175. Memorandum for the Record0
Those present were: The President, Ambassador Merchant, Mr. Gerard Smith, Admiral Lee, Mr. John McNaughton, and McG. Bundy.
The purpose of this meeting was to review and give final approval to instructions to Ambassador Merchant’s negotiating team. The President did review and approve these instructions in the form in which they are attached hereto.1
The President reported that he had learned from Mr. McCone of Mr. McCone’s own doubt that the submarine form of the MLF represented a significant danger from the point of view of possible penetration of U.S. reactor technology, and that he had asked the Secretary of Defense and Mr. McCone to review the matter for him. He asked Ambassador Merchant what his own plan for presentation on this matter was, and Ambassador Merchant replied that he expected to proceed in terms of a clear U.S. preference for surface ships, on a number of grounds: manageability, earlier readiness, operating economy, and the general value of a new weapons system. The President remarked that the pursuit of the Anzoategui indicated that it would not be easy to keep track of a fleet of surface missile ships.
On the control issue, the President reviewed and approved the new language in the attached paper, after revising it to insure that it did not give an implication that the U.S. would necessarily be more flexible in later discussions. The significant point about this language is that it makes no apologies for advancing and defending a position of unanimity. Mr. Smith, who has had the longest and the closest experience of what has been said to Europeans in the past on this matter, expressed his satisfaction with these instructions.
It was at this meeting that it was first made clear to the President—and this is a matter which I myself did not clearly understand before—that the plans for the MLF would require changes in the legislation affecting the custody of warheads. This matter came up as part of a discussion of Ambassador Merchant’s rather testing two hours before the Joint Committee the previous day, and the President asked whether in fact under a rule of unanimity legislative changes would be necessary. Mr. McNaughton said that there were a number of points on which indeed changes would be needed, and said that the men working on the [Page 508] MLF had reached a clear and unanimous conclusion that it would be a much more marketable enterprise if in fact there were symmetry of responsibility, so that U.S. control was exercised at the summit, like that of other participants, rather than all the way along the line in terms of a special monopolist’s relation to the warheads. The President at first appeared to feel that it might be better not to propose arrangements which would require a change in the law on custody, but after hearing strong argument from Mr. Smith and Ambassador Merchant to the effect that the political effectiveness of the proposal would be gravely compromised if there were no modification of our existing practices, and after weighing the argument that the Congress might well find modifications in the law quite acceptable as long as the principal of unanimity was maintained, he appeared to accept the proposed position. Later in the day, at his press conference,2 he confirmed and supported the position which Ambassador Merchant reported that he had taken the day before—namely, that any arrangement as important as the proposed MLF would of course be sent up for Congressional review and approval in the appropriate way.
The President repeated his frequently expressed concern for the preparation of an effective and presentable alternative in the event that the MLF did not make good progress, and it was agreed that such an alternative would have to combine the processes of consultation, participation and representation—of which Mr. Acheson is a notable advocate—with larger emphasis on the so-called paragraph 6 forces. Responsibility for prompt preparation of such a fallback position was assigned to Mr. Kitchen.3
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings with the President. Secret. Prepared by Bundy on February 23. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room.↩
- Not found attached, but printed as Document 176.↩
- For a transcript of the President’s press conference, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963, pp. 201–209.↩
- On February 25 Bruce and Thompson discussed Merchant’s instructions further with Bundy and the President. (Kennedy Library, President’s Appointment Book) According to Schaetzel, Bruce reported that the President was “still deeply worried about the multilateral force; primarily that the project might abort with subsequent discredit to the United States.” Before the United States became too deeply committed, he wanted Merchant to visit Europe, and then return to Washington for a general review of the project. (Memorandum of a telephone conversation, February 26; Department of State, Central Files, Def(MLF).↩
- Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.↩