same path. The result was, he thought, a fair chance that the members of the Mixed-Manned Force might agree to delegate authority to the US, UK, Germany and Italy. In that connection he agreed with the thought advanced by General Norstad that the Secretary General should be included but without a vote.

The President commented that there was a widespread myth in America that there was a single entity called Europe and de Gaulle spoke for it. The Secretary General said that this was totally wrong of course. Europe would not accept such a situation. The President said perhaps this was a point which would emerge when the Secretary General spoke to the press. He thought that it was an excellent idea that a distinguished European would be in a position to set the record straight.

President Kennedy said that the US was watching carefully the evolution of trade negotiations between the US and Europe. If the US was not able to maintain markets there, if it should be locked out of Europe or if it was not earning as much as it now does, then the US would certainly have to do something about it, perhaps a withdrawal of some sort from Europe or a cut in activities in India and elsewhere, actions which were really contrary to the national interest. He hoped there was some comprehension of these considerations in Europe.

The President went on to say that it would be helpful if the Secretary-General could, in the course of his public statements, say a “few kind words” about the multilateral force. He observed that splitting the atom politically was more difficult than physically.

The Secretary General concluded with a final emphatic plea that the US not hold back in moving forward on all aspects of the Nassau communiqué where possible.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, Def 4 NATO. Secret. Drafted by Schaetzel and approved by the White House on March 19. The meeting was held at the White House. For Stikker’s account of the conversation, see Men of Responsibility, pp. 375–377. Memoranda of his conversation on NATO questions with Tyler on March 4 and with Rusk and Rostow on March 5 are in Department of State, Central Files, Def 4 NATO; a memorandum of his conversation with Hillenbrand on Berlin on March 5 is ibid., NATO 8–3. Memoranda of his conversations on NATO military matters with McNamara on March 7 and Rusk on March 8 are ibid., Def 12 NATO.
1. Reports on Merchant’s presentation to the North Atlantic Council on February 27 were transmitted in Poltos 1067 and 1068, February 28, ibid., Pol 7 US/Merchant.
2. See footnote 2, Document 342.