174. Memorandum of Conversation0
PRESENT
- The President
- Secretary Rusk
- Ambassador Bruce
- Ambassador Merchant
- Mr. Walt Rostow
- Mr. Gerard Smith
- Mr. Jeffrey Kitchen
- Admiral John Lee
- Mr. John McNaughton
- Mr. McGeorge Bundy
- Mr. Carl Kaysen
SUBJECT
- The Merchant Mission and the Multilateral Force
The President opened the discussion by expressing his deep concern about the multilateral force project, and particularly the fact that the United States might be tying itself too closely to a project that might fail. He said it was his impression that the British were not for it; the French were clearly against it; and the Italians did not have a deep-seated interest in it. The Germans reportedly were interested, but once they realized how little they were getting for their money, they might look at it differently. Moreover, he wondered whether the multilateral [Page 503] force could have any real attraction unless the United States was prepared to give up its veto, and at this point he saw no justification for relinquishing the veto.
The Secretary of State said the problem at issue came right out of Germany, and how it was resolved was a matter of intense interest to the Germans as well as their neighbors. [2 lines of source text not declassified] At this juncture the alternative to the multilateral path seemed to be the development of national deterrents and proliferation. If the U.S. did not take the initiative, we could expect greater Franco-German collaboration and a considerably more complicated problem. The Secretary agreed that if the Europeans were not interested in the multilateral force, there was nothing we could do about it, but felt that because of the vital issues at stake, a try had to be made.
The President returned to the question of control, citing Ambassador Bohlen’s view that unless the United States was prepared to give on the control issue, the concept of the multilateral force would collapse [5–1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. Clearly this was not something which could be given away easily. Therefore, the multilateral force and possible alternatives had to be carefully considered. The President suggested that an alternative might be the par. 6 forces. These would not require large financial outlays, and, therefore, the Europeans would not have any real basis for insisting upon the relinquishment of U.S. control. Moreover, the principle of multilateralism could conceivably be established through the par. 6 forces.
With reference to the par. 6, Ambassador Merchant thought this could provide us with a fall-back position in the event that the MLF failed. He said it was difficult to judge the situation until we knew better what the other people wanted. His mission—which he considered a reconnaissance in force—should give us a sounder basis for assessing the depth of interest in the multilateral force than we now had. At this juncture he did not feel the U.S. needed to relinquish the veto. It could insist upon the rule of unanimity for the MLF, which in effect meant the reciprocal relinquishment of the veto by all.
The President indicated he remained concerned that we might be identifying ourselves too closely with a proposition (MLF) that might be rejected. Rather than take this risk, he thought we might better focus on some version of a multinational force, operated through an Executive Committee.
Secretary Rusk said that something more was needed since we had committed ourselves at Nassau to go the multilateral force route.
The President, however, continued to insist that the United States should not be placed in the position of attempting to force the sale of the MLF. [3 lines of source text not declassified] He did not see why the Europeans [Page 504] should have more confidence in each other than they had in us. Wasn’t there something that could be done for the Germans—who are on the front line—without giving away our control? [2 lines of source text not declassified]
Mr. Bundy interjected to say that that matter had to be looked at in a time context. He appreciated the President’s concerns but felt the multilateral force could be tied to other arrangements—monetary, economic, etc.—of importance to us, and although there were obvious dangers in relinquishing our monopoly, 10 years from now it would be difficult to see the Europeans willing to leave it all in our hands.
Secretary Rusk agreed, adding that in his view, as the Europeans looked more closely at the problem they would see the impracticability of de Gaulle’s views and join us.
Mr. Bundy said this was an important factor. However, if the Europeans rejected de Gaulle’s concepts, that was one thing; if we did, it was quite another.
The President again returned to the question of the risks in the MLF, saying he hated to see the French and the Soviets stirred up by a proposition that could flounder on the issue of the U.S. veto. The Secretary said he did not quite see the problem that way. In his view, the question was really whether or not we wanted to toss Europe into de Gaulle’s lap. And the principal antidote to de Gaulle at this time was organizing Europe along the lines of the multilateral force.
Ambassador Merchant returned to the question of the German interest in the multilateral force, saying that although he was not optimistic about the project he thought it was worth a serious try. If the multilateral force was established, it would be a major step forward in creating the kind of Atlantic Community we wanted. Moreover, he thought the Germans had a greater interest in the project than the President seemed to imply. He inclined to the view (which he said was also Ambassador Dowling’s) that the Germans would be willing to pay a lot of money for first-class citizenship and, therefore, the MLF could have real and considerable appeal for them. In any event, he felt that in a month we would have a better notion of the depth of European interest and if the MLF worked, we would have extricated the Germans from the exclusive French embrace. If it didn’t, we would have given up nothing. Future decisions were not foreclosed and, given its potential value, the MLF was worth a trial. If it failed, we could always come back to par. 6.
The President was not quite sanguine about this tactical approach. He did not want to find himself in a position of supporting a par. 6 as a fall-back proposition after an MLF failure. Rather, he preferred that the par. 6 and MLF projects be handled together so that, regardless of how it worked out, we would always end up with a multilateral force. Perhaps [Page 505] by identifying both the par. 6 forces and the MLF as multilateral arrangements, we would never be in a position of having the principle of multilateralism rejected.
Mr. Bundy thought the thing to do was to put both these proposals under a single umbrella, the basic concept being shared responsibility of the Allies.
[3 paragraphs (23 lines of source text) not declassified]
The President [2 lines of source text not declassified] went on to describe a possible framework for par. 6 forces—a U.S.-U.K. nucleus, plus an Executive Committee, with access to Omaha, minus multilaterally owned and operated ships and submarines, [less than one line of source text not declassified] And if MLF was not workable, it might be worthwhile going this route, which, at least, did not require our giving up control. The relinquishment of the veto, in his view, in effect meant an acknowledgment on our part of the fact that European interests were different from ours—and this he was not prepared to do.
Merchant said he too opposed giving up the veto at this time. He thought it most important we make clear to the Europeans that the MLF is a serious proposal which we wanted to discuss with them; that we were interested in their views; and that if they had alternative proposals, we were prepared to consider them.
The President again emphasized that although we wanted to get a multilateral force organized and to sea, we wanted to do so without giving up our control.
Mr. Rostow interjected at this point to say that he thought that, although Ambassador Bohlen accurately reflected Paris’ view of the control problem, Bonn’s view of the situation was probably very different. Rostow said he did not believe the control question was an important one for the Germans at this time. The Germans do not trust the British or the French or the Italians; in fact, what they seem to be looking for is an arrangement which would keep us, the United States, inextricably tied to them. And in this context, the control problem does not arise as an urgent issue.
In answer to the President’s question as to why the Germans then were looking for something new if they trusted us so much, Rostow said the Germans merely wanted first-class citizenship, and participation in a nuclear force was symbolic of that class of citizenship.
Still on the control problem, the Secretary said he did not feel this was an issue that would face us immediately. At best, he said, it would take us a year to succeed with the MLF, and at least two to fail. Nothing would collapse in a short term.
Mr. Bundy stressed that, in any event, we wanted to avoid a repetition of last June’s performance, in which we seemed to have had the [Page 506] worst of both possible worlds. It was important, he said, to avoid giving the impression that we did not believe what we were saying. By the same token, we did not want to be in a position of forcing a proposition on others without giving them a fair chance to question and discuss it.
In answer to the President’s question on the cost factors, Ambassador Merchant said he lacked precise figures, but his working estimates were $1.8 billion for a multilateral force of 8 submarines and a little more for a force of 25 surface ships. Merchant also thought that he had fairly impressive arguments to justify the use of surface ships in the MLF in preference to submarines. These included such factors as cost, availability, training requirements, and the fact that the surface ships could be built abroad while the submarines had to be built here, in the United States.
Insofar as his immediate schedule was concerned, Merchant said he planned to leave for Paris on Friday morning (February 22), spending a week there to discuss the MLF with NAC and the Permanent Representatives of the interested countries, and at the same time stopping in to see Couve so that the French would not feel that his principal mission was to encircle him. After Paris, he planned to go on to Rome, Brussels, possibly The Hague, and then London.
As for possible French reaction to the MLF exercise, Mr. Bundy expected the French, in the first instance, to be quite wary.
The President agreed, but thought that the moment the French latched on to the control problem they would begin to fire back. He thought that perhaps one way to deal with this problem was to explain to all interested participants that they would be better off with the MLF which would be a step forward in bringing the United States and Europe closer together and giving the Europeans a greater voice in managing the Alliance’s security problems. However, the President again cautioned against trying to over-sell the MLF and to assure the Allies that this was the cureall for all our problems. The important thing, he emphasized, was not to stick to the MLF too long if it seemed to be a losing proposition but to assure that we had a multilateral formula at hand that had a chance of success.
Insofar as Ambassador Merchant’s immediate mission was concerned, the President indicated he was prepared to issue appropriate instructions along the lines Ambassador Merchant had requested, including Ambassador Merchant’s proposals for dealing with the control question.