Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

176. Memorandum From President Kennedy to the Members of the MLF Negotiating Delegation⁰

Washington, February 21, 1963.

MEMORANDUM FOR

• Ambassador Livingston T. Merchant
• The Honorable Gerard C. Smith
• Rear Admiral J.M. Lee, USN

1. I instruct you, under the general direction of the Secretary of State, as a matter of urgency

(a) to investigate, through consultation within the NATO framework in Paris and in appropriate NATO capitals by direct discussion with interested governments, the possibility of an international arrangement along the lines set forth in the Steering Group report of February 7, 1963 (IND/P/7).¹

(b) if two or more other governments display the necessary interest, to negotiate a Preliminary Agreement along the lines set forth in paragraph 14 of that paper.

2. You should be guided by the following additional considerations:

(a) You should pursue the line taken in U.S. presentations to the North Atlantic Council in 1962 which indicated the substantial advantages and therefore the clear U.S. preference for surface ships for an initial multilateral force, a preference confirmed by further studies in Washington.

(b) U.S. policy regarding the U.S. share of financing of the force and other relevant financial and hardware elements on which allied views are expressed will be reviewed in the light of your reports.

(c) The control of this force is a subject for final settlement in the Preparatory Commission—which is the stage at which countries will be called upon to put up sizeable funds. But obviously you will have to discuss this issue in general terms in exploring a preliminary agreement. In these conversations you should proceed as follows:

(i) You should offer the concept of a committee made up of at least the larger participants in the MLF, which would decide on firing by unanimity. It could act on other issues by less than unanimity.

(ii) You should not hesitate to press the concept of unanimity on the war issue as the tradition of NATO. You should argue our belief that no major participant will wish to abandon the right to approve a NATO decision for nuclear war, and you should emphasize that unanimity offers equal control to all major participants and does not simply perpetuate a U.S. monopoly. You should ask our friends to consider whether in fact they would ever wish to send off a NATO force if the strategic nuclear forces of the U.S. were being withheld.

(iii) You should seek to ascertain from our allies their views as to a desirable control formula. You should state that if our allies favor some system other than (i), we shall of course consider any alternatives they have in mind.

(iv) You should point out that any initial arrangements reached by the Preparatory Commission about control, as about other aspects of the force, could of course be re-examined and reopened as we all gain experience with the MLF. If our allies thus feel that they need not regard the initial control arrangement as immutable, they may be the more willing to settle on a unanimity control mechanism ad interim, since several years will elapse before the force takes to sea. Throughout this period, planning for the MLF will permit us to engage in serious and low key discussion with our allies about matters of strategy, targeting of nuclear forces, and similar issues, in the context of discussing the concrete problems of the MLF. If properly exploited, this opportunity may yield with time a consensus on strategic views and the interdependence of all nuclear and other allied forces, which will have a constructive effect on their attitudes toward the control issue.

3. In the interest of promoting NATO solidarity, you should seek maximum support within NATO in Paris for the concept of an MLF but seek to avoid procedural obstructions to rapid and effective progress, such as might be raised if formal NAC approval were sought for the opening of negotiations on a preliminary agreement.

4. During discussions in NATO you will assist Ambassador Finletter; on your bilateral discussions with governments you will keep him fully informed.

5. You should arrange to be kept continuously informed on negotiations arising from Paragraph 6 of the Nassau Agreement and on the development of policy decisions relating thereto in order to ensure that such negotiations are consistent with the effort to create an MLF as early as possible.

6. You should so conduct this mission as to avoid serious damage to U.S. prestige if our allies do not wish to proceed with an MLF.

7. You should keep me and as appropriate the Secretary of Defense currently informed of your progress by reports through the Secretary of State.

John F. Kennedy

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, MLF. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. An earlier draft of these instructions had been approved in principle at a meeting at the White House on February 13. (Memorandum IND/M/17, February 14; Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2218) Paragraphs 1-2b and 3–7 of the February 14 draft are the same as the source text; paragraphs 2c i-iv were not present in the draft. No other record of the meeting at the White House has been found.
1. A copy of this 6-page paper, which outlined various aspects of an integrated seaborne Polaris force, is in Kennedy Library, National Security Files, MLF.